Daily Report

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-90-056
Thursday
22 March 1990

Daily Report
Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-90-056 *22 March 1990*

CONTENTS

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

Shevardnadze Meets With Foreign Officials on Tour *[TASS]* 1
Popov Views Third World-Soviet Ties *[NEW TIMES No 11]* 2
Adamishin Interviewed on German Unification *[TASS]* 4
VESTNIK Journal Presented at UN *[TASS]* 4

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

U.S. Urges 'Peaceful Conclusion' in Lithuania *[Moscow International]* 5
Text of Bush Congratulations to Gorbachev *[IZVESTIYA 18 Mar]* 5
More on U.S. Election Commission Chief's Visit *[IZVESTIYA 21 Mar]* 5

China

Li Peng Cited on Sino-Soviet Relations *[Moscow International]* 5
Newly Built Road Opens Between USSR, PRC *[Moscow TV]* 6
Issues Facing Chinese Parliament Examined *[IZVESTIYA 21 Mar]* 6

Northeast Asia

South Korea's Kim Yong-sam Continues Visit 7
Yakovlev Talks With Kim Yong-sam *[PRAVDA 22 Mar]* 7
Gorbachev, Kim Reportedly Meet *[Seoul Radio]* 8
YONHAP Reports Gorbachev Talks *[Seoul YONHAP]* 8
DPRK Reporters Refuse Comment *[Seoul THE KOREA TIMES 22 Mar]* 9
Commentary Explains Soviet Concerns About Asia *[Moscow International]* 9
Moscow Marks DPRK Cooperation Anniversary *[IZVESTIYA 16 Mar]* 10
Opening of Moscow-Seoul Air Routes Analyzed *[Moscow International]* 10
IZVESTIYA Profiles New MPRP Leaders *[21 Mar]* 11
PRAVDA Sums Up Mongolian Plenum Decisions *[20 Mar]* 11
Japan-USSR Association Holds Meeting 17 Mar *[Moscow International]* 12

Near East & South Asia

Najibullah Cited on Coup Attempt Backers *[PRAVDA 20 Mar]* 13
Iranian Press Treatment of Gorbachev Election *[Radio Peace and Progress]* 13
Commentator Reviews Sino-Indian Relations *[Moscow International]* 13

Sub-Saharan Africa

More Reportage of Shevardnadze's African Tour 14
Meets Nelson Mandela *[TASS]* 14
Speaks With De Klerk *[TASS]* 14
Interviewed on Namibia *[TASS]* 15
Meets Namibia's Nujoma *[TASS]* 16
Arrives in Mozambique *[TASS]* 16
PRAVDA Runs Gorbachev Message to Nujoma *[21 Mar]* 16
Gerasimov on Namibia, Cooperation With U.S. *[Moscow TV]* 16

East Europe

De Maiziere Says NATO Presence 'Not Possible' *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 22 Mar]* 17
Right-Wing 'Alliance' Seeks Abolition of GDR *[PRAVDA 21 Mar]* 17
GDR's Modrow Profiled on Eve of Elections *[SOVETSKAYA KULTURA No 10]* 18
TASS Cites SFRY Paper on Georgia, Lenin 21
Bulgaria's Lukyanov Meets Polish Senate Leader *[TASS]* 22
Lukanov Views Bulgarian Reforms, German Unity *[IZVESTIYA 21 Mar]* 22
Problems Ensuing From Hungary Pullout Assessed *[IZVESTIYA 19 Mar]* 23
Hungary's MSZMP Chairman on Party's Future *[NEW TIMES No 11]* 24
Hungarian Political Blocs' Programs Viewed *[IZVESTIYA 20 Mar]* 26
Romania's Iliescu Criticizes 'Witch-Hunt' *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 17 Mar]* 27
Interethnic Violence in Transylvania Reported *[IZVESTIYA 21 Mar]* 27

West Europe

Gorbachev Adviser on Soviet NATO Membership *[Vienna Radio]* 28
Policy Adviser Sees United Germany in NATO *[Hamburg DIE WELT 20 Mar]* 28

Latin America & Caribbean

Cuban Army Chief Cited on Anti-Cuban 'TV-Marti' *[TASS]* 30
Komplektov Receives Cuban Envoy, Castro Letter *[TASS]* 30
Cubans Rehearse Energy-Shortage Measures *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 18 Mar]* 30

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Supreme Soviet Session

Moscow TV Carries Supreme Soviet Session 21 Mar 32
Primakov Opens Session 32
Secession Law Passed 32
Union Governing Relations Viewed 33
Union Treaty Discussed 34
Supreme Soviet Further Debates Secession Law 34
Deputy Tarazevich Speaks *[Novitskaya on Moscow Radio]* 34
Law Passed After First Reading *[TASS]* 35
Secession Procedure Detailed *[Moscow Radio]* 35
Supreme Soviet Discusses Demarcation of Powers *[Moscow Radio]* 36
Union Treaty Spurs 'Heated' Debate *[TASS]* 36
Direct Presidential Rule in Lithuania Proposed *[TASS]* 37
Supreme Soviet Resolution on Land Laws Cited *[IZVESTIYA 7 Mar]* 37

Political & Social

Conclusion of 16 March CPSU Plenum Debate *[PRAVDA 20 Mar]* 38
Justice Minister Views Presidential Power *[TASS]* 56
Professor Questioned on Presidential Power *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 8 Mar]* 56
Decree States Kremlin as Presidential Residence *[TASS]* 58
First Secretary Criticizes CPSU Platform *[PRAVDA 7 Mar]* 58
Plenum Elects New Deputy From CPSU 11 Mar *[PRAVDA 12 Mar]* 59
Role of Press, Objective Reporting Discussed *[Moscow International]* 59
Lack of Anti-Pogrom Action Criticized *[NEW TIMES No 9]* 60
Railway Crime Problems Highlighted *[Moscow Radio]* 61
Petitions, Complaints Overwhelm Procuracy *[TRUD 22 Feb]* 61
MVD Chief Discusses Candidacy, Curbing Arrest *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 1 Mar]* 62
Further Reportage on Preliminary Election Results *[PRAVDA 6 Mar]* 64
Academician Considers 'Russian Chauvinism' *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 6 Mar]* 65
Islamic Leader Interviewed on Jewish Emigration *[Moscow TV]* 67
Emergencies Panel Discusses Pollution, Aral Sea *[PRAVDA 6 Mar]* 68
Meskhetian Turks Official Voices Demands *[Moscow Radio]* 68

NOVY MIR To Publish Solzhenitsyn's Works *[TASS]* 69
Vlasov Meets With Yakut Touring Theater Company *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 18 Feb]* 69

Economic

Commission To Draw Up Market Economy Laws *[AFP]* 70
Voronin Views 1990 Economic Performance *[PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK No 11]* 70

Military

Arbatov View on Military Spending Challenged *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 21 Mar]* 74
Kiev Military District Exercises Begin *[IZVESTIYA 18 Mar]* 76
Moscow TV Shows Footage 77
Defense Ministry Fined Over Phosphorous Disposal *[Moscow International]* 77
Military Leaders Sign Gen. Dementyev Obituary *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 21 Mar]* 78

REGIONAL AFFIARS

Baltic Republics

Vilnius Radio Carries 22 Mar Council Session 79
Media Committee Debated 79
Order To Surrender Weapons Discussed 79
Text of Media Law Read 79
Debates Continue 80
Reportage on Order To Hand Over Weapons 80
General Relays Order *[Vilnius Radio]* 80
Decree Termed 'Illegitimate' *[TASS]* 80
Further Landsbergis Comment *[Vilnius Radio]* 80
General Questioned *[Vilnius Radio]* 81
General Criticized *[Vilnius Radio]* 81
Supreme Council Working on Antistate Draft Law *[Moscow International]* 82
Lithuanian Party Official on Antistate Appeal *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 22 Mar]* 82
Landsbergis Rejects Secession Referendum *[Moscow International]* 83
Commentary on Support for Lithuanian Independence *[Moscow International]* 83
Lithuanians Urged To Respect, Abide by Treaties *[Moscow Radio]* 83
Christian Democrats Appeal for Trust, Unity *[Vilnius Radio]* 83
Council Urges Replacement of Media Chiefs *[Vilnius Radio]* 84
Official Discusses Visit of USSR Procurator *[Vilnius Radio]* 84
TASS Views Criminal Career of Lithuanians 84
Vilnius Radio Continues 21 Mar Council Session 85
Ministerial Functions Debated 85
Debate on Ministries 85
Landsbergis Addresses 21 Mar Supreme Council *[Vilnius Radio]* 86
PRAVDA Reports on 20 Mar Council Session *[21 Mar]* 87
Gorbachev Issues Presidential Decree on Lithuania *[TASS]* 87
'Text' of Decree *[TASS]* 87
Landsbergis Condemns Gorbachev Decree *[Vilnius International]* 88
Lithuanian Party Views Antisocialist Stances *[PRAVDA 21 Mar]* 88
Lithuanian Ethnic Groups Support Sovereignty *[Vilnius International]* 89
Council Reads Appeal to Militia Workers *[Vilnius Radio]* 89
Prunskiene Sends Telegram to Gorbachev, Ryzhkov *[Vilnius International]* 89
Supreme Council Discusses Administration *[TASS]* 90
Radio Program Heard on Shortwave Broadcasts *[Vilnius International]* 90
Lithuania's Political Position Examined *[Moscow International]* 90
Moscow Angry, Anxious About Baltic Region *[Vilnius Radio]* 91
More on Vilnius Rally Criticizing Council *[Moscow TV]* 91
Lithuanian Party Plenum Appeals to Workers *[Moscow TV]* 92
Lithuanian KGB Chief Views Current Role *[SOVETSKAYA LITVA 28 Feb]* 93
Lithuanian Delegation Visits Estonian Commission *[SOVETSKAYA LITVA 2 Mar]* 100
People's Front Leading in Estonian Election *[Moscow TV]* 101

Estonian Party Plenum Considers Elections *[Moscow Radio]* 101
Estonian Congress Issues Resolution *[MAAHLET 15 Mar* 101
Estonian Party Discusses Upcoming Congress *[TASS]* 102

Western Republics

Nationalist Party Official on Independence *[AFP]* 102
Ukrainian Oblast Leadership Changes Noted *[PRAVDA UKRAINY 11 Feb]* 103
Belorussian Front Does Well in Elections *[Moscow International]* 103
Belorussian Front Plans Independence Celebrations *[Moscow International]* 104
People's Front Disrupt Moldavian Rally *[Moscow International]* 104

Caucasus

Georgia Drops Party Role, Elections Delayed *[TASS]* 104
Air Defense Troops Appeal for Cooperation *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 10 Mar]* 104
Committee Urges Public Aid for Nagorno-Karabakh *[IZVESTIYA 20 Mar]* 105

Shevardnadze Meets With Foreign Officials on Tour

LD2103212490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1857 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] [No dateline as received]—A meeting has taken place between E.A. Shevardnadze and the legendary leader of the antiapartheid forces, Nelson Mandela, vice president of the African National Congress [ANC] of South Africa.

Immediately after shaking hands, N. Mandela asked for sincere greetings and best wishes to be conveyed to M.S. Gorbachev and to all the Soviet people.

Ardently congratulating N. Mandela on his release and return to active political activity, E.A. Shevardnadze invited him, on behalf of the Soviet leader, to visit the Soviet Union, where he is very well known as an outstanding contemporary figure and a courageous fighter against the inhuman apartheid system. Accepting the invitation with gratitude and noting that he is awaited in virtually all countries of the world, N. Mandela stressed that, bearing in mind the ANC's long-standing close relations with the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union's invaluable support for the antiapartheid forces, he will give priority to the possibility of visiting the USSR when forming his future plans.

During the subsequent conversation, N. Mandela provided a detailed evaluation of various aspects of the situation in the Republic of South Africa [RSA] and spoke about the ANC's approach to the organization of a dialogue with the government. E.A. Shevardnadze, for his part, shared his impressions of the conversation which he had just had with RSA President Frederick de Klerk. Confidence was expressed that, in spite of the complex nature of the arrangement of forces in the RSA and all the difficulty of the forthcoming dialogue, the decision to begin it was the only correct one and the prospects for its ultimate success do, nevertheless, look reassuring.

A favorable background for the dismantling of apartheid has been created by the weakening of tension between East and West which has been achieved in recent years. N. Mandela singled out, in particular, the enormous importance for all mankind of the efforts being undertaken in this area by the leaders of the USSR and the United States. Without a turn-around in relations between those two great states and interaction between them, attempts to solve painful global problems would be condemned to failure.

E.A. Shevardnadze's meeting with N. Mandela showed definitely the sides' intention to maintain close contacts and broad cooperation between the Soviet Union and the ANC at this new stage of world and regional development too.

E.A. Shevardnadze had a conversation with RSA President F. de Klerk. This was the first contact between the two countries at the political level for many decades. Even very recently such a meeting would have been impossible; but now that the situation in the south of Africa is changing qualitatively, it is perceived as a perfectly logical event, although an unusual one.

E.A. Shevardnadze welcomed the positive changes in the RSA, expressed above all in the release of N. Mandela, the legalization of the ANC of South Africa and the accord on the start of a dialogue between the government and the opposition. We are counting on the irreversibility of the process of changes in the RSA, which must lead ultimately to the dismantling of apartheid. That would be a major event of the end of the 20th century.

F. de Klerk stated that the proceses which have begun in his country are irreversible and that he intends to advance them as quickly as possible. The RSA Government, he said, would like to move away from a situation of conflict and confrontation and is dedicated to seeking a negotiated solution to existing problems. The RSA president noted the Soviet Union's constructive role in the creation of an atmosphere in the south of Africa which makes hopes for reconciliation real.

The situation in Angola and Mozambique was touched on during the conversation. The need for active efforts to encourage a political settlement in those countries was noted.

E.A. Shevardnadze met with J.A. Bosque, member of the Cuban Communist Party [CCP] Central Committee Politburo and vice president of that country's Council of State, and J. Risquet, secretary of the CCP Central Committee. Assessments of the peculiarities of the present stage of world development were compared, the situation in the south of Africa, particularly in Angola, was discussed and concern at the difficulties being created there by the continuing subversive activity of Unita was expressed in the conversation with the Cuban comrades, in a spirit of mutual understanding.

A wide range of international problems, particularly the situation in Europe and the south of Africa, was examined at E.A. Shevardnadze's meeting with S. Celac, Romania's minister of foreign affairs. Certain aspects of the functioning of the Warsaw Pact were touched on. Attention was paid to further improving bilateral cooperation between the USSR and Romania in various fields.

E.A. Shevardnadze's conversation with B. Loncar, SFRY federal secretary for foreign affairs, was devoted mainly to a discussion of the state of affairs in Europe, primarily in connection with the movement toward German unity, from the point of view of maintaining a balance and preserving stability on the continent. Certain matters in bilateral Soviet-Yugoslav relations were touched on. The ministers exchanged information on the situation in their countries, principally on approaches to the solution of problems typical of multinational states.

A general survey of the situation in the southern African region, where efforts over many years are beginning to yield tangible results and opening up new prospects for a

normalization of the situation and world development, was conducted in E.A. Shevardnadze's conversation with G. Chiepe, Botswana's minster of external affairs.

Popov Views Third World-Soviet Ties

LD2103145490 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 11, 13-19 Mar 90 pp 24-25

[Doctor of Economic Sciences Yuriy Popov article: "What Flowers To Gather Nectar From"]

[Text] What is the Third World's attitude to the renovation processes now under way in the Soviet Union? The world press offers little information on that score. Don't the Third World countries show interest in Soviet perestroyka? You can take my word for it that they do. By way of confirming this, I shall refer to the talks and discussions I have had in some Third World countries of late.

Does the USSR Betray Its Friends?

The "two superpowers" concept is undergoing substantial changes in the developing countries. Until a few years ago I used to be told in Mali, for instance, that smaller countries had to content themselves with watching the superpowers act. Now most developing countries will no longer resign themsleves to the role of passive onlookers in the international arena. They are seeking a new and worthier place in the fast-changing world.

Many of my friends regarding themselves as revolutionaries and adherents of scientific socialism are clearly concerned about certain aspects of Soviet perestroyka. They are disappointed by what they see as a situation where "the Soviet Union is renouncing the socialist ideal, sliding to capitalism and leaving its friends to shift for themselves...." Arguments to the effect that perestroyka is being carried out under the slogan of "More socialism, more democracy," that its chief objective is to renovate socialism, do not sound too convincing to them.

As counter-arguments, my interlocutors quoted statements by some people's deputies of the USSR and certain Soviet journalists, carried by MOSCOW NEWS and NEW TIMES.

During teach-ins with Malagasy workers and trade union activists, their reaction to my criticism of the "Stalin model" of socialism came as a surprise to me. Following my hard-hitting tirade against "barrack socialism," a worker stood up and said: "When you and your children are hungry, when you keep thinking from day to day, whether you get a job tomorrow, individual freedoms and democracy do not mean much to you." The reaction from other workers in the audience was about the same.

The so-called "moderate circles" in the developing countries react to perestroyka in their own way. Many of those circles think, for instance, that the period of East-West confrontation gave them certain advantages by compelling the West to be more generous as regards their states. Some leaders of African countries publicly voiced their concern over the fact that the West, in their opinion, is now prone to give more financial aid to Poland and Hungary then to its loyal friends in Africa.

Back in 1973, Francois Tombalbaye, then president of Chad, invited me, a Soviet professor, to lecture at the university center, and in a talk with me, frankly admitted that he had done so to bring certain pressure to bear on France. Such a policy was based on the principle that the West had better be more generous, or else....

A former Togolese trade union leader told me recently that his country was like a bee which gathered nectar from flowers irrespective of the colour of their petals—be it white, red, blue or black, because what mattered was not colour, but good honey. One can understand the current apprehension of the "Moderates"—indeed, it is becoming ever more difficult to "gather nectar" now that the confrontation policy is receding into the past.

Intellectuals of the developing countries are engaged in keen debates over Soviet perestroyka. There is a direct connection, if not an immediate interdependence, between the radicalism of the developing countries' intellectuals and the scale and depth of social contrasts and social injustice existing in this or that country.

I observed this radicalism of intellectuals in various parts of the Third World—in the university auditoria of Colombia and Mexico, Burkina Faso and Madagascar.

As a rule, those countries' students and teachers agree, on the whole, with the theoretical analysis of modern capitalism made by Soviet scientists in the period of perestroyka. One ought to bear in mind, however, they stress, that in many Third World countries today capitalism develops in the crudets and the most savage forms of the initial accumulation period: extremely low wages, enormous unemployment, hard working conditions, the absence of even elementary labour legislation and of the working people's social security, and so on. In their opinion, Soviet scientists pay much more attention to "civilized" capitalism than to its "savage" variety. But the latter does exist and is a day-to-day reality for hundreds of millions of people in many countries of the Third World.

I should like to note that under the specific conditions of the developing countries there are, in my opinion, serious psychological barriers to realizing the priority of all-human interests over class ones. Besides, there certainly are class aspects to such global problems as foreign debt, international terorrism, narcomafia, which the less developed countries, among others, are faced with. However, the absolutization of these aspects sometimes prevents many radical intellectuals from realizing the all-human character of the global problems and transcending the rather narrow limits of the class struggle.

The Business Aspect

The business quarters of many developing countries have got seriously interested in Soviet perestroyka. Notably, the developing countries' private entrepreneurs actually had no chance of doing any economic cooperation with the Soviet Union. Before perestroyka, Soviet foreign trade organizations dealt chiefly with the public sector. Besides, this cooperation centred chiefly on building large power stations or industrial plants (the iron-and-steel works in India, Algeria, Nigeria and Aswan Dam in Egypt, the power complexes in Syria, and other countries). Considering the substantial contribution the Soviet Union has made to the training of the developing countries' national personnel, there is no denying the beneficial effects this cooperation has had on many Third World countries, especially at the early stages of their economies' formative period.

In the perestroyka period, however, the Soviet Union's approaches to the very principles of economic cooperation and to its basic trends change radically.

The developing countries' business circles welcome the new aspects of Soviet foreign economic activity: our preparedness to do business with the private sector; the deideologization of the economic cooperation we offer, which has resulted in an abrupt broadening of our business contacts abroad; the granting to Soviet staterun and cooperative enterprises the right to do their own business in the foreign market, etc.

Many businessmen came up with specific proposals. In Madagascar, for instance, I was asked whether small Soviet enterprises (state-owned or cooperative) were not interested in making jewelery out of Malagasy semiprecious stones, furniture out of world's best woods, buying Malagasy quartz for the electronic industry, fruit, cinnamon, pepper and other spices? The fact that the Soviet ruble is not hard currency yet makes no difference to the Malagasy. They are prepared to barter their products for nails, spades, mattocks, tinware, windowpanes and the like. The two sides could earn hard currency together by setting up joint enterprises requiring no sophisticated technology.

The Malagasy believe, for instance, that co-produced windowpanes could be sold in third countries for hard currency.

Businessmen in Burundi and Rwanda offer to sell tea, coffee, and fruit to the Soviet Union; Tunisia and the Seychelles, to rent us their tourist complexes at relatively low prices (25 dollars a day with full board and lodging) in winter periods. Incidentally, winters there are known to be of a peculiar kind, with air temperature of plus 25 degrees C, and water temperature of plus 18 degrees C.

Wealthy businessmen of Arab countries come up with a rather logical suggestion. Soviet science, they say, has many advanced technological ideas to offer, and we have hard currency to buy modern high technology with. Isn't that a good enough prerequisite for setting up joint ventures, they ask.

There are, of course, many objective difficulties in the way of carrying out all these projects. Full-scale economic cooperation will probably become possible only when the Soviet ruble becomes convertible. Nevertheless, I am now more concerned about the subjective factors, which already in the perestroika period hamper the progress of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the developing countries. I repeatedly discussed these factors with my hosts while touring the Third World countries. These factors are, above all, the force of interita of our traditional notions of the developing countries, the conservatism of our bureaucratic structures, the dogged insistence of our new businessmen on dealing with Western companies only. Unfortunately, the Soviet civil servant still prefers to negotiate the purchases of Malagasy quartz in Hamburg. Many cooperators dream of strolling along Champs Elysees and receiving gifts (like personal computers). Among hundreds of joint enterprises registered in the Soviet Union, only a few have been set up in partnership with businessmen and companies of developing countries—a lopsided situation, isn't it?

Momentary advantages have never been the basic criterion of serious and civilized business. I think it's time we have revised the prospects of our cooperation with the developing countries.

By the year 1992, the European Community—a mighty economic bloc—will take final shape. The Soviet Union and East European countries alike are aware of that. This problem is under extensive discussion in many developing countries, the Maghreb ones in particular. Attempts are being made at integration there, too, although warnings are heard that North African countries may become a still more dependent appendage to an intergated Western Europe.

My Tunisian interlocutors attached great importance to the idea of the common European home in this connection. They linked up the idea with the possibility of forming a still broader economic community, which could spread to the whole of Europe. They hope that the Soviet Union's participation in building the common European home may impart a more democratic and humane character to the entire system of international economic relations. It goes without saying that competition is governed by tough laws of its own. Obviously, Western products are more competitive in the world market today than those from the developing countries and the Soviet Union. This circumstance alone compels us to seek and find new ways and forms of cooperation between the developing countries and the Soviet Union. Such is the opinion of many prominent Tunisian public figures. I think, it is not devoid of common sense.

Finally, the fact that the Third World wishes our perestroyka well found its expression in many questions my

audiences showered me with, such as: Would not the hard economic situation in our country, the shortage of consumer goods, acute inter-ethnic conflicts and the pressure on the government from the right and the left lead to the failure of the Gorbachev policy.

Why do most different people in the Third World take the fate of Soviet perestroyka so close to heart? As I tried to find the answer to this question, I finally arrived at the conclusion that people in all parts of the world are becoming increasingly aware of our world being not only varied, but interdependent as well. Somebody aptly put in in one of my Tunisian audiences: "If your perestroyka succeeds, it will go down in world history in a class with the French Revolution and the Great October Revolution of 1917."

Personally, I subscribe to this view.

Adamishin Interviewed on German Unification

LD2103222190 Moscow TASS in English 2201 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 22 TASS—"No one of the Warsaw Treaty countries calls into question Germans' right to self-determination and unity," Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin said in an interview to TASS. At the same time he noted that this right can be implemented only if respect is shown for rights and interests of Germany's neighbours and for prerogatives of the four powers and is combined with the European process.

Adamishin commented on the results of a consultative meeting of heads of foreign policy agencies of the Warsaw Treaty countries, held last weekend in Prague.

Adamishin said that similarity of approaches of the allied states was manifested during the meeting, although there were different stands on some substantial questions.

The Warsaw Treaty countries believe that German reunification must be based on equal negotiations between the two German states. Unification should be a matter of gradual, stage-by-stage construction of German unity, and not the annexation of one state by the other.

In this connection the conference criticised the possibility of applying Article 23 of West Germany's basic law.

The joining of the German Democratic Republic to West Germany on the basis of this article would mean spreading to the German Democratic Republic West Germany's international obligations, for instance those it has in the framework of NATO and of the economic community.

Noting that the Soviet Union objects to the participation of a united Germany in NATO, as this would disrupt balance, the deputy foreign minister described as the ideal variant the conclusion of a peace treaty that would finalise the results of the Second World War and would resolve the questions of frontiers, the status of a united Germany and of Berlin, as well as economic questions stemming from bilateral and multilateral obligations of the two German states.

The participants in the meeting also declared for guarantees that a united Germany will not have nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons and that the threat of war will never come from its territory.

It was decided to continue consultations and the exchange of opinions specifically as regards the use of "two plus four" mechanism.

VESTNIK Journal Presented at UN

LD2103173890 Moscow TASS in English 0733 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] New York, U.N. March 21 TASS—The presentation of the VESTNIK journal, a new publication in English from the Soviet Foreign Ministry, was held here in the U.N. headquarters.

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze pointed out in his address to readers that VESTNIK was a joint Soviet-Austrian venture, based not only on mutual interest, but also on the conviction that an alliance of diplomacy and business can be viable and profitable.

Vitaliy Milyaev, VESTNIK editor-in-chief, said at a press conference here that the journal was published and distributed by the Austrian firm Allgemeine Bauten-Vertreibsgesellschaft. The monthly journal is the result of joint creative work by diplomats, journalists, businessmen, scientists, and cultural personalities.

It will be useful in the analysis of Soviet foreign policy and of processes taking place in the country. Future foreign trade and economic partners of the Soviet Union will also find useful information in VESTNIK.

A large article published by the new journal deals with the participation of U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar in the first international congress of the new decade—the global forum on environment and development for survival.

United States & Canada

U.S. Urges 'Peaceful Conclusion' in Lithuania

LD2203090790 Moscow World Service in English 0810 GMT 22 Mar 90

[Sergey Goryachev commentary]

[Excerpts] The United States does not recognize the declaration passed by Lithuania's parliament to restore an independent state. A White House spokesman, Marlin Fitzwater, has pointed out that the United States does not want to stir up trouble for the Soviet Union. Here are the details in a commentary from Sergey Goryachev:

[Passage omitted] Mr Fitzwater said it's the United States' practice to recognize those governments that are in control of their destiny and of their territory. But, as UPI points out, the United States has not always acted this way. For one thing, it declared its recognition of the new Panamanian Government even before the ouster of the regime of General Noriega. The White House spokesman called for encouraging a peaceful process of development of democracy instead, of trying to stir up any trouble. We want to walk the course that maximizes the opportunity for a peaceful conclusion of this issue, he said.

It seems that a balanced approach meets the interests of both powers, all the more so as their negotiations focus on the upcoming summit, with the agenda that is a matter of concern for all humanity.

Text of Bush Congratulations to Gorbachev

PM1103125190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[George Bush message: "To His Excellency M.S. Gorbachev, president of the USSR" under the general heading "Congratulations to the President of the USSR"]

[Text] Esteemed Mr. President,

Please accept my congratulations on the occasion of your election as president of the USSR. On behalf of the American people I wish you success in your work at the head of the Soviet Union at this new stage of perestroyka. Not only the peoples of the Soviet Union, but also the entire world are benefitting as a result of the democratization process.

Our forthcoming meeting in June will provide the opportunity to expand those significant spheres of cooperation which have already taken shape in Soviet-U.S. relations in recent years. In anticipation of receiving you in June, I am counting on many years of constructive cooperation between our countries.

Yours sincerely,
George Bush.

More on U.S. Election Commission Chief's Visit

PM2103132790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Meeting With Delegation"]

[Text] A.I. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, received a delegation from the U.S. Federal Election Commission, headed by its Chairman L. Elliot, 20 March. The guests are in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Central Electoral Commission for Elections of USSR People's Deputies.

During a thorough and frank exchange of opinions, held in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and benevolence, A.I. Lukyanov familiarized the U.S. delegation members with the progress made in reforming the Soviet political system and the decisions of the extraordinary Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies, which adopted amendments to the USSR Constitution and established the post of president of the USSR in the Soviet Union. The U.S. side was also briefed on the course of the campaign to elect deputies to republic and local organs of state power in our country.

The delegation members expressed gratitude for the opportunity to deepen their ideas about the USSR's election system. Congratulating A.I. Lukyanov on his election to the post of chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, they pointed out that the perestroyka processes and questions associated with the formation of new organs of state power in the Soviet Union arouse great interest in the United States.

During the conversation a positive opinion was expressed of professional contacts between the U.S. Federal Election Commission and the Central Electoral Commission for Elections of USSR People's Deputies, which first exchanged delegations last year. They are becoming an integral part of Soviet-U.S. dialogue and are making a substantial contribution to studying the development of the two countries' state systems.

V.P. Orlov, chairman of the USSR Central Electoral Commission, other officials, and representatives of the U.S. Embassy in the USSR took part in the conversation.

On the same day the delegation had a conversation with USSR people's deputies representing the USSR Supreme Soviet Committees for Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order and for Questions of the Work of Soviets of People's Deputies and of the Development of Management and Self-Management.

China

Li Peng Cited on Sino-Soviet Relations

OW2203044490 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0100 GMT 21 Mar 90

[(Nikolayev) commentary; from the "World Today" program]

[Text] Chinese Premier Li Peng expressed satisfaction with developments in Sino-Soviet relations. In his report to the National People's Congress session in Beijing on 20 March, he stressed that good-neighborly relations between China and the Soviet Union on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence conform to the interests of the two peoples, and are conducive to peace in Asia and in the whole world. Station commentator (Nikolayev) has the following comment:

The Soviet leader agrees with this view. Gorbachev's remarks at a press conference on 15 March attest to this point. On Sino-Soviet relations, he said: We attach great importance to Sino-Soviet relations and will do our best to strengthen such relations. Sino-Soviet relations since the summit meeting at the end of last May have led us to conclude that strict observance of norms governing bilateral contacts is the principle guiding the relationship between the two countries. Moscow and Beijing adopt similar attitudes to each other's internal affairs. The Soviet Union and China have many things in common when it comes to resolving problems pertaining to socialist construction. There are also dissimilarities. Neither country, however, sees this as a reason for dispute or friction. Every country has its own domestic policy and should not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. The exchange of views [between Soviet and Chinese leaders] led to another event. The Sino-Soviet seminar on economic reforms, held in Moscow in February, indicated broad prospects for bilateral cooperation. Agreement reached at the summit in Beijing was not for form's sake. Efforts have been made to implement it gradually by building up mutual trust and seeking new forms of cooperation.

In his report, Premier Li Peng noted the progress made by diplomatic and military personnel of the two countries in border talks. The purpose of the talks is to defuse military confrontation between the two nations in a bid to demilitarize the Sino-Soviet border. Economic cooperation between the two countries has proceeded remarkably. Total trade volume reached R2.4 billion last year. An agreement on further increasing bilateral trade was concluded during a recent trip to China by the Soviet Minister of Foreign Economic Relations. Exchanges between the CPSU and the CPC are also growing with each day. A delegation, headed by Wang Renzhi, director of the CPC Central Committee's Propaganda Department, arrived in Moscow this week. Both countries agree that the potential for cooperation has yet to be tapped fully. The development of such potential requires active efforts in all fields. Both China and the Soviet Union set great store by Premier Li Peng's visit. We hope that the visit will further promote Sino-Soviet relations.

Newly Built Road Opens Between USSR, PRC

LD2103180390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0930 GMT 21 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Presenter] Our relations with China are visibly and tangibly changing. The volume of trade between the two countries goes up every month. The history of our two states has known good times and these times are returning, it seems. Two convoys of motor vehicles met at the Far Eastern border with China. They met each other half way on a newly built road, between the rayon center, Pogranichnyy, in Maritime Kray and the town of Suifenhe in Heilongjiang Province.

[Correspondents L. Savitskiy and L. Borisenko, identified by caption] Never have so many people gathered at this section of the border. It is understandable. The opening to vehicular traffic, which should serve the development of direct ties between this northern province in China and rayons of the Far East, was long awaited. Both sides have reinforced bridges along this 20 km section; they widened the road and made it possible for the customs services to operate efficiently. And here comes the festive moment: Our KAMAZ trucks are leaving with goods for China, taking the new international route, the first such route in the Far East.

On the other side the border is being crossed by vehicles with goods for those who live in the Maritime Kray.

[Begin recording] [Ni Liantsay, chairman of a trade company, identified by caption, in Chinese with simultaneous Russian translation] It is transportation that represents the most acute issue, holding back bilateral economic ties between our countries. Freight cars with goods now sometimes stand idle on the railways for more than a month. This is due to the small throughput capacity of the station. The commissioning of this motor vehicle route gives us the possibility of despatching goods much faster and, the main thing is, of delivering them directly to their destinations. This will undoubtedly facilitate the development of border trade. [end recording]

Two more motor vehicle crossings are being made ready for opening at various sections of the Far Eastern border with China. They will make it possible for the local motor vehicle transportation workers to fulfill orders from the Asian-Pacific Ocean countries on transit cargo transportation. [video shows new road, trucks, military men shaking hands, and an orchestra]

Issues Facing Chinese Parliament Examined

PM2103171590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by own correspondent Yu. Savenkov: "Chinese National People's Congress Session: 'Stability' Is the Key Word"]

[Text] Beijing—A session of the Chinese National People's Congress [NPC] has opened in the House of Peoples Congresses in Beijing. Since the 1978 December plenum of the CPC Central Committee, which initiated the process of renewing the country and restoring it to a healthy path of development after the failure of the

"Great Leap Forward" and chaos of the "Cultural Revolution," NPC sessions have become very important political events.

This session is the third in the five-year cycle of the supreme organ of Chinese state power. The first two saw tumultuous debates, with the deputies boldly setting out their positions on national issues, and not just local issues, as in the past. Observers drew attention to the increased number of votes "against."

On the other hand, the current session is the first since the dramatic events of last summer, which made a deep impression on Chinese society and are still influencing political priorities. Radical transformations in society often lead to economic, social, and political upheavals. The ideologization of many processes in Chinese development and the stake on unanimity and like-mindedness are very apparent at the moment. Many political restructuring issues have receded into the background.

On the eve of the session NPC spokesman Yao Guang gave a guarded response to a question about the development of political reform in China. According to him, it is continuing together with transformations in other spheres, but it will be a gradual, step-by-step process. Its development must not hamper political stability. Deng Xiaoping's upcoming retirement from the post of the chairman of the PRC Central Military Council, which will be discussed at the NPC session, was described by Yao Guang as an illustration of the continuation of cadre reform as part and parcel of the political restructuring. It was Deng, at the beginning of the eighties, who put forward the idea of abolishing life tenure of party and government posts. Last November he quit his last leading party post—chairman of the CPC Central Committee Military Council—and promised to ask the parliamentary session to relieve him of his last state post as well.

Who is going to replace Deng? The session presidium will propose a candidate, having consulted with the deputies. But, as the NPC representative told journalists, the only candidate will be CPC Central Committee General Secretary Jiang Zemin, who already occupies the post of chairman of the CPC Central Committee Military Council.

There are rumors circulating behind the scenes at the session about imminent personnel changes (appointments, resignations), which will be submitted for the session's consideration. "There will be changes, but big changes are unlikely," Yao Guang replied. Incidentally, former General Secretary Zhao Ziyang has remained an NPC deputy despite losing all his leading party posts.

What are the Chinese parliamentary deputies going to discuss over 16 days? It is a packed agenda, as ever. There is a series of reports, including one on the government's work, economic and social development results, and also plans for 1990. The accountability report of the People's Supreme Court and People's Supreme Prosecutor's Office. The plum among the laws to be adopted by the parliament is, perhaps, the basic law of the special administrative area of Hong Kong. The process of reestablishing Chinese sovereignty over this territory, which was initiated in the early eighties by British-Chinese consultations, is acquiring a proper shape.

Prime Minister Li Peng delivered a report. Its title was symbolic—"Struggling for the Future Stable Political, Economic, and Social Development of China." Indeed, stability is the key word in China today.

The report will be discussed by the deputies and, obviously, amendments will be made. I will look at just a few lines. On the eve of the session commentators were predicting that the economy would be the dominant theme. They were expecting a few adjustments to the the policy of stabilization, which, while solving the problem of inflation and rising prices, has to some extent given rise to something else: a powerful market, a decline in production, overstocking, a number of enterprises brought to a standstill, unemployment. The PRC State Council is proposing measures to ease the contradictions. Obviously, the real danger of stagnation is adjusting the economic course.

As for the ideological course, the prime minister's report said: "The class struggle, while not the main contradiction of our society, will nevertheless continue to exist to some extent and, in certain conditions, will get worse. Therefore, as well as comprehensively developing socialist democracy and the rule of law, it is necessary to strengthen the functions of the diktat of the socialist state machine."

While noting the substantial changes in the international situation, Li Peng called the world an increasingly troubled place. As a socialist country, China is very worried by the abrupt changes that are taking place, particularly in the political situation in East Europe.

The development of Chinese-Soviet good-neighborly relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, Li Peng stressed, meets the interests of both countries' peoples and favors peace in Asia and in the world in general.

Northeast Asia

South Korea's Kim Yong-sam Continues Visit

Yakovlev Talks With Kim Yong-sam

PM2203114190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Meeting in the CPSU Central Committee"]

[Text] A.N. Yakovlev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, received on 21 March Kim Yong-sam, South Korean politician and public figure and cochairman of the Democratic Liberal Party.

There was an exchange of opinions on the present state and future development prospects of ties in the economic, scientific, and cultural spheres between the USSR and the Republic of Korea [Republika Korei]. The interlocutors noted that these ties have become possible thanks to the new political thinking and expressed mutual interest in their expansion.

A.N. Yakovlev briefed his interlocutor on progress in implementing radical economic reform and the development of the processes of democratization in Soviet society. Kim Yong-sam emphasized the keen interest shown by the republic's population in perestroyka in the USSR.

The conversation, which was held in an atmosphere of mutual amicability, was attended by the persons accompanying Kim Yong-sam on his trip and by K.N. Brutents, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department.

Gorbachev, Kim Reportedly Meet

SK2103230790 Seoul Domestic Service in Korean 2200 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Kim Yong-sam, co-chairman of the Democratic Liberal Party, is reported to have had a tete-a-tete with Soviet President Gorbachev at the Kremlin in Moscow on the evening of 21 March, Korean local time.

In the blitzkrieg meeting between the co-chairman and President Gorbachev, Kim is reported to have personally conveyed to President Gorbachev President No Tae-u's words that he hopes that a summit meeting between the two countries will materialize in the not-too-distant future.

Answering questions raised by reporters after a 30-minute visit to the Kremlin, Kim Yong-sam did not affirm or deny it, saying: "I will not tell."

Although he was scheduled to host a banquet at the guest house early this morning, Korean local time, Kim postponed the banquet after receiving an urgent call from the Kremlin, and went to the Kremlin accompanied only by an interpreter and a secretary.

In the Kremlin, the co-chairman was first greeted by Primakov, the speaker of the Supreme Soviet, and was then seen heading for President Gorbachev's office accompanied only by interpreter. Thus it is believed he had a secret talk with President Gorbachev. [passage omitted]

YONHAP Reports Gorbachev Talks

SK2203024890 Seoul YONHAP in English 0218 GMT 22 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, March 22 (YONHAP)—Kim Yong-sam, a co-leader of South Korea's ruling party, and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev met in the Kremlin for about 50 minutes for talks on normalization of bilateral relations and economic cooperation, Kim's aide said Thursday [22 March].

The aide said Kim was summoned to the Kremlin just before the Korean leader was to attend a reception hosted by Karen Brutents, first deputy head of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee's International Department, and spoke with Gorbachev alone except for an interpreter. He said Kim was called to the Kremlin by Yevgeny Primakov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet.

Kim would neither confirm nor deny that the meeting had taken place when asked by reporters.

"I met an important Soviet figure, but I cannot reveal who because I promised the Kremlin not to make it public," Kim said.

Kim disappeared from his hotel for over 30 minutes and the reception was delayed, said Korean officials accompanying Kim.

It was not known what Kim and Gorbachev discussed, but the officials said Kim gave Gorbachev a message from President No Tae-u expressing his hope for a summit to discuss upgrading Seoul-Moscow ties.

It is the first time a leading south Korean politician has met with a Soviet leader and is seen as heralding ties in political as well as economic fields, the officials said.

The unprecedented meeting, according to the Korean officials, reflected the substantial progress made recently in bilateral ties between Korea and the Soviet Union, which have no diplomatic relations.

Korea opened a consular department in Moscow last month, the first step toward opening formal diplomatic relations. The Soviet union is expected to soon take a similar measure in Seoul.

Kim, who became a government party leader after a lifetime as an oppositionist in the merger last month of his party with the ruling party and a third opposition party, arrived in Moscow tuesday evening on his second trip to the Soviet union with an 11-member official entourage. He is scheduled to depart March 27.

Before his talks with Gorbachev, Kim proposed that Gorbachev meet with No when he met with Politburo member Alexander Yakovlev, a top foreign policy adviser to Gorbachev, in his office at the Soviet Communist Party.

"I conveyed to politburo member Yakovlev the hope that a summit meeting between presidents No and Gorbachev will be realized in the not so distant future," Kim told reporters after a 40-minute tete-a-tete with the Soviet official.

The talks followed a 90-minute meeting between the two with Korean and Soviet officials attending in which they

discussed ways to promote diplomatic relations and bilateral economic cooperation between Seoul and Moscow.

At the meeting were Pak Chol-on, first state minister for political affairs, Rep. Hwang Pyong-tae, Kong No-myong, head of the Korean Consular Department in Moscow, Kim Sang-ha, president of the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Vladlen Martynov, director of the Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), which invited Kim to Moscow, and Brutents.

Kim also said they had a deep discussion of ways to promote political and economic relations between Korea and the Soviet union and neared the conclusion that the two countries would consider forming an economic cooperation commission comprising businessmen from both sides.

Kim expressed the view during the meeting that there is no reason for the two governments to delay diplomatic ties, which he said are conducive to broad bilateral cooperation, Hwang Pyung-tae said.

Yakovlev was quoted by Hwang as saying, "There is no insurmountable barrier to smoothing relations between the two countries. When the two sides will shift quantitative changes (in bilateral relations) into qualitative ones must be judged from a political point of view."

Yakovlev also called on Korea to promote economic cooperation between Seoul and Moscow, Hwang said.

Kim made his first trip to Moscow last June as a guest of IMEMO, when he was head of the now-defunct Reunification Democratic Party.

DPRK Reporters Refuse Comment

SK2203023690 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English 22 Mar 90 p 2

[By correspondent Yi Song-yol]

[Text] Moscow—When Kim Yong-sam, a co-leader of the ruling DLP arrived at Sheremetyevo International Airport Tuesday evening along with his 11-member entourage on a weeklong visit, Vladlen A. Martynov, director of the Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), and Aleksandr K. Kislov [name as published], deputy director of the Soviet think tank, welcomed him.

Also on hand at the airport were Kong No-myong, the first Korean head of the consular department in the Soviet capital, Ho Chin, vice chairman of the association of Korean expatriates in the Soviet Union as well as a group of journalists from local news media including the Soviet news agency Tass.

When asked to comment on the main purpose of his visit to the Soviet Union by a TASS reporter, Kim said: "I hope that substantial discussions will take place and visible results will be obtained between Seoul and Moscow during my second Moscow trip."

Kim made the first Soviet visit ever by a leading South Korean politician as a guest of IMEMO last June, when he was an opposition leader.

North Korean newsmen including cameramen from Pyongyang TV were seen at the airport but refused to make any comment on Kim's trip, simply saying: "Let's see what happens."

Upon arrival at the airport, Kim issued a statement in which he expressed hope that his trip will serve to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula and further global peace and prosperity.

He also praised Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika and said "it will contribute significantly to world peace, human prosperity and Korean-Soviet relations."

Commentary Explains Soviet Concerns About Asia

SK2203052790 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Text] In a speech delivered prior to his visit to Moscow, Kim Yong-sam, co-chairman of the ROK's Democratic Liberal Party, gave the Soviet Union's foreign policies a good assessment, including its policy in Asia and the Pacific.

In an interview with a TASS reporter, Kim Yong-sam emphasized that it is particularly important to have Asia and the Pacific included in the process of easing tensions and holding dialogues. Regarding this, he called for the creation of a multifaceted insititution for dialogue in [name indistinct].

On the same topic, (Aleksey Nikolayev), our station commentator, writes as follows: Today many people believe that countries, both big and small, understand that they can guarantee safety and stability in Asia and the Pacific only through their joint efforts [word indistinct].

Recently, for example, Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu spoke about [name indistinct] on Asian issues.

While the U.S. Congress was discussing some issues concerning the current situation in Asia and the Pacific, many important U.S. politicians espoused the same view in their speeches.

It is too early to tell if a (?subjective) change has already begun taking place in the Pacific. However, we cannot agree with those who suggest that we wait for such a change to take place naturally.

First, to make affirmative trends become strong demands, all countries concerned should take energetic steps toward this end. In recent years, our country has concerned itself with such things as part of [name indistinct] work.

Mikhail Gorbachev's speech at Vladivostok in the summer of 1986 indicates that Soviet foreign policy was (?being formulated) centering on the Pacific. Three areas—political, military, and economic—can be noted in Soviet program for the Pacific. All these areas are subject to the single goal of (?fostering) common relations and developing cooperation. Cooperation will be in the interests of the Soviet Union and the other countries in this region.

Today, it is apparent to everyone that none of these areas are abstract slogans in the Soviet Union.

Soviet-Chinese relations are a case in point. This is not a partial example. [as received]

Normalizing relations and strengthening cooperation with the PRC and the USSR has become the demand of the times in Asia and the Pacific, which are moving toward (?integration), as well as a theme for all of Asia.

Though the attitude of the supporters of the Soviet Union and of those supporting China is not (?clear) toward those regional countries who are against the integration of Asia, the (?contradictory) obstacles of the past have disappeared.

At the same time, the Soviet Union has taken important unilateral measures to realize military detente in this region, and has called on other countries to hold talks on this issue. As a result, an increase in concerns by Asian countries about economic cooperation with the Soviet Union was seen, while their trust in Moscow's politics has increased.

This was clearly demonstrated during the recent visit by the head of the Soviet Government to Thailand, Australia, and Singapore. [sentence indistinct]

The Soviet Union intends to use the potential found in its peace-loving initiatives to the last. This was reaffirmed by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in his speech at a session of the Congress of the People's Deputies. He stated: The initiatives advanced at Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk should be steadily promoted within the boundaries of Asia and the Pacific, and they must be transformed into something concrete, something that is workable.

The process of building a peace-loving community in Europe and Asia should end up establishing a powerful security system that covers all of Europe and Asia.

Moscow Marks DPRK Cooperation Anniversary

PM2203094990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Mar 90 Moscow Edition p 7

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] The USSR-DPRK agreement on economic and cultural cooperation laid the foundations for the fruitful development of ties between the two countries. This was stated in Moscow 15 March by the participants in a public soiree devoted to the 41st anniversary of the signing of this document.

Kim Khi Su [name as transliterated], DPRK charge d'affaires ad interim in the USSR, spoke at the soiree.

Opening of Moscow-Seoul Air Routes Analyzed

SK2203002590 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 17 Mar 90

[From the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] As we have already reported, air routes between the Soviet Union and the ROK are scheduled to open on 25 March. This is a unique situation between countries that have no diplomatic relations. This was possible when the Soviet Union's Aeroflot and Korean Air, an ROK airline company, signed a [words indistinct] agreement in Moscow a few days ago. (Boris Mikhachov), deputy director of the International Commercial Department of the Soviet Civil Aviation Bureau, will speak in today's program. He had signed the agreement, representing the Soviet side.

[Begin (Mikhachov) recording in Russian with superimposed Korean] Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the ROK on air routes began during the Seoul Olympics in 1988. Cooperation between the two Soviet and ROK airline companies at that time was just an episode.

Soviet delegates met with Mr. Cho Chung-hun, chairman of Korean Air, and Mr. (Ko Kyong-sam), vice chairman of Korean Air. They discussed prospects for future cooperation between the two airlines.

With the draft of the agreement and other documents on hand, an Aeroflot delegation visited Seoul last November. The issue of cooperation was discussed there in detail. The delegations of the two airline companies met in the Soviet Union from 12-14 February. The talks did not go smoothly. But, finally, the delegates of the Soviet Union's Aeroflot and Korean Air signed an agreement on cooperation. The airline companies of the two countries will do as follows: Soviet airplanes can fly from Moscow and East European countries to Seoul directly or via Shanghai or from Khavarovsk to Singapore via Seoul. Korean airplanes will enjoy the same rights. In addition, they will have the right to fly 10 times (?a week) over Soviet airspace without a stopover. Considering the (?prospects for cooperation), an agreement was reached on opening the offices of the two airline companies respectively in Moscow and Seoul. According to this agreement, regular flights can start on 25 March. The first Soviet flight is scheduled for 29 March. This flight will be made to advertise the new air routes and to examine technological feasibility. Also, during this first flight, tests will be conducted on air routes and the [words indistinct] of meteorological observation posts.

This flight will be made from [name indistinct] to Seoul via Moscow, and a Soviet-made Il-62 airplane will fly. (?Plane tickets are on sale) [words indistinct]. The delegation of the Soviet Union's Aeroflot will leave for Seoul aboard this first flight. The delegation will attend talks there on improving mutual cooperation. [passage indistinct] During its talks with the ROK, it will discuss matters concerning flights, security matters, and commercial and technological matters. [end recording]

Concluding, (Boris Mikhachov), deputy director of the International Commercial Department of the Soviet Civil Aviation Bureau, said that he does not think that cooperation will be limited to such relations. Similar examples of cooperation are likely to develop in the Soviet Union and the ROK. Joint ventures are scheduled to be established with the participation of third countries. Aeroflot delegates met with representatives of some tourist companies. Interesting projects were discussed during these meetings.

IZVESTIYA Profiles New MPRP Leaders

PM2103155390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Own correspondent A. Nabatchikov dispatch under the rubric "Abroad": "Party Being Renewed"]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar—The results of the Eighth MPRP [Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party] Central Committee Plenum and the cadre changes made there in the top party leadership are still being discussed widely in the country and are attracting public attention.

As already reported, the former MPRP Central Committee Politburo resigned en bloc. Gombojavyn Ochirbat was elected the Central Committee's new general secretary at the plenum. He is 61 years old and hails from Dzavhan Aymag. He graduated from Moscow State University. He worked as a teacher and on press organs and at the MPRP Central Committee. During 1972-1982 he headed the Mongolian Trade Union Central Council. In recent years he represented the MPRP on the editorial board of the journal PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM in Prague.

Nyamyn Mishigdorj, member of the Politburo and secretary of the MPRP Central Committee, was born in 1939, also in Dzavhan Aymag. He graduated from Moscow Economic Statistics Institute and is a candidate of sciences. He has experience of economic and party work. His last post was as head of an MPRP Central Committee department.

Tserenpiliyn Gombosuren is a member of the Politburo and a secretary of the MPRP Central Committee. He was born in Ovorhangay Aymag. He is 47. He received higher education in Moscow. He has held the post of Mongolian foreign minister since 1988.

Lodongiyn Tudev is a member of the MPRP Central Committee Politburo, chief editor of the newspaper UNEN, and a well-known Mongolian writer. He is a doctor of philosophical sciences. He was born in Govi-Altay Aymag. He graduated from the CPSU Central Committee Social Sciences Academy in Moscow. Tudev will be 55 this year.

Tsevenjavyn Oold, 48-year-old member of the MPRP Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the MPRP Central Committee Party Control Committee, hails from Ovorhangay Aymag. He graduated from the K.A. Timiryazev Agricultural Academy in Moscow. He is an agronomist by specialty and a candidate of sciences. He worked in a ministry and then as an agent and deputy department head of the MPRP Central Committee and as first secretary of the Tov Aymag Party Committee.

The following thought can be clearly traced at the plenum and also in the new party leaders' speeches to various Mongolian public collectives: All kinds of rumors that arise about the Soviet Union's imposing of inequitable treaties and agreements on Mongolia run counter to Mongolia's national interests, which are inseparable from the interests of the Soviet people.

As far as can be judged from certain plenum results and the businesslike atmosphere in which the newly formed Politburo is beginning to operate, there are good enough grounds for assuming that the party of Mongolian Communists is strong enough to renew itself in accordance with the demands of the country's development. The upcoming extraordinary MPRP congress, which will open 10 April, is intended to play a great role in this.

PRAVDA Sums Up Mongolian Plenum Decisions

PM2103123190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Mar 90 Second Edition p 6

[Own correspondent V. Sapov dispatch: "After the MPRP Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar—The Eighth MPRP [Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party] Central Committee Plenum remains the chief event in the life of Mongolia. It met for three days—from the morning of 12 March until late at night on 14 March which is an unprecedented duration for sessions of such party forums in more than 40 years. This was forced by the complex circumstances which have arisen in the country's internal political life and of which we have spoken in previous issues of PRAVDA.

A sharp debate flared up at the plenum concerning the MPRP's leading role, the separation of party and state power, and the nomination of candidacies for the posts of chairmen of the Mongolian People's Republic People's Great Hural Presidium and Council of Ministers. In connection with the resignation of the entire Politburo J. Batmonh and D. Sodnom asked to be released also from the state posts which they held. The plenum took account of both requests. An organizational question was also examined. As we have already reported, G. Ochirbat was elected general secretary of the MPRP

Central Committee. The new Politburo includes N. Mishigdorj, who was working as head of the MPRP Central Committee Socioeconomic Policy Department; Ts. Gombosuren, who held the post of foreign minister; Ts. Oold, chairman of the Party Control Committee; and L. Tudev, chief editor of the newspaper UNEN. N. Mishigdorj and Ts. Gombosuren were also elected secretaries of the MPRP Central Committee.

At the plenum 14 people who had reached pension age were removed from the Central Committee. An equal number of MPRP Central Committee members was co-opted in their place. The new Central Committee apparatus has still to be formed.

It is not all that long until the extraordinary congress scheduled for 10 April. Opposition forces are becoming appreciably more active. Thus, the leaders of the Mongolian Democratic Party, for example, believe that the conclusions drawn by the MPRP Central Committee are not founded on an in-depth, comprehensive analysis of the country's social life, and in this connection they criticize the report at the plenum and the statement that the MPRP is not abandoning the assertion of its vanguard role in society.

However, to judge from articles, comments, and demonstrations by communists and other public organizations, the MPRP, being a part of the people and an organized political force, enjoys the support of the working masses. As was pointed out at the Eighth Plenum, it now has to redefine its place and functions under the specific conditions of restructuring. At the same time Mongolian comrades believe that renewal must find expression not so much in structural and organizational changes as in the renewal of the substance of the current processes and phenomena and in the reinforcement of the leadership with capable, enterprising political cadres.

Voices in support of Mongolian-Soviet friendship and the time-tested policy of deepening cooperation with the Soviet Union were heard distinctly at the plenum.

Japan-USSR Association Holds Meeting 17 Mar

OW2103132190 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Report by Tokyo correspondent Potapov]

[Text] As has already been reported, the Japan-USSR Association held its 34th extraordinary session in Kobe from 17 to 18 March. In this connection, Radio Moscow Tokyo correspondent Potapov has filed the following report:

The Japan-USSR Association is one of the largest among the social organizations in Japan engaged in promoting the development of Japanese-Soviet relations. The association has played an important role in providing correct information to the Japanese people on the life in the Soviet Union and has contributed to the promotion of trust and good-neighborly relations between our two nations. Participating in the association's activities are authoritative political activists, social activists, as well as large workers' organizations in Japan.

The recent 34th session was held in an atmosphere remarkably different from the atmosphere in which past sessions were held. Attending the session held in Kobe were 327 association members. It was for the first time during the past few years that over 300 members attended the meeting. Participants showed [words indistinct] and interests in the current situation and development in perestroyka in the Soviet Union and also in the actual situation in the Japanese-Soviet friendly relations.

The participants analyzed the results of the activities promoted by the Japan-USSR Association last year and approved the action program for fiscal 1990. Listed in this program are various measures to inform the Japanese people about Soviet achievements in various fields, to deepen friendship and mutual understanding between the peoples of our two nations, and to popularize teaching of the Russian language in Japan. In accordance with this program, the Japan-USSR Association plans to hold a series of activities to mark Lenin's birth anniversary in April. The association will also hold the Soviet Day activities in May and a nationality ensemble from the Georgian SSR will visit Japan to participate in the Soviet Day activities. And in summer, a reporter group will visit Sakhalin with the association's assistance. In addition, the association plans to hold several other activities.

In an interview with Radio Moscow, Hideo Nagatsuka, director of the association's secretariat, briefly outlined the association's activities as follows:

I cannot recall any other session of the association that has been held in such a lively and constructive atmosphere. An unprecedentedly large number of staff members from mass media were at the session to gather news. We have also received greeting and congratulatory messages from leaders of both the Japan Socialist Party and the Japan Communist Party. Kobe Mayor Sasayama, Soviet Ambassador to Japan Solovyev, and a representative of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries made remarks to greet the attendants at the association's session.

While promoting our activities day after day, we have noticed that the Japanese people have come to cherish remarkably growing interests in the Soviet Union. Perestroyka as well democratic and social reforms carried out in the Soviet Union and its foreign policy have become the focus of attention in Japan. The changes in the Soviet Union will open up new prospects for improvinge bilateral relations.

Under such circumstances, the Japan-USSR Association will make all-out efforts to promote this positive trend. In particular, we feel that it is our task to make concrete

contributions to the strengthening of friendship and cooperative relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.

Near East & South Asia

Najibullah Cited on Coup Attempt Backers

PM2103105190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Mar 90 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Congress To Be Held"]

[Text] Kabul, 19 Mar—Addressing a PDPA [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan] Central Committee Plenum Sunday, Najibullah, general secretary of the PDPA Central Committee and president of the Republic of Afghanistan, declared that, following their defeat in the military sphere, the intransigent opposition and their Pakistani masters had decided to organize a coup. The plotters included members of the party and state leadership—Karwal, Muhmand, Gulabzoy, Sarwari, Ziray, and Panjsheri.

The PDPA Central Committee general secretary pointed out that the second party congress is to be convened in the very near future.

Iranian Press Treatment of Gorbachev Election

NC2103143190 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Station commentary]

[Text] The Iranian mass media have been commenting on the recent election of Mikhail Gorbachev as president. KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL has described it as a turning point in the Soviet Union's political history. Many of the Iranians have focused on the repercussions and effects this incident will have on Soviet-Iranian relations. Our commentator writes:

Of course it is not without reason that this issue is of interest to the Iranians. This is because this issue is linked with the current situation in Soviet society. Recently the volume of scientific, technical, economic, and commercial relations between the Soviet Union and Iran have increased greatly. The two countries have carried out transactions amounting to billions of dollars, and these transactions can be fruitful only under conditions of economic and political stability in both countries.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the objective behind the creation of the post of presidency is incidentally to ensure such stability. This is because it is a known fact that the enemies of the Soviet Union's reconstruction, both at home and abroad, want to capitalize on the process of democratization and openness in order to destabilize the political and economic situation, fan the flames of internecine conflicts, and destroy the fabric of the socialist structure. Meanwhile, the people's deputies of the Soviet Union who were seriously involved in legislation had (?forgotten) that legislation should rely on a strong legislative branch. This is exactly what the post of presidency takes into account.

The Iranian analysts see only the test of one man—Mikhail Gorbachev—in the creation of the post of presidency. It seems that the forecasts alleging that the post of presidency will grant the Soviet leadership unlimited powers and authority in ruling the country with a so-called iron fist stem from this. But this is not (?true). The post of presidency was created, primarily, on the basis of social requirements. As for the extensive authority that has been granted to the president, the existence of control on his activities by the Congress of Soviet People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet, as well as the existence of openness and political pluralism in the country, balance things out.

Iran's mass media believes that the commencement of the era of true political pluralism in the Soviet Union is a refusal to allow the ruling Communist Party to monopolize power. We can agree with this. But what raises opposition is the wish by the Iranian analysts to portray the party as an obstacle to the post of presidency and to the process of reconstruction in general. This interpretation of the role of the party is clearly contrary to reality.

Was the process of reconstruction not initiated by the Communist Party? Was it not the Communist Party that proposed the need to reform the Constitution and thus confirmed political pluralism? Finally, the effort to portray the party as opposing the creation of the post of presidency appears meaningless. As stated in the draft of the CPSU Central Committee platform to the upcoming 28th congress, the creation of the post of presidency stems from the desire to support the country's stability and progress, render the process of reconstruction more dynamic, and ensure that the process will continue. And this, in turn, stems from the need to ensure the fruitful and natural activities of all the government and social institutions in safeguarding the Soviet Union's interests and the Soviet Government's [word indistinct] on the international scene.

Commentator Reviews Sino-Indian Relations

BK2103135490 Moscow in Hindi to India 1130 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Vinyamin Shuryugin commentary]

[Text] Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen has arrived in India on an official visit. India and China—the two largest countries in Asia—played a significant role in the sixties to accelerate the pace of decolonization and greatly contributed toward the emergence of dozens of Afro-Asian states as independent political entities. During the process of development of bilateral ties, India and China adhered to the five principles of peaceful coexistence—Pancasila—which along with other documents and initiatives give substance to the concept of Asian security. Sino-Indian cooperation proved helpful in the success of the 1955 Bandung Conference. India

propounded the theme of nonalignment, which today has assumed the shape of a movement enlisting about 100 countries.

However, in the early seventies, especially as a result of the 1962 Sino-Indian armed conflict, Sino-Indian relations greatly deteriorated. We will not discuss here the reasons for the conflict nor who was responsible. Surely, relations between the two great Asian nations soured due to many complicated issues, mainly the border problem. The current Sino-Indian border is based on the so-called McMahon Line which the British colonial administration had fixed at the Simla Conference during 1912-1914. China does not recognize it as a state border and calls it only the line of actual control. China thinks that India is illegally occupying a large area of China in the eastern sector of the border. Countering this claim, India declares that China has occupied the Aksai Chin area in the central sector, which belongs to India.

With the passage of time, the necessity to normalize relations was increasingly realized in Beijing and Delhi. Domestic political developments and the changing situation in Asia and throughout the world contributed toward this realization. International detente was replacing the Cold War atmosphere. The commity of nations was looking for ways to resolve regional and other crises, and had been successful. I think the normalization of U.S.-USSR relations and the improvement in Sino-USSR relations played a positive role in this. It is no secret that some quarters in NATO had until recently tried to play the China card vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and India, and had been successful to a certain extent.

The first step toward normalizing Sino-Indian relations was the decision of the Indira Gandhi government which led to the restoration of diplomatic relations, which were suspended in 1962, at the ambassadorial level. Later, the foreign ministers exchanged visits and a dialogue began for the normalization of relations. By the end of 1988, former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi paid an official visit to China which proved an important milestone toward this goal. The joint Sino-Indian statement issued during the visit stated that the restoration and development of cordial relations based on Pancasila is not only in the basic interests of the two countries, but also serves the cause of strengthening peace and stability in Asia and the entire world. This was not a mere declaration. As the TIMES OF INDIA wrote during the Rajiv Gandhi Beijing visit, this was the first serious attempt toward the development of Sino-Indian relations.

Chinese Premier Li Peng's comments during his South Asian tour some time ago were welcomed in India. The Chinese leader had emphasized that China would distance itself from the internal problems of the subcontinent. This was considered proof that Beijing would not allow India's neighbors to play the China card while negotiating with India.

The message sent to the Chinese leadership by new Indian Prime Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh, stated: India and China are the two biggest countries in Asia, and, continuing the process of mutual understanding and cooperation initiated recently, they should greatly contribute toward the cause of peace, stability, and progress in Asia and the whole world.

Sub-Saharan Africa

More Reportage of Shevardnadze's African Tour

Meets Nelson Mandela

LD2103120390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0000 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] Windhoek, 21 March, (TASS)—The meeting between USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and African National Congress [ANC] Vice President Nelson Mandela in Windhoek today took place in an exceptionally warm atmosphere. E. Shevardnadze conveyed to Nelson Mandela an invitation to visit the Soviet Union. It was received with gratitude.

"I am very pleased with our meeting and am very pleased to learn you feel well," said the Soviet minister. "I must say that in our country you are a legendary personality. You are awaited not just by the leader of the USSR, President Mikhail Gorbachev, but also by the entire Soviet people."

N. Mandela noted that special relations have formed between the ANC and the Soviet Union, which has always responded to requests for assistance from the national liberation movement. The support from the USSR and other socialist states is unique in character and it would have been much more difficult to wage the struggle against apartheid without it, he said. The prominent ANC figure expressed confidence that ANC-USSR relations will continue to develop fruitfully and successfully.

A detailed examination of the situation in South Africa took place during the meeting. E. Shevardnadze welcomed the ANC's decision to commence dialogue to remove obstacles along the path of arranging talks with the government in Pretoria.

Speaks With De Klerk

LD2103115890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1105 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Report by TASS special correspondent]

[Text] Windhoek, 21 March (TASS)—Ussr Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to Namibia, where festivities are taking place marking the proclamation of the country's independence, is continuing. This morning the Soviet minister had a meeting with Frederick de Klerk, they noted that in their view it had been "useful" and that it had helped the sides to better understand each other's position. This is important, especially now,

during a "decisive stage of the development of the situation" in southern Africa, they noted.

Interviewed on Namibia

LD2203083890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0700 GMT 22 Mar 90

[Text] Windhoek, 22 Mar (special TASS correspondent)—E. A. Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, who is in Namibia, has met with TASS correspondents. He is taking part in the celebrations on the occasion of the declaration of independence of this country. The text of his interview follows:

First and foremost, I would like to note the significance of the present event—the proclamation of the independence of Namibia. A lengthy, complicated, contradictory process has been completed.

What is very important here is that the people have received independence. They have acquired sovereignty. This is undoubtedly the result, first and foremost, of their own heroic struggle, as well as of the common efforts of the world community within the framework of the United Nations, of the Security Council, with the personal participation of the UN secretary general, of the neighboring states, and Cuba. Thanks to this, they have succeeded in realizing the ideals of freedom.

We have become witnesses to the start of deep-seated changes in the region. The solution of the Namibian issue is opening up good prospects for the settlement of the internal conflict in Angola through national reconciliation. During my trip, I met with the leaders of Angola and became convinced of their sincere efforts to attain this. In this respect, the appearance of an independent Namibia next to Angola will undoubtedly facilitate this.

The Namibian factor is having an effect on Mozambique as well. My trip includes a visit to Mozambique. I am familiar with the position of its leadership, the situation and the mood in the country. This allows me to draw the conclusion that they are adhering to the idea of a peaceful settlement there as well.

But perhaps the most significant among the things awaiting us is the prospect of dismantling apartheid in the Republic of South Africa [RSA]. In Windhoek I had an interesting and constructive conversation with the president of the RSA, Frederik de Klerk, and the minister of foreign affairs, Roelof Botha. I told them that, if progressive forces succeed in carrying out the dismantling of the system of racial segregation, then this will be a most major event of the end of the 20th century.

The president assured us that he sincerely believed in such a prospect and had a direct interest in it.

On the other hand, there was also a meeting with Nelson Mandela and other leaders of the African National Congress of South Africa.

What is of importance here is that they are ready to enter into contacts. These are not yet talks, but "talks about talks." Such readiness was, incidentally, also voiced by F. de Klerk. On 11 April a meeting is to be held between representatives of the ANC and the South African Government.

The forthcoming negotiating process will clearly not be simple, it will be complex, I would even say agonizing. What is essential here is consistency and persistence, but at the same time tolerance, flexibility, and mutual understanding, which are particularly necessary as there are forces that aspire to preserve apartheid. I think that the African National Congress and the leaders of other progressive organizations are making a correct assessment of the situation. Not to take account of these forces is impossible and naive, and the naive are punished by politics.

In any case, I have come to the conclusion that the sides have an interest in ending the bloodshed.

As concerns the Soviet Union, we are ready to extend the utmost assistance in this. We shall continue our contacts with the ANC and other democratic forces, and shall use the possibilities we have at our disposal for a peaceful settlement.

A positive influence is also exerted here by Soviet-American cooperation. During a prolonged conversation in Windhoek with U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker, we touched in the main on regional conflicts in the south of Africa.

Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States can do a very great deal in the south of Africa and throughout the continent.

In general, speaking of Soviet policy with regard to this region, I have to note that we have much to learn in terms of cooperation on the basis of new principles. Certain voices can currently be heard urging the curtailment of ties with Africa because of our own serious economic situation. But such an approach is superficial. We have to orient ourselves towards the principle of mutual benefit. In the past, we sometimes took a primitive approach to this issue. Now a new stage is ensuing: it is essential to master the complex science of skillful cooperation.

There are enormous possibilities for such cooperation with Namibia, Zambia, Angola, and many other countries of Africa.

Unfortunately, this is not only personally my first visit to Africa, but in general the first journey here by a Soviet minister of foreign affairs, which is, of course, not correct. I have no doubt that the visit will foster an improvement in our relations.

Meets Namibia's Nujoma

LD2203135790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1235 22 Mar 90

[Text] Windhoek, 22 March (TASS)—TASS special correspondents Aleksandr Prosvetov, Vitaliy Chukseyev and Georgiy Shmelev report:

The visit to Namibia by USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze ended today with a meeting with President Sam Nujoma. Shevardnadze was here in connection with the celebrations to mark the declaration of Namibian independence.

The Soviet minister handed the president a message from President Mikhail Gorbachev.

E. Shevardnadze and Theo Ben Gurirab, Namibian foreign minister, who was present at the meeting, signed a communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Namibia, dated 21 March.

In the conversation, which took place at Windhoek Airport, Eduard Shevardnadze noted that the USSR and Namibia have good prospects for setting up and developing relations of cooperation. He expressed the hope that the example of the Namibian settlement will have a positive effect on solving the problems of southern Africa.

For his part, Sam Nujoma declared Namibia's willingness to promote, as far as it is able, a settlement in southern Africa.

Earlier today, the Soviet minister had a conversation with FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

Today, Eduard Shevardnadze, who is visiting a number of African states, flew to Maputo, capital of Mozambique, where he is to hold talks with President Joaquim Chissano.

Arrives in Mozambique

LD2203142290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1345 GMT 22 Mar 90

[Text] Maputo, 22 March (TASS)—E.A. Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, arrived here today from Windhoek on a short working visit. In Namibia, he took part in ceremonies on the occasion of the declaration of that country's independence.

The Soviet minister is on a nine-day visit around Africa. He is on a working visit, apart from Namibia, to Angola and Zambia. After Mozambique he will fly to Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Nigeria. At the airport the minister was met by Pascoal Mocumbi, minister of foreign affairs of Mozambique, and other officials., Meetings are planned today between E.A. Shevardnadze and P. Mocumbi and Joaquim Chissano, president of Mozambique.

PRAVDA Runs Gorbachev Message to Nujoma

PM2103130390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1

[M. Gorbachev undated message to Namibian President Sam Nujoma]

[Text] To His Excellency Sam Nujoma, president of the Republic of Namibia

Esteemed Mr President,

On behalf of the Soviet people and myself I send you and the Namibian people sincere congratulations on the proclamation of your country's independence.

The Namibian people's victory in the many years of selfless struggle against colonial and racial oppression, with SWAPO [the South West Africa People's Organization] invariably in its vanguard, is an event full of deep, historic significance: The last colony on the African continent has ceased to exist.

Soviet people, who sided with Namibia's patriots throughout those years and gave them aid and support, welcome Namibia's acquisition of freedom. Guided in mutual relations between states by the principles of equality, territorial integrity, freedom of choice, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs, the Soviet Union solemnly declares its recognition of the Republic of Namibia as a sovereign, independent state and is ready to establish diplomatic relations with it and exchange diplomatic representatives at ambassador level.

I express confidence that the Soviet Union and Namibia will develop full relations in the interests of our peoples, peace, and international security.

I wish all citizens of independent Namibia happiness and prosperity.

Respectfully,
M. Gorbachev.

Gerasimov on Namibia, Cooperation With U.S.

LD2103213690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 21 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast: Studio interview with Gennadiy Ivanovich Gerasimov, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, by presenter Vladimir Molchanov; 21 March—live or recorded]

[Text] [Molchanov] Here in the "Vremya" program studio is Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Directorate.

I have two questions: By no means can everyone immediately indicate on the map the whereabouts of Namibia. Nevertheless, all countries have an extremely high assessment of what has taken place now. What is the significance of the proclamation of Namibia's independence for us, particularly in light of the statement by

George Bush that the USSR and the United States have made their own great contribution to the proclamation of the fall of the last colony?

[Gerasimov] On this occasion, we did indeed act together. This is a very fine sign of the spirit of the times because previously we and the Americans had the tendency, and I would say the ideological fervor, to transfer our rivalry onto the African continent. Incidentally, the Republic of South Africa Government used this. It alleged that the Southwest African People's Organization [SWAPO] activities were part of a communist conspiracy. Indeed, there was a time when Magnus Malan, the country's defense minister, was saying that in the event of a SWAPO victory, Moscow's flag would be flying over Windhoek. However, we have just seen the new flag [referring to previous item in the newscast, a video report on the independence celebrations in Namibia] and it was by no means Moscow's flag. We have seen, too, that independence was brought to Namibia by the joint efforts of the Namibian people themselves and the entire international community, both East and West, including the very big role played by the United Nations, as well.

I would like to say in general that we have loved Africa to some extent as though from afar, as it were; I would say, perhaps platonically and ideologically, inflicting on the African continent our notion of ideological confrontation throughout the world. Yes of course, we have been assisting countries that have called themselves countries with a socialist orientation, but I think in this respect, too, some things need rectifying because previously there was, say, the notion of colonial commodities, such as tea or coffee. Now there are no longer any colonies, and there are no colonial commodities either, or almost none. I think that our relations with the countries of Africa now should evolve in the direction of greater common sense and economic advantage.

[Molchanov] Thank you. The second question is this: Today, the world agencies reported another very important event. For the first time ever, there was a 90-minute meeting between USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, and South African President de Klerk. What is the significance of this meeting for the future of our relations?

[Gerasimov] Well, as yet we do not have any relations. Together with the world community we have been opposing and will continue to oppose the policy of apartheid, the policy of the races in that country living separately. However, changes also are taking place there. We have been seeing them and you have been showing them. Dialogue therefore is becoming a method of our policy, and indeed the world community has registered for the first time the fact that for 90 minutes Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze and Frederik de Klerk conversed and exchanged views. Of course, this is useful.

[Molchanov] Thank you, Gennadiy Ivanovich.

East Europe

De Maiziere Says NATO Presence 'Not Possible'

PM2203113590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 22 Mar 90 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report under the general heading: "Teletype"]

[Text] Berlin—I believe that the stationing of NATO troops on GDR territory is not possible. We must achieve a situation whereby the political significance of both military alliances overcomes their military significance, in close coordination with the Vienna talks on disarmament and the CSCE process. Talks within the "two-plus-four" formula are opening up great possibilities. Lothar de Maiziere, chairman of the Christian Democratic Union (GDR), stated this in a conversation with TASS correspondents.

Right-Wing 'Alliance' Seeks Abolition of GDR

PM2103130190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent M. Podklyuchnikov dispatch under the rubric "Subject of the Day": "The 'Merry-Go-Round' Turns"]

[Text] Berlin—On the eve of the Volkskammer election, many GDR citizens were asking with alarm: "What will become of us?" Now the election results are known.

The largest parliamentary faction is the right-wing "Alliance for Germany" bloc comprising the CDU [Christian Democratic Union] (GDR), the German Social Union, and the "Democratic Awakening" party. The SPD [Social Democratic Party] was in second place, and the PDS [Party of Democratic Socialism] in third. The distribution of forces in the Volkskammer is clear. But the question posed by many GDR citizens has not been answered. They still do not know what will become of them. No party secured a majority.

The attention of political commentators discussing the election results is focused on the fact that the third-largest faction in the Volkskammer will be the PDS. The attempt to push it off the political stage using the burden of the former SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] leadership's mistakes, which still besets it, did not come off.

"Without any assistance from abroad," NEUES DEUTSCHLAND writes today, "the PDS has become the third-strongest party, securing over 16 percent of the votes. The PDS result is all the more worthy of respect in that our party was subjected to concentrated attacks and hostile slander like no other party."

On the basis of the election results, the PDS Board Presidium adopted a statement which stressed that the party's election results deserve a positive evaluation. The Presidium noted with concern that the "Alliance for Germany" won a large number of votes. The statement

points out that it is essential to deepen the democratic process in the GDR and prevent the elimination of social achievements.

Meanwhile, the "coalition merry-go-round," as the newspapers are calling the process, has started turning in the GDR. The CDU, which won thr highest number of votes, has started looking for partners with which the right-wing parties bloc can be sure of securing a majority in parliament.

Lothar de Maiziere, chairman of the CDU, made public the basic program points according to which such a partner should cooperate. There are five of them. The first priority is to rapidly achieve currency, economic, and social union with the FRG. Then to urgently restore the division of the GDR, altered in 1952, into five laender. The CDU program talks about making the process of German unification correspond to the course of European efforts to unify the continent. It points out the principle of adhering to agreements reached, without specifying what agreements. In conclusion, the CDU deems it necessary to take down the Wall as rapidly as possible, thus clearly expressing its desire for unification.

When you read through the five points of the CDU progress you are struck by the extreme vagueness of the wording relating to the international aspects of the unification of the two German states. The CDU'S stance as a whole shows that answers to questions regarding methods of unification should be sought not in Berlin, but in Bonn. Only one thing is clear from the speeches of the CDU (GDR) chairman and the representatives of other parties in the "Alliance for Germany": They support the idea that the GDR should be abolished as fast as possible. At the moment there is only one possible coalition partner on the horizon for the "Alliance for Germany"—the Alliance of Free Democrats. A coalition with it would ensure a simple majority for right-wing forces in the Volkskammer and would provide an opportunity to change the laws. But in order to realize the right-wing bloc's main aim of joining the GDR and the FRG on the basis of Article 23 of the West German Constitution, which is what the right-wing forces on the Rhine want, a simple majority is not enough. Two-thirds of the votes are needed.

The CDU (GDR) received instructions from the CDU (FRG) Bonn headquarters to invite the Social Democrats to be partners. With their votes, the necessary majority in the Volkskammer would be achieved. But the SED (GDR) stated before the election that there could be no question of its cooperating with the right-wing "Alliance for Germany" bloc. The SED, consequently, envisages assuming the role of the opposition in parliament.

GDR's Modrow Profiled on Eve of Elections

90Ui0431A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 10, 10 Mar 90 pp 12-13

[Article by Igor Osinskiy, TASS correspondent for SOVETSKAYA KULTURA (Berlin): "The Last Day—The First Day"]

[Text] **From the biographical reference: Born 27 January 1928 into the family of a worker. Worked as a metal worker. For many years he was engaged in leadership work in the Union of Free German Youth. He has diplomas in economics and social sciences. He headed the party organization of one of the regions of the capital and the department for agitation and propaganda of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] Central Committee. Since 1973 he has been first secretary of the Dresden SED district committee...**

Many people thought that this would be the last chapter in the political biography of Hans Modrow. Moreover, they predicted that he would retire soon and go on a pension under the respectable pretext that it was "because of his health," although the strength of his body and spirit can only be envied. Having "taken a liking" for sports in his student years, he still likes them now that he is 62.

The clouds thickened over the head of Hans Modrow for quite a different reason. In spite of the great political and economic significance of the Dresden district, its leader was never a member of the SED Central Committee Politburo. The majority of people with whom we spoke thought this was a consequence of the unenviable position Hans Modrow always held. He would criticize the decisions of the Central Committee if he considered them short-sighted. He was not afraid and was able to stand up even to the general himself, although he knew that Erich Honecker did not like obstinate people. In a word, in the SED leadership of the time he had the reputation of a "rare bird." His "asceticism" in his personal life was regarded as nothing more than eccentricity. He had neither hunting lands nor dachas nor private homes—he lived in an ordinary apartment in the city. He did not take vacations at coastal resorts, generously paying out of the party treasury, but in the mountains, on tourist trips—and, naturally, at his own expense. He expected the same thing of other people. They say that one time when he was entertaining an important guest from the capital, having arranged an elegant dinner in keeping with tradition, at the end he took out his wallet, took out a large sum, and suggested that everyone else in attendance do the same.

I will admit that in such discussions some things may be exaggerated. But still I am convinced that the image created by popular rumors does not differ much from the "original." Life has confirmed this more than convincingly. When in October of last year revolutionary events were taking place in the country Hans Modrow did not observe them from his office window as other "firsts" did, but in each rally he was at the head of the column,

shoulder to shoulder with the workers. And this was not work for show—in the GDR today they can distinguish real democracy from show...

The process of renewal on the country's political landscape took place like a severe, merciless snowstorm. Having been at the helm of the state for 40 years, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (now the Party of Democratic Socialism) was deprived of its constitutional right to the leading role and had practically no chance of winning in the first free elections to parliament in the history of the country which were held on 18 March of this year. Only about one-third of its original members were left and there was actually nobody left from the former leadership. Many of the much decorated Politburo members were moved from their spacious offices, which were finished in oak in keeping with tradition, to cramped jail cells or else they were sitting at home frightened, awaiting their fate, protecting themselves with their pension books as if with shields. Only Hans Modrow, like the "last of the Mohicans", not only withstood the revolutionary whirlwind but became even stronger. In the most difficult hour for the GDR, when the country was at a political and economic impasse, losing citizens not by the day but by the hour, when catastrophe threatened, the people turned their gaze namely toward him. By unanimous agreement the People's Chamber and the "roundtable" where all the most important parties and political groupings are represented, Hans Modrow headed the coalition government of the German Democratic Republic...

In March of this year the Berlin publishing house Dietzverlag will publish the book "The First 100 Days of Hans Modrow" which was written by his assistant, the former deputy editor-in-chief of the newspaper BERLINER ZEITUNG, Karl-Heinz Arnold. I wish to relate a couple of moments from the difficult life of H. Modrow along with my personal impressions.

7 November 1989

It takes about 2 hours to travel from Dresden to Berlin by automobile. But they could stretch into an eternity for Hans Modrow. Disturbing thoughts would not leave him in peace. The party and state were actually without leadership. Under pressure from the masses who swarmed the streets of the cities and villages, the former Politburo was forced to step down. It became obvious that the country was experiencing a serious political crisis. Each day thousands of specialists were abandoning the country, having lost faith in the possibility of radical change and having become tired of waiting.

"You should head the government," they told him in the Politburo. "The fate of our party and perhaps the country as well depend on you."

"All right," he answered without unnecessary words. And he achieved what he had worked for so long: "But the government will be a coalition. And without the dictatorship of the SED, not fictionally, as before, but in reality. All parties will hold an equal position in it."

I am sure that not everyone took this demand seriously. The nucleus of the Politburo remained as it was before—some thought that Hans Modrow's popularity would cover the breach that had formed in the SED authority and they would gain at least a small space to breathe. And then, adopting new, restructured phraseology, they ould return to their temporarily abandoned positions.

Members of the Politburo used official, carefully smoothed-out information, while Hans Modrow obtained it "first hand"—on the streets and in the labor collectives. It was with bitterness and pain that he observed how Erich Honecker and his close friends were "burning their bridges" after themselves, the ones that had united the party and the people. Instead of admitting that the "New Forum" from Berlin was taking over the streets, they sent down to the party committees the demand not to make contact with this "hostile movement." Instead of trying to find a common language with the people, a member of the Politburo of the SED Central Committee, the chairman of the Ministry for State Security Erich Mielke, with the blessing of the secretary general, gave the command to "apply force and restore public order." Incidentally, Hans Modrow was not a side observer of the October events. In spite of the strictest prohibition, he arranged a constructive dialog with the opposition forces. And, as is attested in the newspaper WECHSISCHE ZEITUNG, the chairman of the New Forum, Dieter Rainfried, prevented the outbreak of violence in Dresden...

Several hours after being appointed as chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, Hans Modrow went to the workers of the Berlin electrical equipment plant. He very much needed to know workers' opinions of the existing situation and to consult with them about the first steps of the coalition government—one recalls the words of M.S. Gorbachev at the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the GDR. He, Modrow, knew quite well how great was the danger of being too late—the account was being kept not in years and months but in days and even hours.

...They were clearly not expecting guests at the plant. The watchman at the entrance studied his documents for a long time and scrutinized the stranger. His face was quite unfamiliar. And a departure from the customary routine and bustle causes suspicion.

"The prime minister, you say?" she cross examined him.

"Yes, the prime minister... No, nobody gave you notice, there was not time..."

Modrow in no way "idealizes" haste. Even during the first days of his new job he was convinced that one could get into a political mess much more quickly than one could get out of one. During the night between 9 and 10 November Egon Krenz, who had taken over the SED, and Guenther Shabovsky, secretary of the Central Committee, actually without consulting with the government leaders, made an arbitrary decision to open up the borders with the FRG and West Berlin. It is difficult to

say what motivated them: the desire to seize the initiative at any cost and demonstrate their new style of thinking? Or the fear that tomorrow would be too late. One way or the other, it is now quite clear that this step, although perhaps irreproachable in its essence, turned out to be ill-considered in terms of execution and to a considerable degree only aggravated the political situation in the country.

Incidentally, Hans Modrow did not find out about this until 2 days later.

22 December 1989

This was unexpected on both sides of the Berlin Wall—perhaps since the very day of 13 August 1961 when, by a decision of the GDR government, the Brandenburg Gate and the country's entire border along with it were locked up. People waited especially impatiently after 9 November 1989. The rumors indicated, as if suggesting to the government, particular dates. Western journalists who were to be seen everywhere even arranged a real "gypsy encampment" next to the gate—they stayed on duty here day and night for 4 days, attracting immense crowds of onlookers. But they did not stay long enough for their expected sensation.

Hans Modrow understood quite well: The gate was a symbol. Until it was opened the people would doubt that the changes would last long. But even the first days after the fall of the wall showed that the border was not just open to those with good intentions. There was a sharp increase in the number of contraband runners and speculators: They smuggled inexpensive food products and consumer goods from the GDR to the West, and in the opposite direction—drugs. The neo-fascists became active. There was a direct threat that their formations would be created right on the territory of the GDR. It was necessary to take immediate measures to provide for the safety and protection of the vital interests of the population. If they did not halt, at least they retarded the rates of destabilization the political situation.

To open the Brandenburg Gate means to give the people a political advance, to take a step toward the future unification of Germany. Demands for this became more and more persistent at demonstrations in Leipzig, Dresden, and other cities and villages. And most frequently the people do not recognize what is behind this, that they will have to give up in exchange their high material standard of living...

"Where should the commander be?..." Hans Modrow was a student in Moscow at the time when the legendary Chapayev was demonstrating his simple leadership ability from the screens in movie theaters. I do not know whether he recalls that amusing episode, but his steps, in spite of their obvious political coloring, were calculated and precise like Chapayev's. Here are just a couple of lines. On 17 December along with the other republic leaders, Hans Modrow met with the federal president of the FRG, Richard von Wiezsaecker at the famous Zizilienhof Castle where the historic Potsdam conference was held. The appeal to the West German politician's reason could be heard right away and this helped to keep the hottest tempers cool... A telephone conversation with M.S. Gorbachev and later a meeting with him... A meeting with West German Chancellor H. Kohl... Efficient, weighed decisions of the Council of Ministers... Even one of Modrow's enemies (and there are many of them in the political camp) could not but admit that these were the actions of an eminent politician...

It started to drizzle in the morning. The rain became heavier and heavier, as if testing the patience of the people who were crowding next to the wall. And at about 3 in the afternoon, a half hour before the festive ceremony, it became a downpour. The umbrellas of those who had been gathered here since morning were soaked through and water literally streamed under their collars. But nobody paid any attention to this. First here, then there, one could hear the pops of champagne corks.

At exactly 3 o'clock they went to meet one another—from the eastern side of the Brandenburg Gate Hans Modrow and the mayor of Berlin, Erhardt Krak, and from the western side—Helmut Kohl and the interim mayor of West Berlin, Walter Momper. A couple of days before this they had asked Modrow whether he considered it necessary to exchange brief speeches. It would be better without unnecessary words but if the gentlemen wished it...the prime minister answered.

A handshake.

Hans Modrow: "The Brandenburg Gate is a symbol of the renewal of the GDR and the very ceremony of opening it is evidence of the resolve of the German socialist state to participate actively in the construction of a 'common European home.' The events at these gates should never again be clouded by military fire—let them always be gates of peace, as they were conceived by their creator."

Helmut Kohl: "Today is one of the most exciting events in my life. We want peace and freedom, we want to make our contribution to the cause of consolidating peace in Europe and throughout the planet."

The crowd of many thousands received both speeches with rapture. Everyone's gaze automatically turned to the famous "chariot of victory" rising up over the Brandenburg Gate. After the wall of concrete comes down will they really begin to destroy the walls of prejudice and mistrust?...

15 January 1990

On this day Hans Modrow participated in the work of the "roundtable" for the first time. The preceding meeting of this extraparliamentary organization ended in failure. Each of the participants, as in the famous Krylov fable, was drawn to his own side—and as a result they quarreled, accusing one another of all kinds of things. The most radical politicians heatedly gave an ultimatum to the prime minister, demanding that he

submit a report on government activity within no more than 2 hours. The obvious blackmail did not make any impression on him. This was not the first time he had encountered such audacity. And when, having ended up at an impasse themselves, the participants in the "roundtable" were trying to figure out how to get out of this delicate situation, Modrow unexpectedly came to the next meeting himself. And he honestly laid all his cards on the table.

The entire country could observe this dialog—GDR television gave a direct broadcast from the "roundtable" meetings. They compared their impressions with the perceptions of their German colleagues. Their opinions coincided—next to Hans Modrow the "opposition" looked like mischievous school children whom the teacher had caught misbehaving.

This comparison became even clearer during the evening of that same day. The prime minister was receiving people where he was staying in the residence of the Yugoslavian minister of foreign affairs. Someone unexpectedly brought him a note. Hans Modrow excused himself saying that he had to interrupt the meeting because of extraordinary circumstances. He had learned that an immense crowd of demonstrators, incited by hooligans, was trying to storm the building of the former ministry of state security. Blood might be spilled at any moment, which would sharply change the peaceful process of renewal in the GDR. The organizers of the demonstration from the "New Forum," convinced that the events had gotten out of control, asked for Modrow's help.

His black Renault tore through the human crowd under a hail of fists beating on the hood and roof. "Red swine" somebody's angry voice hissed. He got out of the car as usual, without any guard and made his way to the improvised podium and took the microphone in his hands—he began to speak without hurrying, without strain... An hour later the crowd had dispersed. And not because they were afraid—they were unable to find arguments to counter his convincing reasoning.

...18 March 1990

There is not much time left before the parliamentary elections. They will be free for the first time. This means that everything must be decided by the voters—by their political maturity and perspicacity. The latest public opinion polls predict a victory for the Social Democrats. Hans Modrow is not in the running with the political figures. But he will represent his party in the elections—the Party of Democratic Socialism to which he has devoted more than 40 years of his life. And it has practically no chance. Does this mean he will have to retire? That cannot be ruled out. Although hardly anyone would doubt that it was because of him that the economy did not end up in a "tailspin" during that difficult transitional period and the people have experienced practically no serious interruptions in supply. This means that Modrow's experience, common wisdom, and irreproachable reputation could have an even more useful effect on his homeland in the future...

But they say that he is a proponent of a sovereign GDR and the people hunger for a unified Germany. He is too scrupulous in his actions and now, they say, a different, more "flexible" style is needed...

On 21 January during the meeting of the Council of Ministers he received a package marked "urgent" from Dresden. The deputy chairman of the Party of Democratic Socialism, the mayor of Dresden, Wolfgang Berghoffer, announced that he was leaving the party.

Could Hans Modrow follow his example? Many people who know him were asked about this. The answer was always the same: Because of personal considerations—never! There is only one power to which he is subject—the people of the GDR.

...Many people think that this stage will be the last one in the political biography of Hans Modrow. But he has reached this point before in his life.

TASS Cites SFRY Paper on Georgia, Lenin

LD2103143290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1335 GMT 21 Mar 90

[This item was killed by TASS at 1412 GMT]

[Text] Belgrade, 21 March (TASS)—The 'VECERNJE NOVOSTI' newspaper has published the following rejoinder under the title "Lenin Is Not Compromised":

In France a few days ago V.I. Lenin was proclaimed a major personality of the 20th century. At the same time, in Tbilisi, the capital of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, the monument to Lenin was destroyed.

It is quite possible that too many monuments to Lenin were erected in the USSR, but their public destruction is reminiscent of vandalism. What happened in Tbilisi is a crude escapade and compromises, not Lenin but primarily those who perpetrated this act of vandalism at his memorial.

Lenin was and to this very day still is—the French are right here—one of the major political figures of our century. The ideas and sometimes also the illusions of hundreds of millions of people are linked with his name. It is inseparable from one of those most humane ideals, which no one and nothing can compromise in the eyes of mankind.

The event in Tbilisi is notable for two things. The monument was to a man who fought for the national uniqueness of Georgians, to the extent of granting them the right to secede from the union, and in this respect he came into fierce conflict with Stalin, a Georgian who defened the Greater Russian approach to the nationalities issue. However, a majestic monument to Stalin to this day stands in his home town of Gori. If all this is a

matter of history, then in the case at issue, history has at least mixed up the sequences of steps.

Bulgaria's Lukyanov Meets Polish Senate Leader

LD2103150490 Moscow TASS in English 1443 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 21 TASS—Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Anatoly Lukyanov today met Marshal of the Polish Senate Andrzei Stelmahowski, who is now in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Parliament.

Both sides expressed satisfaction with the development of relations between the Soviet Union and Poland, stressing the importance of preserving everything that was valuable from the accumulated experience of bilateral Soviet-Polish cooperation. The sides confirmed their desire to strengthen parliamentary relations and promote political, economic and cultural interaction in the spirit of equality and good-neighborliness.

Key international problems were discussed and most attention was devoted to the process of German unification. Outlining the Soviet Union's stand on this problem, Lukyanov particularly noted the need to synchronize the rapprochement and possible unification of the two German states with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe process. He also stressed the importance of legally confirming the existing borders and ensuring the security of neighboring and other nations. Stelmahowski agreed with this view. The sides agreed to continue the dialogue on this problem.

Lukanov Views Bulgarian Reforms, German Unity

PM2103144990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Mar 90 Morning Edition p4

[Interview with Andrey Lukanov, chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers and member of the Bulgarian Communist Party Supreme Party Council Presidium, by TASS diplomatic correspondents A. Alekhin and S. Zharkov: "'Nostalgia for the Past Is Inappropriate'"]

[Text] "Nostalgia for the past is inappropriate," Andrey Lukanov, chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers and member of the Bulgarian Communist Party Supreme Party Council Presidium, said when talking about the nature of Soviet-Bulgarian relations today and pondering the future. At the end of his visit to the Soviet Union he answered questions by TASS diplomatic correspondents A. Alekhin and S. Zharkov.

[Correspondents] How do you view your talks in Moscow with President M.S. Gorbachev and Council of Ministers Chairman N.I. Ryzhkov, on the basis of the fact that our relations are being taken to a qualitatively new level?

[Lukanov] The spirit and atmosphere of my talks with the Soviet leaders, which were in harmony with the nature of our relations, completely lived up to my expectations. These meetings were very sincere, friendly, and frank.

Despite the changes in the social, political, and economic life of the two countries, Soviet-Bulgarian ties are distinguished by their deep substance and firm foundations and are very stable. If we are talking about changes, they primarily come down to the fact that our relations are now gaining a new lease of life and new opportunities for development.

Of course they are changing—and they will go on changing. However, nostalgia for the past is inappropriate: We simply cannot cling onto what has served us in the past or stick to formal postulates. We must create a new system of collaboration, and this is particularly relevant to the economy. This system must be based on the realities of the modern world and of the world, Soviet, and Bulgarian economies, and also on the new principles of a market economy, and must ensure full mutual benefit and bilateral ties with a future. I would put it like this: For all its originality, it must increasingly take the form of normal ties between normal economies in normal market conditions.

[Correspondents] It is no secret that trade and economic relations between our countries are not going through the best of phases at present. What do you see as the way out of the current situation?

[Lukanov] Obviously we must make the transition to the kind of principles and mechanism of implementing ties that will ensure the dynamics and development of a structure—not by virtue of some administrative wish or directive but by virtue of the vested interest of the economic entities party to it—in line with general trends in the world economy and equivalent economic exchange in any form: classic commodity exchange, investment measures, or the sale of services. We have tried more than once in the past to resolve the problems of making cooperation effective at the bilateral and multilateral levels. We failed in this, so now we must frankly ask ourselves: Why?

The answer, in my view, is that the economic entities either did not participate or had no interest in the end results. Consequently, any leadership directive or wish came to naught. So now we must really involve economic entities in economic exchange, give them our confidence and freedom of action, and take a more modest view of our own role. This role must amount to nothing more than creating the conditions for normal, mutually advantageous ties between economic entities rather than making decisions—of whatever nature—on their behalf.

[Correspondents] Soviet people are closely following the renewal processes in Bulgaria. Could you give us your opinion of these changes?

[Lukanov] The events taking place in our country are undoubtedly part of that process of renewing and restructuring social principles currently in progress in

other East European countries. At the same time, however, the processes in Bulgaria are distinguished by definite specifics. These specifics bring us significantly closer to certain elements of Soviet perestroyka. First and foremost from the viewpoint that in Bulgaria the renewal processes were initiated by the Communist Party. This does not mean that it has a monopoly on initiative and new ideas. On the contrary, it has rejected this monopoly. But, at the same time, the party retains its influence, potential for action, and potential for implementing extensive restructuring processes. This, of course, is not quite the same thing as what has happened in other socialist countries. If we are talking about perestroyka's objectives, they are similar in many respects. They primarily consist of the following: the real democratization of society, the creation of a new social structure on the basis of pluralism and multiparty democracy, the holding of free, democratic elections, and the formation on this basis of new bodies of power that have authority and a mandate from the people to govern. All this must lead to the formation of a rule-of-law state and civil society.

Of course, different political forces take different views of this society's objectives. As Communists, we are committed to the socialist choice. Other forces defend other points of view. In the final analysis, the Bulgarian people have the right to say what kind of society they like and to what they aspire. I would like to point out in this respect that a considerable number of our country's citizens—you could say the majority—are committed to the socialist choice.

[Correspondents] The complex processes taking place in Eastern Europe are certainly far from straightforward. An example of this is the "German question," which has recently become very topical. What does Bulgaria think about this?

[Lukanov] We are of the same view as the Soviet Union on this question: The Germans undoubtedly have the right to unification. But, on the other hand, the German question represents such a knot on a historical and current level that this right should be exercised with strict regard for the interests of all interested countries, particularly neighboring countries, and also of the great powers and all European states. The best context in which to find a solution to these problems—a solution that is not only to the advantage of the Germans—is the all-European context. In this respect it is very important to strictly abide by the principle of inviolability of the borders established after World War II and to respect the rights of those states which bore the main, bloody burden of the war and Hitlerism—primarily the Soviet Union, Poland, France, Britain, and other states. Our discussion of this question was conducted in this context.

[Correspondents] Did you discuss the concept of building a "common European home"?

[Lukanov] There are no differences of view between us on this point either. We fully support this idea of M.S. Gorbachev, which just a year ago seemed to be a political abstraction. Now, however, it is acquiring perfectly real outlines. I would say that the building of a "European home" has gone beyond the planning stages and entered the stage of real construction. This process is going to take more than a year or two, but what is important is that it has begun and must be sustained. For it to be able to develop properly, every European state must respect the rights of all other states, their national identity, and their right to make their own choice. And they must act in the spirit of those principles affirmed by the series of all-European conferences.

Problems Ensuing From Hungary Pullout Assessed

PM2103141790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel General B. Omelichev, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, by correspondent V. Litovkin under the rubric "Details for IZVESTIYA"; place, date not given; first two paragraphs are IZVESTIYA introduction: "Hungary: Divisions Going Home"]

[Excerpts] As our newspaper has already reported, the Soviet-Hungarian talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Hungarian Republic have ended. Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn paid a working visit to Moscow 10 March. An intergovernmental agreement on the timing of the Soviet troop withdrawal was signed. The first train left Hajmasker Station for the motherland 12 March with a motorized rifle battalion under the command of Major S. Zorin.

Col. Gen. B. Omelichev, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, tells our military correspondent of the problems associated with resolving this task. [passage omitted]

[Litovkin] How did the talks with the Hungarian side go? What problems had to be resolved? What difficulties is the Soviet side experiencing in connection with the troop withdrawal and the need to station the troops in a new location?

[Omelichev] The talks were not easy for us. This is accounted for by the internal political situation in Hungary—the scheduling and timing of the Soviet troop withdrawal under these conditions is a very acute political question. There is also the purely technical aspect. As you realize, such a volume of hardware, property, materiel, and people cannot be moved from one country to another in the space of a single hour. Even in six months...

We provided the Hungarian side with full documentation on the makeup of the group, its materiel resources, supplies, and facilities. We agreed that the main property belonging to the Southern Group of Forces will be removed to the USSR's territory.

The real estate leased to Soviet troops, which is the state property of the Hungarian Republic (barracks, airfields, training fields, test ranges and their equipment, residential, official, and other buildings and structures)—all this will be transferred, in accordance with the agreement, to the Hungarian Ministry of Defense in its technical state on the day of its transfer. When Soviet troops hand over facilities constructed or acquired at our expense, the competent Hungarian organs are to compensate the Soviet side for the expense incurred, while taking account of the said facilities' depreciation and also the possibility of their continued use.

In my view, the arguments which we put to our partners in the talks are very convincing. They attest that we do not have the slightest desire to prolong the process of the Soviet troop withdrawal from Hungarian soil.

In this regard we plan to transfer to the USSR approximately 70 percent of all the troops and materiel resources in 1990, and the rest by 30 June 1991.

Now about the fate of the more than 13,000 families of officers and ensigns now serving in the Southern Group of Forces, who have no apartments at all. Their units are being withdrawn to the Moscow, Kiev, and Belorussian Military Districts. We will accommodate soldiers and sergeants in the existing barracks stock. But where are apartments, schools, and preschool establishments (more than 16,000 children) to be found?—this is the no. 1 problem.

It is planned to construct 43 apartment blocks with 2,000 apartments in 1990. Eighty hostels will be rebuilt for 3,500 families. A further 227 residential buildings will be erected during 1991-1993, along with schools, kindergartens, creches, clubs, and municipal and consumer establishments. This will require additional capital investments of half a billion rubles. The Ministry of Defense alone cannot resolve this task—it is a statewide problem.

Hungary's MSZMP Chairman on Party's Future

PM2103145090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 11, 13-19 Mar 90 pp 10-11

[Undated Budapest interview with Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Chairman Gyula Thurmer by Stanislav Bulakh: "Gyula Thurmer: Tomorrow People Will Remember Socialism"]

[Text] New Times. It is clear today that despite the decision of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party congress, held in 1989 to disband itself and form the Hungarian Socialist Party, the former is not about to disappear. What tasks will the reestablished party pursue, and how different is it from its predecessor?

Gyula Thurmer. The HSWP is in fact a combination of both. Politically, we took over from the old party, and that is why we highly appreciate all accomplishments in the building of socialism in this country's history. Yet we are critical of the party's policies in the last several decades, and dissociate ourselves from political errors and abuses of power that took place. Continuity is also apparent in the membership of the new HSWP, which draws considerably from the old party.

What's new? We now have a different political approach to solving problems since we live under different political and economic conditions and act as a leftist opposition party, whose chief aims is to counteract right-wing tendencies. We critically assess the course pursued by the previous party and the way it linked with government authorities. We believe the party should act as a political movement. In their way of life and behavior, the leaders of the old party deviated from the ideals of the working class (this is not true, perhaps, of Janos Kadar). We must restore these ideals. Concentrating on big politics, the old party often completely ignored problems besetting local communities - towns and districts, and these are the problems we want to focus on.

We plan to alter the organizational structure of our party, shifting the centre of attention to party organizations at the grass-root level. Decision-making will proceed at two levels only—at the grass-root level and in the party's Central Committee. All the intermediate levels—district and regional party committees—are to be disbanded. Primary party organizations will delegate their members to coordinating commissions which will act as go- betweens (for example, they could publish jointly owned newspapers, coordinate their political propaganda activities, election campaigns, etc.)

The congress of the revived HSWP (organized in two stages—one in December and the other in late January)—saw the emergence of a united Marxist workers' party. New party rules were approved, and a new leadership elected. We also defined the party's position on major political issues. We are now actively involved in the election campaign which, together with the recent congress, is bringing forward many popular and talented young candidates. We did not know they existed because the old party leadership was totally isolated from the rank and file.

N.T. One must note that the new party has in its ranks not only the radicals, but the conservatives and the hard-liners. How much of a problem is their influence on the party?

G.T. Some members of the new party have outdated ideas about socialism and the present political situation, yet their influence is insignificant. We will pursue our discussion with them because we think it is essential.

N.T. What are your chances in the upcoming general elections?

G.T. It's too early to predict anything. It is clear, however, that popular interest in the HSWP is mounting. The recent congress produced a powerful impression on the public which expected to see the old leadership heading a conservative party. Instead, our allies and opponents saw the emergence of a party with democratic

rules, a new leadership and a critical view of the situation. No other opposition party has such an authoritative leadership. The three vice-chairmen of the party are two workers and the manager of a profitable agricultural cooperative.

Besides that, interest in our party is growing because of the aggravated economic and political situation in Hungary. Inflation is on the rise, we are faced with the real threat of unemployment, and people are losing confidence in their future. Anti-communist tendencies are gaining ground in the social life of the country. Members of both our party and the Hungarian Socialist Party are being fired from their jobs. We also have to combat growing anti-Semitic and nationalistic tendencies, as well as discrimination against the gypsies.

Those who tend to think of socialism today only in negative terms, citing its drawbacks, will tomorrow recall what they gained under socialism—things like confidence in their future, the opportunity to work and to lead a quiet and happy life. It is this confidence that is the moral and political stronghold of our party.

N.T. Don't you think such a reevaluation might take place only over a comparatively longer period of time, say by the next general elections?

G.T. We suffer no illusions. Of course, today one cannot count on the popularity of the left wing in this country, as well as in all of Eastern Europe. And this will inevitably show in the outcome of the elections in 1990. But today we must start laying the groundwork for future changes.

N.T. Obviously, much will depend on your ability to pull the country out of the economic crisis. How do you plan to do it?

G.T. I think, we should not look to restoring capitalism, but revive the basic socialist ideas. We object to such forms of privatization as turning state-run enterprises into privately-owned ones by force, and taking the land away from farming cooperatives under the pretence of what is alleged to be a land reform. We stand for a variety of forms of ownership, with collective ownership gaining the upper hand, and that includes municipal ownership, too. The prevalence of collective ownership should be achieved through better economic performance, and not by administrative measures.

We also appreciate the role of agricultural cooperatives in this country. Agriculture is subsidized by the state throughout the world, but in Hungary it is so profitable it supports the better part of the economy. At the same time, we should stop extracting all revenues from agricultural cooperatives, which was the case before.

In a word, what we want is a modern democratic socialist society. We oppose attempts to change the political and economic system in this country. Hungary is still a socialist country and will, hopefully, remain one. It is another story that it should have a multiparty system and be run by a democratic parliament. We realize that the revival of socialism is a long and painful process. We are not immune to errors and deviations from the course, but eventually we will achieve positive results.

N.T. In this context how are you going to solve the problem of paying Hungary's 20 billion dollars foreign debt?

G.T. You should not overestimate the enormity of the problem. Hungary is not the only state with such a big debt. The answer is not to sell off the country, but to raise the efficiency of our economy, and by economizing. Public spending has to be cut, and inevitably we will face lower living standards.

N.T. With the return of the HSWP, the left in Hungary is now represented by two major parties, the second being the Socialist Party. What is the difference between the two?

G.T. We are a Marxist party, and the Socialists consider themselves at best a variation of that. What our party borrows from Marxism is a way of political thinking, a world outlook, and a method of cognition. The two parties differ in their organization, in their positions on some internal issues, including the question of forms of ownership, and in political orientation.

We believe that each party must seek solutions to the problems it sets itself, proceeding from concrete historical conditions and national sovereignty and independence. Yet is should take into account the possible effect its actions might have on the interests of other parties. Basing our policies on this principle, we seek cooperation primarily with the communist parties, whereas the Socialist Party has asked to join the Socialist International. I should add, however, that we would appreciate contact with socialist and social-democratic parties.

Despite obvious differences in our positions, we look at the Socialist Party as our partner and potential ally. We are also seeking cooperation with, and support from all left-wing forces who are prepared to join effort to save Hungary and pull it out of the economic crisis.

N.T. What is your position on foreign policy issues?

G.T. We are open to cooperation. The HSWP thinks it vital that Hungary retain and develop links of cooperation with the Soviet Union and observe its obligations towards other countries. We stand for preserving the Warsaw treaty as long as the situation requires. Hungary's unilateral withdrawal from the organization under present conditions would, in our view, be a political error that might disrupt the balance of forces in Europe. On the other hand, we favour broad political dialogue between the WTO and NATO and more democracy within the Warsaw treaty.

The HSWP is also in favour of the pull-out of Soviet troops from Hungary's territory, which should be conducted with due regard to the ongoing political processes in Europe. If the situation permits and an agreement is

reached between the two blocs, we would welcome an immediate withdrawal of troops. Yet this step should be taken in adherence to the principle of common security.

Hungarian Political Blocs' Programs Viewed

PM2103111590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent F. Lukyanov dispatch under the rubric "We Report the Details": "In the Quest for a 'Third Way'"]

[Text] Bucharest—On the eve of the Hungarian election three political centers clearly emerged, taking shape around the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] (see IZVESTIYA No. 63), and the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF].

...I was told by a guard that the MDF headquarters, which I was about to visit and which was until recently located in a prefabricated hut on O. Street, had moved to a building on Bem Square next to the Foreign Ministry building. The building was previously occupied by a Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] district party committee. In the entrance to the building hangs the national flag and a loud election poster showing the back of a powerful man's head—a man wearing the uniform of a secret police agent—with an inscription in Russian: "Comrades! This Is the End!" Everything indicates that this allegory signifies the transition to a sovereign, rule-of-law state...

The MDF was set up in the fall of 1987. At first it comprised the most varied trends and represented a kind of broad movement in favor of democracy and renewal. Later some forces detached themselves from it to form independent parties. The forum itself remained a mass public movement (which also enabled it to operate within the ranks of the then MSZMP) until spring 1989. It only finally formed a political party and adopted an action program in October 1989 when "Kadar's" MSZMP ceased to exist.

I attended the First and Second MDF Congresses and saw public support for the forum gradually increase and its orientation take shape. Today the MDF is one of Hungary's largest parties, numbering approximately 25,000 members, with considerable chances (according to the polls, more than 20 percent of the vote) in the coming general election on 25 March.

Dependence on Christian and national traditions closed the gap between the MDF and parties of similar orientation such as the Hungarian Peoples' Party [MNP] (10,000 members), the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP], and also to a certain extent the Smallholders Party, which numbers approximately 50,000 members. Admittedly, the smallholders have recently been more inclined toward a coalition with the MDF's influential opponent, the SZDSZ, whose liberal program the MDF considers too pro-Western and failing in many respects to take Hungarian national interests into consideration. Internationally speaking the MDF is, judging by recent statements made by its leaders, closer to the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union parties in the FRG and the Rally for the Republic in France. The MDF chairman's recent visits to those countries and his meetings with H. Kohl and J. Chirac obviously marked the establishment of ties with parties close to it in spirit.

In the political context the forum and its natural allies—the MNP and the KDNP—which rely on the legacy of the well-known Hungarian thinkers Istvan Bibo and Peter Veres, equally deny both the Eastern—Soviet—and the Western—liberal—paths of social development, advocating a so-called "third way," which does not amount to autarky or self-isolation but combines a market economy with strong self-management. They believe that this model accords more with Hungarians' national interests and historical values.

It must be said that constant stress on the national element gives rise to charges of anti-Semitism leveled at the forum. A recent speech on the radio delivered by writer I. Csurka, member of the MDF Board, was seen as blatant anti-Semitism and provoked a host of protests within the country. The forum itself rejects this charge, pointing out that the MDF program condemns manifestations of anti-Semitism, along with anti-gypsy sentiments, in the section "Defense of Minorities."

The MDF's economic program fully advocates, according to its economic adviser P. Boda, a switch to a market economy, which envisages the denationalization and privatization of inefficient sectors of the economy and the closure of loss-making enterprises. The forum's representatives have stressed on several occasions that the idea of a "third way" does not mean attempts for symbiosis between a planned economy—at least in the form in which it has taken shape in the countries of East Europe—and a Western market economy. Markets are markets. However, according to forum experts, it is not necessary to copy foreign models in their entirety in order to set up a market economy but rather to take all the best elements from others, as Japan, Austria, or Finland did in the past and—and this is the main thing—unfetter the producer and give him freedom of action, which is currently suppressed by bureaucratic directives.

At the same time the MDF rejects unplanned spontaneous activity so as to ensure that state property, which belongs to the whole nation, does not fall into the hands of rich foreigners for a song. With this in view, according to P. Boda, definite restrictions can be established on land acquisition as is the case, for instance, in Switzerland or Denmark, where the state protects the land from being sold to people who would not work it directly.

The provision of incentives for private enterprise will inevitably be accompanied by unemployment and inflation: there should be no illusions on this score. The

forum is proposing its own anti-inflation program, along with a program for retraining people who have lost their jobs following the closure of unprofitable enterprises. Local self-management units, whose activity the forum considers to be one of the mainstays of the "third way," are allocated a large role on all these questions.

I know MDF Chairman J. Antall. A 58-year old historian who was involved in the events of 1956, one of the founders of the then Christian Youth Union, he kept himself aloof from politics until recently. After 1956 he worked as a school teacher for about 20 years and was then in charge of the archives and library at the medical history museum. His father, J. Antall Sr., was the government minister during World War II who was empowered to deal with refugee affairs and, I was told, did a great deal to save the lives of Soviet prisoners of war.

"As for relations with the Soviet Union, we are naturally interested in ensuring that they are normal and good-neighborly," J. Antall said during our conversation. "In our view, this requires Soviet troops to be withdrawn from Hungarian territory (the discussion took place shortly before the agreement was signed in Moscow) and Hungary's current dependence on the USSR, above all in energy supplies, to be eliminated. This does not mean that we need to stop trade: On the contrary, we want our enterprises and firms to cooperate as extensively as possible with their Soviet colleagues and, if a real market takes shape in the USSR, we are prepared to become equal participants in it."

According to my interlocutor, the attainment of neutrality on the lines of Austria and Finland is an aim that is enshrined not only in the MDF's program. But many factors in the general European situation need to be taken into consideration to attain neutrality.

Romania's Iliescu Criticizes 'Witch-Hunt'

PM2003101790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Mar 90 First Edition p 6

[Dispatch by TASS correspondents D. Dyakov and N. Morozov: "Press Conference Held"]

[Text] Bucharest, 16 Mar—The transformations taking place in Romania, the Soviet Union, and other neighboring countries create objective and healthy prerequisites for eliminating elements of distrust and suspicion from our relations and asserting relations based on the principles of equality, respect, and mutual advantage. This was stated by I. Iliescu, chairman of the Provisional Council of National Accord, answering TASS correspondents' questions during a news conference here.

The Soviet Union is our great neighbor, a country which has a large economic potential and an economy which supplements the Romanian economy, which is very important for maintaining the viability of the Romanian national economy. The further development of bilateral cooperation is a question not of political choice but of common sense, a question whose solution accords with Romania's national interests.

Touching on the accusations frequently leveled against the present Romanian leadership to the effect that many posts in the leadership are now held by former members of the Communist Party, the chairman of the Provisional Council of National Accord said that this is an objective feeling, since people are transferring their hatred for the Ceausescu regime, which called itself communist, onto all Communists. But this feeling is being deliberately exaggerated by some circles which are giving it a vulgar coloring, inciting people to a veritable "witch-hunt."

Obviously, the 4 million former Communists, together with their families, and the members of the communist youth organization comprise the overwhelming majority of the country's population. To make them responsible for the dictatorship's deeds is a big mistake. Those who died in the fighting for the victory of the Romanian revolution included many former members of the Romanian Communist Party and Communist Youth League. There is no doubt that all those guilty must be made answerable, but we should not confuse these with the bulk of the members of Romanian society. The identification of all Communists with Ceausescu's stooges also has a blatant political thrust: Communists are being sought out only within the National Salvation Front, but a blind eye is turned to the presence of Communists also in the leadership of other political parties.

Interethnic Violence in Transylvania Reported

PM2103134790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Volodin dispatch: "Transylvania: Outbreak of Violence"]

[Text] Bucharest—Do not respond to provocation! This appeal was addressed by Romanian Television's Hungarian program announcer to Hungarian residents of the Transylvanian city of Tirgu Mures 19 March after several thousand demonstrators had marched through the city tearing down Hungarian signs. The extremists burst into the local headquarters of the Hungarian Democratic Union and, staging a pogrom, injured several of its members.

Law-enforcement organs were unable to stop the extremists and ensure the security of the inhabitants. I. Iliescu, chairman of the Provisional Council of National Unity, speaking on television late that night, called on the inhabitants of the city to end the violence and show reason and patience.

I believe it would be difficult to find responsible political forces in Romania which would welcome the explosion of interethnic strife in Transylvania, where Romanians, Hungarians, Germans, and Serbs have traditionally lived side by side. However, as events in Tirgu Mures have shown, the escalation of the conflict has become a sad reality.

One of the causes of the deterioration of the situation was the demand by representatives of the Hungarian population for the restoration of the system of education in Hungarian, which had been reduced to a minimum. Among the demands put forward by the Hungarian population in Transylvania was the reopening of the Hungarian university in Cluj, which had been merged with the Romanian university in 1973.

Demonstrations in support of this demand were held more than once, finally culminating in a long strike of students and teaching staff of Hungarian origin which, according to the newspaper ADEVARUL, paralyzed the Medical and Pharmaceutical Institute in Tirgu Mures. Counterdemonstrations by Romanian students were held in Cluj and Tirgu Mures. A meeting arranged between students of Romanian and Hungarian nationality in Bucharest failed to produce results.

It would, of course, be naive to assume that the interethnic conflict in Transylvania was caused solely by the desire of some people to speak and instruct children in their mother tongue, and the suspicions of separatism evoked by this in others. Its roots go much deeper and are the legacy of the distant past when Transylvania was frequently the scene of clashes between Romanians and Hungarians. The consequences of the dictatorship regime in Romania, which conducted a policy of assimilation in respect of national minorities, have brought to breaking point the already extremely taut situation in this vast historical area between the Carpathians and the Hungarian and Yugoslav borders. A quest for compromises and dialogue could help to resolve the prevailing problems. However, the first step toward it must be a departure from the extremism and violence of which, as Iliescu said in his television address, both sides are guilty.

West Europe

Gorbachev Adviser on Soviet NATO Membership

AU2103181490 Vienna Domestic Service in German 1700 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] An unusual proposal has been made by one of Mikhail Gorbachev's advisers on Germany policy, Valentin (Koptseltsev), in connection with the issue concerning the future united Germany and the military blocs. In a prereleased interview with the FRG magazine NEUE REVUE, he is quoted as saying the following: If NATO is undergoing changes, why does nobody ask us whether we want to join NATO as well? This would solve all problems concerning the military alliances, Koptseltsev added.

Policy Adviser Sees United Germany in NATO

AU2103130990 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 20 Mar 90 p 9

[Telephone interview with Vyacheslav Dashichev, Germany policy adviser to USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev, by Manfred Schell in Moscow on 19 March: "A United Germany Must Be Bound Within the Framework of NATO"]

[Text] [Schell] Professor Dashichev, what does the GDR election result mean for the Soviet Union's future Germany policy?

[Dashichev] We must accept the results of these elections and draw the proper conclusions for our international policy and for domestic policy regarding the acceleration of perestroyka and reform. The elections in the GDR have shown that the people's mood is an important factor.

I consider the elections in the GDR to be the natural consequence of the disastrous policy pursued by the former GDR leadership. It sought to keep the people in a state of intellectual isolation; it sought to suppress travel and national feelings. All that has enhanced dissatisfaction among the people and has also resulted in the ideals fading in the system of the so-called real socialism. All this is also reflected by the election results.

[Schell] You say that Moscow must draw the "proper conclusions." What does that mean for Moscow's position at the current four power talks on the unification of Germany?

[Dashichev] The GDR people have stated that they want to achieve unification. We must proceed from this fact. That is the most important conclusion from the election results. Now we must prepare for cultivating our political, cultural, and economic relations with one German state, not two.

[Schell] Moscow has stressed its security interests. How must these interests now be defined under the new conditions?

[Dashichev] You cannot consider the Soviet Union's security interests from the angle of the fifties or sixties. However, it seems to me that there are also old stereotypes in our way of thinking, such as the military status of a united Germany, when the question of Germany's future is discussed—will it be in the framework of NATO? Will it be neutral?

Those who discuss the problem in this way proceed from the necessity of maintaining the principle of the balance of forces in Europe. However, this balance of forces has ceased to exist. We must recognize that and must proceed from this fact. For instance, the unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary means that the existing balance of forces is upset.

Before long, Soviet troops will also be withdrawn from Poland and the GDR. That will create an entirely new situation.

I think that the principle of balance was necessary during the period of confrontation and cold war. But what do we need the balance of forces for, since we do not have any expansionist goals, and neither side constitutes a threat any longer. We will develop a different security system which is not based on the principle of balance but on the principle of collective security. That is how it is. The demand that Germany must remain outside of NATO after unification means the demand to disband NATO, because NATO could not exist without the Federal Republic and without a German contribution. We must see that. The Western powers cannot at present disband NATO. Therefore, I do not think that this idea is realistic.

In addition, we must take a special aspect of the Soviet Union's situation into account. The Soviet Union was forced, over the course of decades—and this was the Stalinist heritage—to turn against all Western powers. The Soviet Union's share in military expenditures of the Warsaw Pact amounted to 90 percent.

Now new principles are valid, because the Soviet Union has a nuclear deterrent potential preventing an attack. These new principles must also be applied when we consider the complex of Germany and NATO.

[Schell] What will become of the Soviet troops on the soil of what is now the GDR?

[Dashichev] Once Germany is united and sovereign, the troops must be withdrawn from German territory. I do not think that it makes sense any longer for these troops to continue to be based in the Eastern European countries. Why? Because we have proclaimed the right to self-determination for all peoples, and we strictly observe this principle. The Warsaw Pact's former function of protecting the so-called socialist achievements does not exist any more. As for the threat from the West, nobody believes in the aggressive intentions of that side. So the situation has basically changed. Therefore, it does not make sense any longer for Soviet troops to stay in Eastern European countries.

[Schell] Has the postwar development in Europe ended now?

[Dashichev] The postwar development is coming to an end. Once Germany is united, and the division of Europe has been overcome, and when all this has been solemnly corroborated at a pan-European conference on the level of chiefs of state, we can also say formally that this postwar development has ended. Of course, the bloc structures in Europe will remain; however, they will also gradually disappear.

[Schell] Does a guarantee of Poland's western border also represent a piece of security for the Soviet Union?

[Dashichev] Yes, that is an important thing, it is essential. The issue of borders is a very sensitive one, it is indispensable for stability in Europe. Therefore, their inviolability must be anchored in an agreement. But at the same time, the borders are becoming more penetrable and are losing their dividing character.

[Schell] Is reconciliation between Germany and the Soviet Union an unsolved issue?

[Dashichev] I must admit that there are still many old notions in our society; enemy images still exist in certain quarters, above all among the older people, in contrast to the younger generation. Some quarters still think along the lines of two Germanys—socialism in the East, and capitalism in the West, even though one does not really know what socialism means. Black-and-white thinking also exists in our country. We still have to do a lot of educational work to bring about the historic reconciliation between the Russians and the Germans.

[Schell] Why has the communist GDR ultimately failed? Was it the Wall, or its confrontation with the market economy, or its opposition to Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroyka?

[Dashichev] All things combined were decisive—the economic shortcomings, the suppression of the people, the leadership's distrust of perestroyka. However, in my view the national feelings of the Germans are primarily responsible for the failure. By that I do not mean nationalism. We must understand the Germans. It is hard to believe at the end of the 20th century that they should not visit their relatives in the GDR and vice versa in the FRG. That was an important factor.

[Schell] Now the Soviet Union has brought up the topic of the peace treaty. What could be achieved by a peace treaty?

[Dashichev] I do not advocate a peace treaty. I do not understand why a peace treaty should be concluded after 45 years. Meanwhile, there are new generations. The situation has basically changed, and the internal development in Germany has also changed.

It seems to me to be better to negotiate on an agreement between the four powers and Germany and perhaps with Germany's neighbor countries, and then to solemnly sign this agreement. That would not be a peace treaty, but an agreement to define Germany's role in the framework of a new peace order in Europe.

[Schell] You said that the cold war is almost over. Where did it start, and where did it end?

[Dashichev] We do not know exactly where precisely it began. There was a certain situation, and we must view this problem in close connection with Stalin's prewar policy. His expansionist goals became manifest for the first time when he concluded the pact with Hitler, in the secret supplementary protocol. The common danger united the Western powers and the Soviet Union in the war. However, when Nazi Germany was almost

defeated, differences emerged between the former allies. We see indications of the incipient cold war as early as in 1945. I think that the atrocities that were committed in Katyn by order of Stalin—the murder of Polish officers—marks the beginning. We can well imagine what emotions that created in the West. When a vacuum was created in Europe following the defeat of Germany, the differences between Stalin and the Western powers began. In 1947/48, the cold war was already in full swing.

[Schell] Where and when did the cold war end?

[Dashichev] With the beginning of perestroyka under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, with the effort to abolish confrontation. Now we have real results—the unification of Germany, the overcoming of the division of Europe, the integration of the Soviet Union into the world market, and the Soviet Union's return to European culture. We owe that to our perestroyka.

[Schell] Are Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union drifting to the West?

[Dashichev] You might say drift to the West and drift to the East. That means that we are opening up to all directions, including to the East, to Japan. We are also turning to the West; possibly this is the region of the Soviet Union's main interest. Both belong together. The isolation of the Soviet Union from the whole world, which was begun under Stalin, has been extremely harmful to my country. This has been recognized, and I think that the process of opening up is being pursued at an accelerated pace.

[Schell] What role will a united Germany play?

[Dashichev] A united Germany must be bound in the framework of NATO. There is the metaphor of the gun on deck of a ship, which is not lashed. Some people compare a neutral Germany with such a gun. German policy must be cautious and delicate toward its neighbors. On the other hand, its neighbors and the four powers must also proceed cautiously. Every humiliation of national feelings and every violation of a country's sovereignty contributes to revanchism—as the Versailles Treaty has shown. In the final analysis, it led to Hitler's assuming power. We must avoid such phenomena in a new Europe. In this new Europe, there must be no diktat, no suppression, no disrespect. I think that Germany's strength lies in its economic and technological potential. These are its resources which it should make available to Europe. Its strength does not lie in the military area.

[Schell] Do you expect the unification of Germany soon?

[Dashichev] I think that following these elections in the GDR, the process of unification will accelerate. It may come about before the end of this year, or by the middle of next year. By that time, Germany's neighbors must also have solved their problems with Germany—security problems, border issues, status problems. Regarding the Soviet Union's national interests, I must say that the division of Germany was the cause of confrontation between East and West. This cause will then have been abolished.

Latin America & Caribbean

Cuban Army Chief Cited on Anti-Cuban 'TV-Marti'

LD2203084590 Moscow TASS in English 0824 GMT 22 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Paska]

[Text] Havana March 22 TASS—The Pentagon is directly involved in opening an anti-Cuban TV station, TV-Marti, Chief of Cuban Armed Forces General Staff Division General Ulises Rosales del Toro said in a local TV address on Wednesday.

He noted that the transmission will be made from a U.S. military base, using means of the American Air Force.

The Cuban Armed Forces have been safeguarding the sovereignty and integrity of Cuba since the first subversive radio stations began broadcasts in 1960, Rosales del Toro noted. They continue to be ready to protect the revolution from the new aggression.

It is no secret to Americans that the Cuban Armed Forces are equipped with means to be used in case of an "electronic war." Although these means are protective, they are capable of not only neutralizing the broadcasts but penetrating into U.S. territory as well.

Nevertheless, the Cuban response will depend on U.S. actions, Rosales del Toro stressed. "It is the United States that is planning an aggression against our country, trying to violate its sovereignty," he said.

Komplektov Receives Cuban Envoy, Castro Letter

LD2003235190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1753 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 20 Mar (TASS)—Viktor Komplektov, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, today received Jose Ramon Balaguer who handed over a letter from Fidel Castro addressed to Mikhail Gorbachev.

Cubans Rehearse Energy-Shortage Measures

PM2003105990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Mar 90 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Cuban Demonstrations"]

[Text] Havana, 17 March—"Socialism or death!", "The people are with the party and Fidel!"—under just such slogans mass youth rallies and demonstrations were held Friday in the Cuban capital and other of the country's cities in support of the proclamation here the day before of the "Appeal to the Fourth Communist Party Congress." As the AIN national news agency reports, these events took place spontaneously and were convincing demonstrations of young men and women's devotion to

the ideals of socialism, and of their readiness, if need be, to sacrifice themeslves in defense of these ideals.

One of the key ideas expressed in the party appeal to the Cubans is the necessity "to prepare for the possible development of the country in complex conditions and to maintain its durability in any circumstances." In accordance with this appeal, a "day of labor in special conditions" was held Thursday in Havana. Over 800,000 employees of industrial enterprises, transportation, and the services sphere worked on this day with a view to the maximum saving of fuel and power. The aim of the experiment, the local press writes, is to reveal hidden reserves in the economy and to seek out ways of raising labor discipline, as well as to monitor the readiness of labor collectives to ensure the operation of the economy in conditions of the so-called "special period in peacetime" which may be announced in the event of an enforced shortage of fuel and power in the republic.

Supreme Soviet Session

Moscow TV Carries Supreme Soviet Session 21 Mar

Primakov Opens Session

LD2103214190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1905 GMT on 21 March begins carrying a recorded relay of the Soviet of the Union session on 21 March in the Kremlin in Moscow.

Yevgeniy Primakov, chairman of the Soviet of the Union, opens the session, registers the deputies, and announces that the session will discuss legislation affecting secession from the union.

At 1906, Deputy Sebentsov, chairman of the Committee on Issues of Legislation of the Soviet of the Union, is invited to speak. He outlines the procedural possibilities for the bill. He says that at the third session no one argued with the Lithuanians' right to secede. He adds that during examination of the bill in committee critical remarks were made. One is that it does not adequately handle the issue of autonomous formations. Another point concerns the time scale for the holding of referenda. How are the results of referendums to be presented to the local Supreme Soviet and formalized? he asks, and goes on to consider all the other stages in the secession process as outlined in the bill. Articles 11 to 18 concern the transitional period as such, and there are a number of shortcomings in the wording, which he goes on to detail. There must be more precision concerning the rights of citizens living in a territory that is on the way to secession. The final stage of secession has to be formally recognized by a meeting of USSR People's Deputies and by the head of state as well. Article 19 is vague. He goes on to criticize others in close detail.

He then presents a personal view: It might be a good idea to consider the wording of a law on accession to the USSR as well as secession from it. In conclusion, he recommends acceptance of the bill at the first reading so long as the amendments moved by the Legislation Committee are taken into account.

At 1921, Tarazevich then starts to speak. He talks about a six-month time frame for the holding of a referendum after the question of secession has first been posed. Voting must take place in each autonomous entity separately. He outlines the actual means of holding a referendum. The transitional phase in secession must be approved by the union as a whole so as to protect the interests of the USSR. He recommends careful consideration of the bill and supports the conclusions and amendments moved by the legislation committee. He makes the point that while the secession process is under way the laws of the USSR should remain in force in the territory.

At 1933, an unidentified deputy speaks about the six-month period in between moving secession and the holding of a referendum.

At 1935, Deputy Zelinskiy talks about the problem of refugees that result from territorial upheavals.

At 1938, Deputy Ostroukhov speaks briefly about the mathematics of the issue.

At 1940, Deputy Kim talks about the problems of ethnic groups that have no autonomous entity of their own.

At 1941, an unidentified deputy speaks briefly about the position of servicemen in seceding territories. He is followed by Deputy Ryabchenko, who talks about the ratification process whereby each seceding territory would endorse the secession. Reservations could be imposed at this stage. He also talks about the need for provisions to protect the rights of minority ethnic groups. Special bodies are needed to oversee the secession process. He recommends taht the bill should be referred back for further work.

At 1947, Deputy Kogan makes individual criticisms of the bill. In particular, he says that the USSR Supreme soviet must be the body that oversees the secession process since the interests of the whole country are involved. He goes on to make detailed comments about a whole series of articles in the bill. A period of 10 years should elapse between one secession attempt and the next, he says.

Secession Law Passed

LD2103215390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1954 GMT continues its recorded relay of the Soviet of the Union session in the Kremlin.

Deputy Bocharov says that what is really needed is not a debate on how to secede but on how we can create the conditions in which no one will want to secede. He proposes that the bill not be passed at the first reading.

At 1959, Deputy (Abdimuratova) talks about the need for the equality of all republics in a renewed federation. They must all have an equal opportunity to succeed.

At 2001, Deputy Rogatin poses the question of what the USSR actually is. He thinks that the right to secede should be stated in the bill to be an exceptional wish. The merits of remaining in the USSR must be depicted positively.

At 2003, Deputy Boyars seeks to refine the concept of citizen and permanently resident for the purposes of identifying who has the right to vote in a referendum in a given seceding territory.

At 2006, an unidentified female deputy speaks briefly, followed by Deputy Volkov, who talks about the mutual

debt claims between Lithuania and the USSR, and says that an objective body must be set up to decide on such claims.

At 2011, Deputy Blokhin says that the bill is following along in the wake of events already in train.

At 2012, Deputy Borodin reiterates the view that the law is too late. Events are already happening.

At 2015, Deputy Gross talks about the need for more independence from the center for each republic. They must be able to run their own affairs on the world stage, e.g. to manage their own trade deals. Then there would be less talk of secession. Attention must be be paid to the interests of all the national groups and minorities. We ignore them at our peril; negative phenomena will result from indifference on the part of the authorities.

At 2021, Deputy Burayev raises the question of military installations in independent territories. They must remain under Soviet control.

At 2023, Deputy Alksnis makes a brief point of information. Primakov then begins to sum up the debate prior to voting. He says that points have been raised about the law of union, which is multilateral in nature, affecting all republics. Some deputies have urged delay. He then puts the bill to the vote: for 175; against 15; abstained 6. The bill is thus passed.

At 2027 GMT, the recorded relay of the Soviet of the Union session ends and a recorded relay of the Soviet of Nationalities session begins.

Union Governing Relations Viewed

LD2103224590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2027 GMT on 21 March begins carrying a recorded relay of the Soviet of Nationalities session on 21 March in the Kremlin in Moscow. The session is chaired and opened by Rafik Nishanov, chairman of the Council of Nationalities. He announces that the issue under discussion is legislation governing relations with the Union.

At 2030, Deputy Oleynik calls for the need to clearly delimit the powers of the Union and those of each republic. There is much resentment of the powers of the center following the decades of totalitarian rule, which moved peoples around as it thought fit. He outlines provisions contained in various articles in the bill, including areas of joint interest between the center and republics. The bill also contains provisions for resolving territorial disputes between republics. He also deals with articles covering the status of autonomous formations.

Oleynik goes on to comment on the rights of republics to enter into economic agreements with each other. Such agreements must not run counter to the interests of the USSR or other Union republics. He cites other articles covering this and other subjects. The Union Constitution takes precedence where it is in conflict with a republic's constitution.

At 2046, Oleynik commends the bill to the house, calling for a Union where people belong voluntarily and do not wish to leave.

At 2048, Nishanov offers the floor to Lubenchenko, speaking for the legislative committee.

Lubenchenko describes the bill as an enrichment of the existing Union treaty and sets out his committee's reasons for this opinion, dealing with the historical background to the old treaty, which comprises various laws passed since 1922. A federation has to be an organic whole worth more than the sum of its parts. The committee feels that the title of the bill should drop the reference to renewing the Union treaty, for that must await a new constitution. On delimiting the powers of the Union and the republics, the committee recommends a full list of the powers of the Union and joint powers, leaving everything else to the republics.

At 2056, Nishanov offers the floor to Tarazevich, chairman of the Commission on Nationalities, who focuses on the commission's discussion of protection of the rights and interests of autonomous formations, referring to articles relevant to this issue. The bill delimits the powers of the center and the republics well, and Tarazevich invites further suggestions.

At 2100, the floor is offered to Deputy Angapov from Buryatiya, who speaks of the importance of friendship and trust in relations between republics.

At 2102, Deputy Sharipov calls for extension of the rights of autonomous republics, as provided in the CPSU Central Committee platform on relations among nationalities. Changes in the status of an autonomous republic should take account of all ethnic groups living there.

At 2105, Deputy Shevchenko expresses views on which spheres should be the province of the central government and which should be under joint central and republican responsibility. She agrees with Lubenchenko that areas not spelled out in those two categories should be the sole responsibility of the individual republics.

At 2108, Deputy Safin expresses views on the right of autonomous formations to conclude agreements with Union republics.

At 2110, Deputy Gryazin criticizes the bill for undermining the sovereignty of republics and doubts that the Estonian Supreme Soviet would not agree to a Union treaty as envisaged here.

At 2112, Nishanov calls for a constructive approach to the debate and offers the floor to Deputy (Chekhoyev), who calls for guarantees for autonomous republics.

Union Treaty Discussed

LD2103225790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2115 GMT continues its recorded relay of 21 March session of the Soviet of Nationalities in the Kremlin.

Nishanov observes that today is a holiday in some Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan and congratulates people in the republics concerned on behalf of the chamber.

At 2117, Deputy Mongo dwells on guarantees for small peoples. The law should be adopted as soon as possible, but more needs to be done.

At 2120, Deputy Manko supports the notion of calling to account those responsible for violations of the Union treaty.

At 2121, Deputy Blokhin speaks on behalf of the Committee on Economic Reform, taking issue with Gryazin's objections to the bill. Sovereignty is provided for in the bill, but the rights of all nationalities living in a given republic have to be taken into account.

At 2125, Deputy (Balbasov) voices his opinions on the proposed bill.

At 2126, Deputy (Obolenskiy) calls for consideration of the rights of peoples who do not have their own territorial formations.

At 2129, Deputy Komarov says that people have compared the USSR to a zoo: The inhabitants have been fed and looked after, but they want their freedom even so. The Soyuz group of deputies have looked at events in Lithuania and have concluded that the rights of Soviet citizens there who wish to retain the status quo are being trampled on. These people have appealed to the Soyuz group to try to get the Lithuanian deputies disqualified, since they are doing nothing to protect them from the extremists. Komarov calls for the introduction of direct presidential rule in Lithuania. A referendum should be held in Lithuania.

At 2135, Deputy Boyars says that the principle of subordination must be clearly stated in the preamble to the Union treaty. He goes on to make a couple of textual criticisms.

At 2140, Deputy Kogan says that there must be equal terms of accession to the USSR—equal rights and equal obligations.

At 2141, an unidentified female deputy compares the future planned Union of the countries of West Europe with the state of the Soviet republics. Why can they not join together on the basis of economic benefit?

At 2143, another unidentified female deputy draws attention to the difficult conditions prevailing in the USSR at the moment, and says that all republics must agree on the basic provisions of the treaty of the Union.

At 2144, the announcer breaks in to say that other deputies also spoke, and adds: "tomorrow morning discussion of the bill will be continued."

At this point the recorded relay of the Council of Nationalities session ends.

Supreme Soviet Further Debates Secession Law

Deputy Tarazevich Speaks

LD2103135690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Excerpts] At the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet: commentator Marina Novitskaya is at the microphone. [passage omitted]

[Novitskaya] The Soviet of the Union has been in session since this morning. It has started examining the draft law on the procedure for settling issues relating to the withdrawal of a union republic from the Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

Deputy Sebentsov delivered a report on behalf of the Committee for Issues of Legislation and Legality. He described the draft in detail, though he did complain that the text was received by the committee only two days ago. What are the main things in this draft? Well, first of all, it envisages several stages in settling the issue of a republic seceding from the USSR. Either a relevant secession decision of the Supreme Soviet of a republic, or a demand put by no less than one tenth of its population constitute grounds for beginning the procedure. In the event of such decisions being made, a referendum is conducted in the republic; the results of this are summed up and formulated by the Supreme Soviet of the republic. After that, the results of the referendum are submitted to the country's Supreme Soviet. The latter evaluates the material received, and in the case of any legal infringement, it may proclaim a repeat referendum. After the decision of the Supreme Soviet, and only then, a transitional period is established. It is suggested that this should last approximately five years. During this period, all issues relating to the republic's secession from the country are settled, as well as the economic, and legal and constitutional and social rights of citizens—and only then, after according to general opinion an agreement is reached on all issues, is a congress of people's deputies convened, and the secession of the republic acknowledged to be effective. On the whole, in the opinion of the speaker, the draft envisages a democratic procedure for resolving the most difficult issues; to put it bluntly, the realization of the right of the republics to self-determination; and it can be submitted for discussion.

[Passage omitted] In order to give deputies' the fullest idea of this, to put it bluntly, unique bill, the chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities Commission on Nationalities

Policy and Interethnic Relations was invited to the sitting and given the floor. This is Deputy Tarazevich. [passage omitted]

[Begin Tarazevich recording] I want to stress in particular that the draft takes as its point of departure the fact that in a union republic which comprises autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts and autonomous okrugs, a referendum is separately conducted in each autonomous formation. The people of autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts and okrugs maintain the right to independently solve the issue of staying in the union or in the seceding republic. The people of the autonomous formations also independently resolve the issue of raising the question of their state and legal status, their future state and legal status. I think you will support this approach, since it indicates the universal nature of the right of any people to the free self-determination of its historical destiny.

As regards groups of national minorities living in an integral area of the territory of a seceding republic, the draft does not, it is true, as yet provide for a specific mechanism for settling their destiny.

The draft devotes due attention to procedures which would ensure that the decision of every participant in the referendum is free and voluntary. These involve, first and foremost, setting up a commission to conduct the referendum, with representatives of the interested parties; and the presence on the territory of the union republic, in the capacity of observers, of authorized representatives of the union and also representatives of international organizations. A number of legal norms and procedures are also envisaged, which enable the expression of attitudes of other union republics and of the union as a whole about the problems arising as a result of the secession of an individual republic from the USSR. These include sending to union and autonomous republics and autonomous formations the relevant documents for studying and evaluating the consequences arising from the fact of any possible secession of a union republic from the union; examination of the issues at the USSR Supreme Soviet and at the Congress of People's Deputies; establishment of a transitional period not exceeding, as has already been mentioned, five years, to allow mutual interests to be met; setting up a conciliation commission; and other procedures. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Law Passed After First Reading

LD2103135890 Moscow TASS in English 1319 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 21 TASS—Tensions ran high today in the Soviet parliament as deputies grappled with a bill designed to set procedures for secession from the Soviet Union.

The new bill, put before both houses of the Supreme Soviet, says that the referendum on secession from the Union may be called by the republic's Supreme Soviet or on the demand of a tenth of its total population.

Secession is granted if no less than two-thirds of citizens permanently residing on the territory of the republic approve.

After the results of the referendum are discussed at the Congress of Soviet People's Deputies, the republic can leave the Union during a five-year transition period.

Five years are given to determine what to do with federal property on the territory of the republic and settle property and financial issues with the union and other republics, the bill says.

Under the bill, the outcome of the referendum is considered final, irrespective of the outside reaction, said Deputy Andrey Sebentsov from Moscow, who spoke on behalf of the parliament's legislative committee.

Sebentsov praised the draft for a smooth economic transition mechanism. Some provisions in the document should be improved, including the part on the separate count of referendum results in ethnic enclaves, he said.

The debate that followed showed that deputies were divided on the issue. Some flatly rejected even the first reading of the draft, saying it was badly formulated.

Vaidotas Antanaitis of Lithuania said that he and his compatriots were attending the session only as observers.

However, he said the bill should take account of the differences between republics, the history of the republic's entry into the Soviet Union and "its current international standing."

Yevgeniy Primakov, who chaired the session, then interrupted Antanaitis and told him to sit down, saying that he had deviated from the subject and was presenting his own interpretation of events that happened half a century ago.

Deputy Yevgeniy Kogan, who represents Estonia's Russian speakers, suggested not to limit the transitional period to five years, but let it continue indefinitely until all disputable questions are settled. Several other speakers supported him.

The Council of the Union passed the bill in the first reading, submitting it to parliamentary committees for improvement. It will then be put before the other house—the Council of Nationalities.

The Council of Nationalities will begin its session in the afternoon.

Secession Procedure Detailed

LD2103204690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1600 GMT broadcasts a 25-minute "Supreme Soviet Diary" by correspondent Marina Novikskaya on today's

work of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The program begins with Novitskaya noting that today the deputies examined the procedure for resolving questions connected with the secession of union republics from the USSR.

"What procedure for secession is proposed? The legislator proposes that it should be divided into several stages. The first of these is the decision by a republic's Supreme Soviet, or the demand by no less than one-tenth of its population. In such an event, a referendum is conducted within six months. Its results are presented to the Supreme Soviet of the country and it, in its turn, has the right, if the referendum has not been carried out in accordance with the law, to declare a repeat referendum.

"Then, the question is presented for examination by the Congress of People's Deputies, and in the event of a positive decision, the so-called transitional period begins from that moment. It is to last approximately five years. Over this time, all the questions of mutual relations between the union republics seceeding from the Soviet Union and the USSR as a whole must be resolved. Naturally, that concerns the economy, questions of law and constitutional liberties, and many other problems. And that process is completed again by the Congress of People's Deputies which also adopts the decision on the secession of one republic or another from the USSR," Novitskaya says.

She goes on to say that the debates were "even more stormy." Nineteen people spoke and although they did not all agree with each other, the majority proposed to adopt the law at its first reading.

Novitskaya then plays recorded excerpts of speeches by deputies Zelinskiy, Kim, Ryabchenko, and Borodin propounding differing views on the secession procedure.

Novitskaya notes that Deputy Antanitis from Lithuania also spoke today. "He said right away that the deputies from Lithuania are present here only as observers. And he tried to substantiate and justify his republic's election of the Supreme Soviet. However, since his speech was in no way related to the draft laws under discussion, the chair, Deputy Primakov, chairman of the Soviet of the Union, was forced to cut him short."

Novitskaya notes that the majority of deputies voted to adopt at its first reading the draft law on the procedure for resolving questions connected with the secession of union republics from the Soviet Union and it "will now be passed to the Soviet of Nationalities," she says.

Following this, correspondent Andrey Nikiforov reports on the work of the Soviet of Nationalities which examined the first reading of the draft law on renewal of the union treaty and the demarcation of the power of the USSR and the union republics.

Supreme Soviet Discusses Demarcation of Powers

LD2103145190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] At the USSR Supreme Soviet session. We go over to where our all-union radio correspondents are reporting from the Kremlin.

[Ruvinskiy] Aleksandr Ruvinskiy at the microphone: Let me sum up the preliminary results of the day. Discussion of the bills connected with tackling interethnic problems is under way today.

The Soviet of the Union sat in the morning. The procedure for tackling the issues connected with a union republic seceding from the USSR was examined. This bill was approved in the first reading. Further work is to be done on it and it will then return for further discussion.

Since 1500, the Soviet of Nationalities sitting has been discussing another document: A bill on renewing the union treaty and on demarcating the powers of the USSR and the union republics. Deputy Oleynik reported on the discussion of this document in the commissions and committees. Deputy Lubenchenko spoke on behalf of the legislative committee. As for discussion itself, in this chamber it proceeded in what is perhaps a more exacerbated form than was the case where the Soviet of the Union is concerned.

Deputies from Georgia, Lithuania, and Estonia subjected the bill to serious criticism. Those representing autonomous formations likewise expressed complaints about the document under discussion.

An intermission in the sitting has now been declared. The discussion will resume after the intermission.

Union Treaty Spurs 'Heated' Debate

LD2103183290 Moscow TASS in English 1804 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 21 TASS—A heated discussion of the bill on the renewal of a Union treaty and separation of powers of the Soviet Union and Union republics was held this afternoon in the Council of Nationalities, one of the two chambers of Soviet Parliament.

Presenting the first reading of the bill, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Nationalities Boris Oleinik of the Ukraine stated that this legal act reduces to a minimum the powers of the centre, expanding to the utmost the rights of republics as sovereign powers.

The bill serves as a real legal basis for the creation of a new Union treaty and the corresponding section in the USSR Constitution, said Konstantin Lubenchenko, speaking on behalf of the Supreme Council Committee for Legislation.

He emphasised that the document enumerates powers of the federation and spheres of joint competence of the

Union and the republics. All other things are in the competence of Union republics.

Many participants in the debate are of the opinion that the competence of the Union and joint powers set out in the bill are so extensive as to leave no room for real sovereignty of the republics.

Vladislav Ardzinba, representing Abkhazia, an autonomous republic within Georgia, Valentia Shevchenko, president of the Presidium of the Ukraine's Supreme Soviet and others emphasised that what is needed is not the renewal of the 1922 Union treaty, but the adoption of a new treaty in keeping with present-day conditions.

Representatives of some republics called into question the validity of the old treaty. The speeches by Tamaz Gamkrelidze of Georgia and Igor Gryazin of Estonia were so harsh that Rafik Nishanov, chairing the meeting, urged deputies to conduct the debate in a more constructive way.

Representatives of autonomous republics and regions expressed dissatisfaction with the actual contents of autonomy. There were proposals to grant to autonomous republics the same rights as union republics have.

Separate meetings of the chamber will be held again on Thursday. The debate on a package of bills on the renewal of Soviet federation will be continued.

Direct Presidential Rule in Lithuania Proposed

LD2103174990 Moscow TASS in English 1744 GMT 21 Mar 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow March 21 TASS—A group of Supreme Soviet deputies today urged President Mikhail Gorbachev to introduce direct presidential rule in Lithuania.

The several hundred-strong group "Soyuz" (union) of deputies from different republics also declared that the issue of Lithuanian secession from the USSR could only be decided through a referendum in the Baltic republic.

In an appeal to the president and Supreme Soviet, they called attention to a Lithuanian bill on criminal accountability for anti-state calls, which, they said, will make it possible "to effectively make short work of citizens of the USSR that call for preserving the existing system and the state integrity of this country".

The group said the bill targeted Soviet citizens wishing to see Lithuania stay in the USSR and should be declared in contradiction of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and both federal and Lithuanian constitutions.

The appeal said also that since Lithuanian deputies insisted their status was now that of "observers", they no longer represented or upheld the interests and rights of hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens living in Lithuania.

The group said it had been approached by the committee of Soviet citizens in Lithuania, asking for help to protect rights and liberties defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the federal constitution.

"From this moment the people's deputies who are members of the 'Soyuz' group assume the responsibility and duty of representing in the Supreme Soviet the interests of Soviet citizens living in Lithuania and unwilling to leave the USSR, and of upholding their rights and interests to the extent of their powers and possibilities," the appeal said.

Supreme Soviet Resolution on Land Laws Cited

PM0803162590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Text of USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution: "On the Enactment of the Fundamentals of USSR and Union Republic Legislation on Land"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To enact the Fundamentals of USSR and Union Republic Legislation on Land on 15 March 1990 and Article 12 of the Fundamentals on 1 January 1991.

2. To lay down that, until the Land legislation of the USSR and union republics is brought into line with the Fundamentals of the USSR and union republic legislation on land, the existing USSR and union republic legislative acts on land will operate insofar as they do not contradict the Fundamentals.

The Fundamentals of the USSR and union republic legislation on land shall be applied to legal relations formed after the enactment of the Fundamentals, that is, from 15 March 1990, except for legal relations envisaged by Article 12 of the Fundamentals to which this article shall apply from 1 January 1991.

With regard to legal land relations established before 15 March 1990 (and before 1 January 1991 in the case of the legal relations on the land tax and rent), the Fundamentals of the USSR and union republic legislation on land shall apply to those rights and duties established after the enactment of the Fundamentals.

3. To establish that:

Decisions on the granting of land plots adopted before 15 March 1990 by the relevant organs within the bounds of their competence but not executed by the time of the enactment of the Fundamentals of USSR and union republic legislation on land shall be executed in accordance with the requirements of the Fundamentals;

Citizens who are not workers of agricultural enterprises and also legal entities enjoying temporary use of plots of land granted to them by agricultural enterprises before 15 March 1990 shall retain their rights until the registration by them of the right to own or use land;

The calculation of the periods envisaged by Point 9 of Article 9 of the Fundamentals shall begin from the moment of their enactment.

4. Union and autonomous republic Supreme Soviets:

shall bring the legislation of union and autonomous republics into line with the Fundamentals of the USSR and union republic legislation on land;

shall elaborate the form of the State Deed certifying the right to own and the right to make permanent use of land, the procedure for granting or withdrawing land, and also provide a specific timetable for registering the rights of land ownership and land use;

must proceed, in the process of transforming land relations, from the need for the priority development of agriculture, the free choice of forms of economic management, the phased performance of work, the maximum consideration of socioeconomic and ecological consequences, and close interlinking with the full range of measures to implement the economic reform.

5. The USSR Council of Ministers is instructed:

before 1 October 1990:

to submit to the USSR Supreme Soviet proposals to amend and augment the existing USSR legislative acts which arise from the Fundamentals of USSR and union republic legislation on land;

to bring decisions of the USSR Government into line with the Fundamentals of the USSR and union republic legislation on land;

to ensure that ministries and state committees and departments of the USSR revise and repeal their normative acts which are contrary to the Fundamentals;

By 1 August 1990 to implement a package of measures with the aim of enacting the Fundamentals of the USSR and union republic legislation on land, to include:

the systematic discovery of lands which are unused or are not being used rationally;

the establishment of the principles of payment for land;

the ratification of basic provisions of land use arrangements and a procedure for drawing up a land registry and the monitoring [monitoring] of lands;

the creation of new state organs or the strengthening of existing ones to provide, on an interdepartmental basis, for the monitoring of lands, the compilation of a land register, land use arrangements, and state checks [kontrol] on the use and protection of lands;

and a special program of support for peasant farms.

The draft 13th 5-Year Plan is to provide for measures to create equal opportunities for the development of all forms of economic management on the land.

6. As from 15 March 1990 the Fundamentals of the USSR and union republic land legislation approved by the USSR Law on 13 December 1968 (USSR Supreme Soviet Gazette for 1968, No. 51, page 485; 1977, No. 38, page 567; 1977, No. 51, page 771; 1980, No. 3, page 42; 1981, No. 3, page 75; 1984, No. 24, page 422; and 1987, No. 32, page 514), are deemed inoperative apart from Article 8 (in the version of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree of 2 December 1987 (USSR Supreme Soviet Gazette, 1987, No. 49, page 791), which is deemed inoperative from 1 January 1991.

7. The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Agrarian Questions and Food, the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Ecology and the Rational Use of Natural Resources, and the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for the Committee for Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order are instructed to monitor the implementation of the measures envisaged by the Resolution and where necessary submit appropriate proposals to the USSR Supreme Soviet.
[Signed] M. Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.
Moscow, the Kremlin, 28 February 1990.

Political & Social

Conclusion of 16 March CPSU Plenum Debate

PM2103001090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Mar 90 Second Edition pp 2-4

[Debate speeches delivered at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 16 March]

[Text] S.I. Gurenko (Second Secretary of Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee)

Esteemed Comrades! Questions concerning the CPSU Statutes have assumed special significance and acuteness in the precongress debate about ways of renewing the party. The need to revise a number of the statutes' norms is now so pressing that this is already being done in some places without so much as a by-your-leave, so to speak. The universal interest in the draft party statutes is natural. The norms and principles embodied in them will determine the main thing: Whether the CPSU will be a renewed Communist Party or will become a party of a different type; whether it will remain united or be transformed into a loose conglomerate, which, incidentally, is what certain reformers are persistently urging us toward.

The answers to these questions are vitally important both today and in the long term. On the one hand, in the prevailing situation only radical, democratic perestroyka of the party can enable it to overcome its internal difficulties and to prove its right to be society's political vanguard.

On the other hand, and many people sitting here have been able to see this for themselves, with the change in the wording of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution

attacks on the CPSU will sharply intensify and attempts by destructive forces to shake and destroy the party structure, to block its activity, and ultimately to try to remove the party from the political arena will be stepped up. In particular, the idea of the need to abolish party organizations in enterprises, educational establishments, state institutions in general, the Armed Forces, and law enforcement organs is being persistently foisted on public opinion. We must categorically sweep aside such attempts, and it is good that this has been reflected in the draft statutes. Our party stems from the worker environment. It has always derived strength from there and had firm support there. Unless we want the CPSU to be transformed into an organization of politicos, if the party intends to continue to express the interests of working people, it cannot and must not quit any sphere connected with society's practical activity.

We must primarily respond to the demand of the time with the ideological and organizational strengthening of party ranks, with unity of action by communists, and with the revival of genuine party comradeship. Examining the draft submitted to the plenum from this viewpoint, we believe that on the whole it takes into account the fundamental processes taking place in the party today, the trends in their development, and current and long-term tasks.

I would like to highlight two points. First, in our opinion, the document contains the basic fundamental principles binding on all party organizations without superfluous detail.

That is not merely a question of form, comrades: The abandonment of the overregulation that today fetters party organizations and communists to some extent opens up scope for initiative and ultimately stimulates a transition to activeness and creativity. Moreover, a substantial expansion of union republic communist parties' independence and democratization of their relations with the center are envisaged. In our view, this approach not only accords with the requirements of renewal in the party but also is fully consonant with the expansion of republics' economic independence and the strengthening of their sovereignty and accords with the new content of the principles of the treaty-based Soviet federation.

I want to say that we intend to implement one of the draft statutes' provisions regarding union republic communist parties at a Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum very soon. It will discuss a draft action program and status of the Ukrainian Communist Party elaborated on the basis of the draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th congress and the draft statutes.

Noting all the importance of expanding the independence of union republic communist parties, we believe that this approach must be dialectically combined with the strengthening of the CPSU's ideological and organizational unity. The basis and foundation of this unity must be a commitment to the communist ideal, an obligation imposed by the very name of the party.

I would like—here I support the comrades who spoke earlier—this thought to be emphatically expressed in the CPSU Statutes, obviously in their preamble. Today we should also give some thought to the idea that the statutes should provide for a reliable mechanism for defending the party's unity and potential for reacting adequately to attempts to bring about a split.

Now a few words about the section of the draft devoted to CPSU membership. First, it should be clearly stipulated that a member of the CPSU cannot simultaneously be a member of other parties. That must be unequivocally stated. This must be done today in view of the fact that a multiparty system is now a fait accompli.

Regarding the duties of party members. The list of duties is obviously less specific than the provision about rights. Indeed, norms in paragraph three of the statutes like, for instance, "to set an example of diligence, strictly observe legality and the norms of honor and morality," and so forth are more civil duties than party duties. I think that the condition for CPSU membership must be not merely work in a party organization, which in reality is often confined to silent attendance at meetings. The main thing for a communist is to raise urgent problems of social and production life and take a direct part in solving them.

All the provisions connected with party membership and the criteria for it must be worded unambiguously and—let us not be afraid of the word—toughly. Otherwise party organizations will be transformed into loose, eroded structures membership of which imposes no obligations. In this connection we should note a point like the suspension of CPSU membership for a certain period. It should either be removed or clarified: What is this and who needs it?

Certainly, a strong point of the draft CPSU Statutes is the fact that they make a considerable turn toward democracy, broad glasnost, and collegiality and squeeze out rigid centralism. Nevertheless, it is a mistake for us to refrain even from mentioning the basic principle on which our party is built and operates today—the principle of democratic centralism. The ten paragraphs of the internal party democracy section essentially reveal its new content. There are norms of relations between local and higher party organs and the correlation between self-management, organization, democracy, and discipline within the party, but the term itself is missing.

Supporting the proposals voiced here, I want to say that the opportunity for communists to unite in platforms on specific problems, clubs, and discussion centers must be regarded as a method of internal party work and in no way as an organizational principle. That is a direct path to the organization of parallel and even opposing organizational structures and thereafter factions, whose creation is not permitted by the draft CPSU Statutes and which lead to a split in the party.

I would also like to draw your attention to the provision of the draft regarding the need for repeat discussion of disagreements in assessing the draft decisions of party committees' executive organs. This would considerably complicate work. In our view, in such cases a commonplace, practically tested norm should be observed—decisionmaking by the majority. Otherwise we will be doing nothing but hold discussions. But now, more than ever before, we need to act.

I support the proposal that the powers of party congress and conference delegates should be retained for the entire period of activity of the party organ.

There is another group of questions concerning the formation and activity of the higher party organs. They certainly merit attention also because some of the proposed changes are extremely radical. We cannot assess their expediency on the basis of any experience, but only in the abstract. But the existing arguments in favor of, for instance, instituting the post of party chairman and his deputies convince by no means all communists.

I think that after publication of the draft statutes many communists will also ask themselves the following questions: What new elements will the creation of a Presidium introduce into the work of the CPSU Central Committee, and how is this organ supposed to differ from the present Central Committee Secretariat? Let us be blunt, these are natural questions and the draft statutes do not provide an exhaustive answer to them. I will quote the wording of the draft: "The Presidium's decisions on the most important political questions are adopted provisionally and enter into force once they are ratified by a scheduled CPSU Central Committee plenum."

First, it is not altogether clear what yardsticks will be used to determine the importance of questions. Second, what if there is still some considerable time to go before the Central Committee plenum, but matters brook no delay, as has been happening increasingly often of late?

I believe that in view of what I have said we should give some serious thought to the option mentioned by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in his report. Namely: Think about improving the functions of the existing CPSU Central Committee Secretariat.

Several obscurities also arise in connection with the upcoming formation of standing commissions of party organs, including the CPSU Central Committee, on the main spheres of activity. Here we should precisely define who will work in these commissions on a permanent basis and how, and at the same time take into account practical experience, which, let us be blunt, is today more negative than positive.

The question of creating independent elected control organs in the center and at local level requires considered, well thought-out approaches. The experiment being held in our republic in the Kiev city and oblast party organizations, and also in five city and rayon party organizations, makes it possible to draw practical conclusions in this regard. The experiment shows that there is a danger of these commissions duplicating party committees and becoming parallel leading organs. In order to avoid this, we must more clearly define the functions and rights of control and auditing commissions, including the central commission. Their attention must be focused primarily on internal party affairs and not be diverted into monitoring the implementation of various decisions and into routine preparations for plenums.

One final point. As has already been said here, there is a need to elaborate specific provisions regarding the juridical and legal status of party organizations, including their property status. Don't misunderstand me, I have not set myself the goal of finding as many faults and obscurities as possible in the document under examination. A draft is a draft, it must be brought up to scratch, so to speak, through common efforts. The better we do this, the more successfully the CPSU Statutes will work for the party's renewal and promote the perestroyka of its entire life and activity.

Thank you for your attention.

V.I. Mitrokhin (Secretary of the Moscow Higher Party School Party Committee)

Today, when contradictions in social development in the country and the party have reached an extreme degree of tension, it is exceptionally important in analyzing their causes and seeking methods of solution to utilize the Marxist methodology of analysis set forth by Lenin with extreme clarity in the well known formula: From direct contemplation of life to creative scientific interpretation of it, and only then to practice, to action.

In the distant and not so distant past this triangle of the intellectual analytical process, so to speak, was distorted and transformed into a straight line leading from superficial contemplation to action. Many extremely complex economic, social, political, and ethnic questions were resolved in this way without serious reflection, without intellectual effort.

But, alas, they were resolved in such a way that we have been quite unable to break out of the vicious circle of, in Hegel's words, "the irony of history," whereby we supposed one thing... and the upshot in reality was totally different. I think there is no need to bolster this thesis with facts, there are plenty of them and we are all well aware of them.

The simplification and desire to squeeze the complex dialectics of contradictory life into standard instructions for the behavior of all and sundry to a great extent contributed to the formation of one-dimensional dogmatic thinking, including on the part of party cadres, involving a set of standard value judgments like: "good," "bad," "clear," "unclear," "mine," and "enemy's."

Nostalgia for the artificial simplicity and universal clarity of questions and for straightforward methods of resolving them is often displayed even nowadays. Packaged in various ways, it was voiced at the CPSU Central Committee February (1990) Plenum and it is also being voiced today.

The lack of dialectical interaction between science and policy, policy and science, is one of the main reasons for stagnation in the past and the deepening crisis today. Science, when it is not required, begins to wither, and policy, when it is not enriched by real scientific methodology, turns into improvisation and dilettantism.

This is a dangerous trend, especially for our party, which is operating in such complex conditions of revolutionary perestroyka.

It is equally dangerous to base policy on so-called pluralist methodology and theory.

The diggers of new foundations of socialism have already sharpened their shovels and set to work.

Pluralism in ideological debates and in theoretical quests should certainly be welcomed in every way. But debate cannot serve as the theoretical basis for policy, it is merely a method of apprehending the truth.

Real policy is based on knowledge of the objective laws of social progress. I believe that we must over and over again carry out a profound analysis of the practice of perestroyka and grope for the objective trends in the country's social development in the context of world processes and on this basis identify the determining, leading guidelines for the renewal of the party and society.

I will venture to make a few specific points about this that are directly relevant to the draft documents prepared for the 28th CPSU Congress.

The leading trend in social development today is the humanization of social relations and the overcoming of man's alienation from his human essence, from ownership, from power, from nature, and from culture.

This trend is noted and receives appropriate theoretical and practical political substantiation in the draft CPSU Central Committee platform. Although the section of the platform entitled "Man Is at the Center of the Party's Policy" is extremely schematic, on the whole this orientation should certainly be supported. Unfortunately, it cannot be discerned in the draft statutes. The draft statutes should more clearly and more thoroughly set out provisions regarding the humanization of political activity; that the party consists not of masses but of people; that not only does the party need the individual, but above all the individual needs the party; that a party based on the principles of party comradeship and collectivism can do a great deal for every communist, to satisfy his political interests, and to maintain and defend his active life stance and political position.

Slogans of humanism have already been hung on the facades of many movements laying claim to the status of parties. This fact should also be taken into account in our theoretical and political work.

For the CPSU humanism must be not just another slogan, but a most important principle of political activity.

I think there is no need to prove and substantiate the objective trend toward democratization of the whole aggregate of social relations, including political relations.

It can be noted with satisfaction that the draft statutes not only set out the basic principles of the consistent democratization of internal party relations, but also formulate the mechanism for their implementation. Subsequent work in this direction could be devoted to deeper and clearer study of questions of democratism in the formation of elected organs, especially at the central level, and delegates to CPSU congresses and all-union party conferences.

In this instance the principle of diversity and of a free choice of options does not seem the best and most democratic. Therefore paragraph 10 needs additional work.

The provisions regarding party referenda should also be set out more clearly.

As perestroyka deepens, society and all its social structures are being politicized. The party should comprehensively take into account this fact. Unfortunately, judging by the draft statutes, there is no real orientation toward political methods and diverse forms of political activity, including political struggle. Two or three declarative theses saying that we must work by political methods will scarcely suit communists. There is a need for thorough assessment of the draft by political scientists. It must be the statutes of a political organization operating in a multiparty political system and seeking political leadership in society.

In social development a trend toward the intellectualization of social relations can clearly be discerned. Are our party and its top leading organs reacting adequately to this? I think not. The thesis regarding the party's intellectual tasks, including questions of social science, culture, ideology, education, and information in the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform, is superficially worked out. These questions are also practically sidestepped in the draft statutes. The statutes do not even mention the party's scientific forecasting, ideological, cultural educational, and political information functions. You get the impression that, as before, the draft statutes were prepared on the basis of departmental principles and were not studied in the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Commission and other commissions.

I think that the relevant sections of the draft platform and statutes require substantial additional work.

In the context of the problems of the party's intellectual potential I would like to touch on the question of the party's scientific, research, and educational institutions. There has long been a pressing need to radically reconstruct this system: It is cumbersome, inefficient, and poorly linked with real tasks in the activity of party organizations and their organs, and as a result is rightly criticized.

Without laying claim to the truth, I will make just a few specific proposals on this score.

About the structure. The structure of these institutions must be optimized at both the local and central levels. Today courses for improving qualifications, universities of Marxism-Leninism, houses of political enlightenment, and in a number of places higher party school training and consultation centers operate in regional party committees. Each toils away, not always in the right direction. It is advisable to simplify the structure and to create under local organization party committees single centers with scientific forecasting, sociological, training and methodological, and political propaganda functions, reinforcing them with professionally trained cadres. Preliminary calculations show that the total number of personnel could be reduced in the process.

Clearly, the system of training cadres in party VUZ's [higher educational institutions] on a long-term basis, whereby students study for five, four, three, or two years, mostly by correspondence, is obsolete. The interests of the cause demand an orientation toward a system of intensive targeted internal training courses which students would take while continuing with their main job. Such courses could last between three days and a year according to the category of student and the aim of the instruction. Party committees could use real requirements to shape their order to the Higher Party School regarding the duration of study, the categories of student, the thematic direction, and the specialization of tuition. This orientation would create the conditions for considerably strengthening the scientific consultation components of higher party schools and their more active practical political activity in the regions.

It is hard for me to talk about the Academy of Social Sciences, the Marxism-Leninism Institute, and the Social Sciences Institute, but I think there is a pressing need for profound changes there, too. Overall, I think we need a reorientation: from training apparatus-type cadres to training political leaders capable of carrying out professionally competent, intellectual work in conditions of a multiparty system.

Our sluggishness in economics has long been noted. Today everyone is also acutely aware of sluggishness in politics and in the activity of its leading organs.

To lose time is to lose almost everything. This is happening today. The main measure of political activity and political decisionmaking must be not five-year plans and years, but days and weeks. I have already said this at a Moscow CPSU Gorkom [City Committee] plenum, and I repeat it here—the party, its organs, and everyone who is sincerely concerned about the party's prestige must work more intensively, and therefore more effectively. In view of this we need to elaborate a mechanism for implementing the party's forecasting function in order to ensure, in Lenin's words, that circumstances are not the master of socialists, but socialists are the master of circumstances. World political science and practical politics have accumulated rich experience of developing forecasting models. It is time we too ceased to live in an atmosphere of constant surprises.

I think that the system of party leading organs whereby it is proposed to have seven agents of political leadership at the top level (the congress, the conference, the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium, the party chairman and his deputies, CPSU Central Committee commissions, and CPSU Central Committee secretaries) will prove in practice to be cumbersome and inefficient, and I would think the commissions ought to reflect on this question.

G.Ch. Shirshin (First Secretary of Tuva CPSU Obkom)

Comrades! I want to speak out on questions concerning our party's place and role in Soviet society.

The Central Committee draft platform for the 28th CPSU Congress correctly says that the party will be able to retain its vanguard positions and continue the cause which it has initiated and which the people support at this difficult juncture only if it undergoes radical perestroyka itself. Since it is a question of profound perestroyka of the party, then communists, and not only communists, are entitled to expect a clear answer to fundamental questions concerning the nature and essence of the party and the fundamental ideological and organizational principles of its life and activity. In this regard in studying and discussing the draft platform we constantly run up against the basic Leninist tenets about the party of the new type—the Communist Party—and its place and role in socialist society. Especially as the draft platform raises the question of the need to fundamentally change, I emphasize, the CPSU's position in society and of the reform of the party.

We conceive of the renewed CPSU as a party with a socialist choice, the draft platform stresses. First, many people are asking a question. Why merely conceive? It seems a bit of an afterthought. Second, why is the socialist choice only now becoming our party's program goal? Did it not make the socialist choice back in 1903? Was a program of socialist building not adopted at the eighth party congress? Those are the questions communists are asking.

Let us look at the preamble to the draft statutes. In my view, not everything here is thought through. Thus it says that, basing itself on creative development of the ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, it (the CPSU) serves the people and sets as its goal the creation of humane democratic socialism in the country and the affirmation of common human values. The CPSU relies on the

socialist choice of the working class and all the working people.... It does not say here that our party will be guided by the Marxist-Leninist teaching, merely that its work will be based on creative development of it. That is not enough.

Then it says: sets as its goal the creation of humane democratic socialism in the country.... Why creation, not building? There may be no fundamental difference here, but, as we see it, building would be more substantive, more profound.

Then it says: the affirmation of common human values.... But that is not the Communist Party's specific task, although this task does not run counter to its goals. Since the statutes are the Communist Party's fundamental law, they should define and set the party's main tasks as a political organization.

In my view, the words "...relies on the socialist choice" are not altogether felicitous. Why just "relies" rather than wages a struggle, heads the struggle of the working class and the working masses to build a humane democratic socialist society?

If the preamble is retained in its submitted form, this will do still more to sow confusion in people's minds by calling into question, as it were, the party's struggle for socialism over its 87-year existence. The draft statutes should clearly say that the CPSU is built on Leninist ideological and organizational principles.

Communists are perplexed why, every time we want to introduce something new into sociopolitical life and implement it, this is done via criticism of the party's position in society. Yet this position is not one we ourselves have devised, but is objectively law-governed. The emergence of the Communist Party and its functioning in socialist society are profoundly objective. We know this perfectly well.

In my view, it is impossible to change the party's position in society without making some change in approaches toward Lenin's teaching on the Communist Party in socialist society, without diverging, consciously or otherwise, from something fundamental in this.

The very important provision that our party is the nucleus of society's political system was deleted from the constitution at the recent Congress of People's Deputies. Of course, that is the will of the people's deputies, but when we are talking about the fundamental law of the life and activity of the party itself—the statutes—let us more clearly define the party's position in society, and that is possible only on the basis of Lenin's teaching, so we can rally the party ranks around this, strengthen communists' ideological and political positions, and strengthen trust and confidence among communists so we can more resolutely and better advance the cause of perestroyka.

The objective position and role of the CPSU in Soviet society are no impediment to the profound democratization and renewal of society. Moreover, the Communist Party's vanguard role is the guarantee and a most important condition and factor in society's normal functioning. Why then should we change the party's position in society? The renewal and perestroyka of the party itself are quite another matter—they must be implemented without fail.

I think that, instead of profoundly analyzing the essence of the past and present criticism of the party and determining what relates to the party's position in society and what to its activity, level, style, and methods of work, we have lumped all this in a single heap and approached it extremely simplistically, which in turn has evoked an equally simplistic spontaneous reaction and a similar perception in society. I think our work has been seriously deficient here.

I am astonished by the passiveness of the party's theoreticians and its scientific institutions on questions of defending the fundamental tenets of Lenin's teaching on the party in socialist society and Leninism in general. You will remember, comrades: At the Ideological Commission session discussing topical problems of Lenin's legacy in contemporary conditions in connection with the upcoming 120th anniversary of the birth of Vladimir Ilich Lenin (the materials were published in the 2 February PRAVDA under the headline "Leninism and Perestroyka") all the speakers spoke with great concern and alarm of attacks on Lenin and Leninism. I carefully studied all the speeches. G.L. Smirnov, director of the CPSU Central Committee Marxism-Leninism Institute, said: "Lately anti-Leninist ideas have begun to be widespread in our party and country." Saying that a party had formed within our party—the "Democratic Platform" Association of Communists—he quoted the following words from Yu.N. Afanasyev, one of the "Democratic Platform" leaders: "Loyalty to the Leninist tradition is an important factor legitimizing the present regime and is its last bastion, therefore it is necessary to reject all features of the party that springs from Lenin." How can a communist with a party card say such things? I cannot understand how come we go on so much about these comrades, but they continue to speak out in the same vein at Congresses of People's Deputies and in the press. What are the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee and Comrade B.K. Pugo doing? After all, Lenin said way back that in order to unite, you must dissociate yourself from those you disagree with. How come we are only talking about this, why do we not act, why do we not take measures? It's astonishing!

That is not all. So far as Yu.N. Afanasyev is concerned—I am using the words of G.L. Smirnov—Lenin had no concept of socialism at all. But, reading the material pegged to the 120th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth, we find the following words: "Lenin did not leave a detailed program of socialist transformations." So we agree with Afanasyev? I, like many other people, believe that Lenin had a concept of socialism. Comrade Smirnov rightly said that all this must be seriously analyzed at all costs, especially as our scientific institutions and party organs

are almost wholly maintaining a not entirely understandable silence about this. I agree with that.

Ivan Timofeyevich Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chief editor of PRAVDA, who has spoken here, expressed some surprise at the Ideological Commission session and said on that occasion: "We must grasp the real acuteness of the situation, which is that Lenin and Leninism are being rejected, and not somewhere in the West but in our own country, openly, in the pages of many newspapers and journals, from whatever standpoint you like—from monarchism to anarchism." The next speaker, I.I. Antonovich, prorector of the Academy of Social Sciences, said: "Superbly organized forces opposed to socialism are operating in the country, forces so evil and fanatical that the outcome of the struggle is uncertain." (I am quoting from PRAVDA for 2 February 1990.) So, comrades, are our chief ideologists I.T. Frolov, G.L. Smirnov, R.G. Yanovskiy, and the rest merely going to endlessly keep on noting facts, or, as Comrade Chikin, chief editor of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, said at that same session, are we going to muster our scientific forces, focus efforts on the most important fundamental questions of Marxism-Leninism and socialism, and strengthen confidence among communists?

M.F. Nenashev, chairman of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, said on that occasion that today we are engaged in an ideological confrontation with opponents of the party and socialism, we are essentially at the final line, where the very final position is Vladimir Ilich Lenin. I think that one day, when historians analyze this time of ours, they will describe it as a period of astonishing ideological passiveness and helplessness. I think that Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev, Comrade Kapto, and others should act. There is the Central Committee Ideological Department, there is the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Commission.... Why do we in fact show such passiveness on these fundamental issues?

Comrades, we should certainly somehow investigate all these matters. In the most complex, precongress period, when polarization is under way and people are choosing their positions, some people are teetering from one side to the other. We badly need to work clearly and efficiently in this vein during the period before the 28th CPSU Congress. The Academy of Social Sciences, the CPSU Central Committee Marxism-Leninism Institute, our other party educational institutions, and our ideological cadres, especially at the center, must work vigorously. We are having a very difficult time at local level, comrades. When you read the papers and journals you find one thing, when you read political education textbooks you find another.

Comrades, I want to make a proposal here. In the first section, "Membership of the CPSU," where it says that a communist is entitled to take part in the work of social organizations and movements whose activity is based on a socialist foundation, we should slightly broaden this thesis and make it more specific in the spirit of our proposals made at the last sitting of the Central Committee Plenum regarding part two of Article 7 of the USSR Constitution.

I support the proposal of Comrade Shaymiyev, first secretary of the Tatar party obkom [oblast committee], regarding the title of party organizations of autonomous formations. At present a republic's party organization is called an oblast organization. In my view, they should be called, for instance, the Tatar ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], Bashkir ASSR, or Tuva ASSR party organization.

Thank you for your attention.

G.I. Anufriyev (Member of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission, Fitter at Kuybyshev Aviation Plant)

Comrades! Many of us do not happen to be people's deputies, while others find themselves inside this hall for the first time ever. On behalf of these comrades, I would like to congratulate Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on his election to the post of president of the country, to wish him good health and successes in attaining the set goal, and to assure him of our concerted help.

The secretaries of our aviation association's party organizations expressed a wish to meet with me prior to my departure for the Central Committee plenum. They instructed me to incorporate a letter in my speech at this plenum. Allow me to read it out to you.

"We, secretaries of shop party organizations at Kuybyshev's aviation production association, express grave concern over the political situation in the country. In view of the correctly chosen course of our society's democratization, we cannot comprehend the targeted propaganda work being done against the party; public opinion is being shaped with active participation by mass media and television in attempts to discredit the CPSU, and there is a gamble on the party disintegrating from within.

"We believe that perestroyka within the party and its democratization are indeed lagging behind the overall perestroyka processes in the country. The blame for this lies with the extremely inactive stance taken by the Central Committee and the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

"In our view, this was manifested in the absence of a comprehensive concept of perestroyka from the very beginning, the inability to correctly and promptly evaluate the prevailing situation, and the erroneousness of a series of decisions that were made. The result is that today we have a belated and largely declarative draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee, and we still have no draft of the new statutes." (At that point, I had only three hours left before my departure, I had only just shown them the draft, and of course we were unable to discuss the statutes.)

"We fail to comprehend the mass concept of expressing no confidence in a whole series of obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms [rayon party committees]. What is this? Spontaneous processes among the masses or a settlement of scores with the party as a whole, well designed by someone and sanctioned from above? Why is it that the Politburo and the Central Committee have failed to react to these cases? If it is true that people who had compromised themselves were elected to obkoms in oblasts where the people expressed no confidence in the leadership, why is it that the Politburo and the Central Committee failed to promptly intervene in their activity and allowed matters to progress as far as spontaneous rallies and trials? If this is not true, why were they not backed? Neither of these occurred.

"All this, figuratively speaking, can be compared to the situation which prevailed in the country in 1937, when communists were put on trial by 'troykas' with the Politburo's consent, the only difference being that now we find ourselves on the brink of unmanageable kangaroo courts.

"The CPSU's prestige is seriously undermined by the absence of full and unabbreviated information and glasnost on the work of plenums and conferences and on meetings in the Central Committee, which makes it impossible for rank-and-file communists to objectively appraise the stance of Central Committee and Politburo members.

"An extremely negative influence on the CPSU's prestige is exerted by the existing procedure for the dismissal from office of party and state leaders who fail to cope, whereby communists who compromise themselves evade party responsibility and are sent to take a well-deserved rest.

"We ask for an explanation of the Politburo's stance toward the article 'Aliyevism' which was published by PRAVDA. Bearing in mind that it was published while the Central Committee plenum was in session, how is this to be perceived? As a direct challenge to the entire composition of the Central Committee, or as an affirmation that 'Aliyevs existed, Aliyevs exist, Aliyevs will exist'? All these irreplaceable former functionaries live not somewhere far away but in Moscow, right next door to the Central Committee, enjoying their privileges and continuing to perturb the people.

"We get the impression that the party leadership does not read newspapers or journals but, if it actually does, then why does it not perceive that glasnost is working only in one direction—the direction of undermining the party's prestige and eroding communist ideals, the direction of intensified propaganda of the bourgeois way of life and a negative attitude toward our historical past. Speaking at various forums, Comrade Gorbachev asserts that objective perestroyka processes are under way in the country. To admit this means accepting as normal all the sabotage on railroad transport, rising crime, interethnic conflicts, declining discipline and morality, open calls for disobedience of organs of power, and growing shortages of goods.

"Unfortunately, all these facts constitute the actual reality of five years of perestroyka. We accept that these processes are inevitable but, under the circumstances, reaction to them ought to be instantaneous. Resolute actions are needed wherever necessary, but we have yet to see this. As for those who benefit from anarchy, they perceive this as a weakness of government and exploit the situation to their own advantage.

"Party members disagree with the absence of glasnost as regards the expenditure of party budget funds at all levels, despite the fact that PRAVDA carried an article—but just a few days ago. We have learned a few things. We do not understand who plans the building of new party institutions and buildings, of party committees.

"Indignation is aroused by the continuing breaches of party ethics by individual party and government leaders who enjoy privileges, primarily the right to use special rest homes, sanatoriums, dachas, and entire nature reserves which have become places for rest and recreation for their numerous relatives and associates." (In my view, this was prompted by television reports about Smolensk and Volgograd.)

"We categorically disagree with the absence of reaction and proper appraisal by the Politburo and the Central Committee of the campaigns conducted in East European countries and the desecration of the sacred graves of soldier-liberators. We are amazed by the Central Committee's silence over the hooligan actions by Romanian extremists in dismantling Vladimir Ilich Lenin's monument, and why is it that television is reveling in facts like these?

"Perhaps the latest drop of fuel to the flames serving to undermine the party leadership's prestige was provided by the decision to raise party officials' salaries, a decision which was made behind closed doors. Salaries should be increased, but this was done at the wrong time. It would have been more expedient either to do this earlier, when sizable cutbacks of the party apparatus were implemented, or to altogether refrain from making this decision for the time being. And yet, attempts are being made to convince us that an objective self-cleansing process is under way in the party. It is possible to accept this to a certain extent, but we are worried by the fact that communists of long standing, honest and proper comrades who did not join the party casually, are now leaving the party ranks—this can in no way be considered a positive phenomenon in this process.

"For example, 63 of the 4,200 communists recorded as members of our association's party organization have left the party in just the first two months of this year. The main reasons for leaving the CPSU are unwillingness to remain within the ranks of a party many of whose high-ranking leaders have committed serious breaches of legality and morality, as reported by the mass media;

dissatisfaction with the results of perestroyka in the party and the country; the Politburo's and Central Committee's unprincipled stance toward officials of party, soviet, and economic management organs who have failed to justify the people's trust; the ill-timed decision to raise the wages of party apparatus officials and the absence of glasnost on the party budget; and the indecisive measures to eliminate all privileges for a section of society. [end quotes not supplied]

Fifth. To set the maximum percentage of membership dues (this was already said here) at two percent, but I would add this: based on the total amount of earnings used to calculate income tax liability. Thank you for your attention. Signed by the party committee and 116 secretaries of shop party organizations at Kuybyshev's aviation production association.

B.M. Volodin (Member of the CPSU Central Committee, First Secretary of Rostov Party Obkom)

Comrades! When trying to work out the present situation within our party and the reasons behind its declining prestige, one recalls V.I. Lenin's words about the alienation of workers from active revolutionary activity. They were said a long time ago, back at the turn of the century, but these words remain obviously topical for the present. This alienation—and not just of workers alone—is occurring as a result of distortions of a series of principles of party building, of deviation by some communists from the norms of intraparty life. This is why the proposed draft CPSU Statutes, in my opinion, ought to serve as the main lever for overcoming the prevailing situation. I believe that the proposed draft statutes can be adopted as a basis and, bearing in mind the discussion at this plenum, they can be submitted for partywide discussion.

At the same time, I would also like to make some proposals of my own. I deem it necessary that the plenum resolution without fail reflect a mechanism for the collection and processing of remarks on the draft statutes received from communists and party organizations. This must be done so as to ensure that communists realize the full importance of this consultation with them, their involvement in all-party work. Otherwise they may simply not believe in the sincerity of our desire to have this document discussed by the entire party.

About the draft statutes. In my view, the proposed draft offers an insufficiently precise formulation of the party's goals. I deem it necessary that the statutes should precisely identify both the long-term goal of the CPSU's activity, the building of a communist society, and its immediate goal of humane and democratic socialism. What I mean are the modern ideas of socialism, focused on the working man.

I support the draft statutes' proposal on building the party along production and territorial lines. There is no argument that labor collectives will remain a broad field for party activity in the future. It is there that the party is in the best position to perform its historical mission by organizing working people to protect their own interests, primarily those associated with labor activity, as a basis for all the rest.

But while giving priority to work with labor collectives, we should not forget the need to step up the party organizations' influence at places of residence. This is especially important in conditions when, as the draft statutes read, "the CPSU, like the other sociopolitical organizations, struggles for political leadership in society in free elections and through other forms whereby the will of Soviet citizens is expressed." Preparations for the elections of USSR people's deputies and of republic and local soviet deputies in our oblast graphically confirmed the importance of party influence at places of residence.

I would like to cite our oblast's example by way of confirmation. We have 3,057,000 voters, about one-half of whom are either pensioners or people of working age who are not working, in other words one-half of the voters do not work and are, naturally, not members of labor collectives. Even members of labor collectives are not at work around the clock, they are there for just eight hours. Bearing this in mind, party committees in the oblast's cities took the path of setting up party groups and non-statutory neighborhood party organizations at places of residence. As a rule, they are composed of communists elected to neighborhood soviets and communists employed by state institutions who, by virtue of their official duties, serve the neighborhood in question. Like, for example, precinct physicians, militiamen, deputies, and others. Secretaries' councils for coordinating work at places of residence were set up, comprising secretaries of non-statutory party organizations, party organization secretaries from enterprises and institutions sited in the neighborhood in question, and secretaries of territorial party organizations. Their activity is guided by the party raykom or gorkom. These party organizations have taken on many questions concerning daily life, and have made it easier to influence the population. Experience testifies to the promising nature of this avenue of work. Maybe we ought to study the question of possibly having communists, subject to their consent, on the strength [of party organizations] both at work and at places of residence, and legitimize this in the CPSU Statutes? Or maybe we should leave everything as before, but the section on "Duties" should note the need for each communist to participate in activities at his place of residence?

I would like to dwell on yet another question. The draft statutes avoid the question of recommending prospective party members. Provision is made to take into account only the opinion of the labor collective or the public. At the same time, it is proposed to abolish candidate membership and permit free withdrawal from the party. But will this, comrades, not turn the party into something akin to a hobby club? We declare that the CPSU is a league of like-minded persons committed to communist ideals. This being so, when admitting someone to the CPSU's ranks, communists must be certain that they are dealing with a like-minded person

prepared to dedicate himself to the materialization of socialism. This can hardly be established at a party meeting. There is no doubt that it is necessary to rely on the labor collective's opinion, but it is also necessary to enshrine mandatory recommendation by at least two communists who have known the prospective party member for at least one year either at work or at their place of residence. The statutes must also stipulate the question of communists' responsibility for the quality of new recruits and the selection process in the party. In order to simplify this, it may be possible to repeal the requirement for written recommendations, which have not proved their worth, but to limit the requirement to, for example, just having communists countersigning the prospective candidate's application form.

I would like to say a few words about party discipline. The present situation in the party is very complex, you know this. This was confirmed yet again by the Congress of People's Deputies which has only just ended. As a result of this, the mood of many communists, especially those in leadership positions, is somewhat depressed. This is also due to the fact that we never developed a mechanism for the social protection of officials, especially those on party organs, since we never imagined that they would be the targets of such a mass offensive. In order to withstand and emerge victorious from this situation, we need strict and conscientious discipline by each communist, based on ideological tenets. The time has finally come for everyone to take a clear stance in this situation, to determine who stands where—whether people find certain individual provisions in the platform unsuitable, or whether they are simply bored with membership of the Communist Party. In my view, now it is more important for us to know the true disposition of forces rather than to console ourselves with the idea of our unity. In this context, I propose that paragraph five of the draft statutes read as follows: "By building its activity on a broad democratic basis, the CPSU shows concern for strengthening its members' conscious discipline based on the ideological unity of communists. Membership of the CPSU is terminated by decision of the primary party organization or higher-ranking party organ with the primary organization's knowledge in the wake of the expulsion from the CPSU of a party member who rejects its ideological-political and organizational foundations and discredits the party through his behavior."

Yu.A. Prokofyev (First Secretary of Moscow CPSU Gorkom)

In essence, the discussion of the draft CPSU Statutes is a continuation of the debate launched within the party on the Central Committee platform and the forthcoming congress. These fundamental documents are closely interlinked and, I must say, they share joint merits and joint shortcomings. Perhaps the main point is the fact that they go no further than reflecting the currently prevailing state of affairs in sociopolitical life and inadequately address the future, when developed political forces will be operating inside the country.

In these conditions, greater importance than ever before attaches to the clarity of the party's fundamental ideas and political principles. It is impossible to reduce everything to utilitarian pragmatism without looking into the future and laying down clearly defined goals. I believe that the CPSU Statutes must declare that our party's ultimate goal is the building of a communist society. Of course, this is not a question of constructing new dogmas and making practical work fit within them. It is, however, necessary to perceive the outlines of the society which we wish to attain. People need this in order to be able to make a conscious choice between different political programs. For the time being, any party declaring a commitment to democracy can subscribe to the concept of humane and democratic socialism.

In this context, the discussion of the platform in party organizations produces wishes for more precisely defined criteria of society's socialist nature in the documents, for more thoroughly worked out ideological foundations of the party that is undergoing renewal. Opinions are also expressed that the party's program document, along with the tasks and objectives of its political activity, should also elaborate a mechanism for their attainment, for overcoming the crisis in sociopolitical life and within the CPSU itself. Therefore, taking other parties' experience into account, I would propose a different compositional structure for the document.

The platform should be divided into two parts—a declaration of principles and an action program. It goes without saying that amendments introduced while additional work is being done on the Central Committee platforms should be properly reflected in the party statutes.

As far as the draft statutes themselves are concerned, they also ought to be geared more toward the changing realities of political life and the developing mixed political system [politicheskaya mnogoukladnost]. For the time being the new statutes are just a declaration without offering a clear idea of how party organizations should implement the policy of blocs and coalitions with other political social organizations.

They do not elaborate a mechanism for collaboration between party committees and communists in organs of people's power. The provision that party groups are guided by decisions made by the corresponding party committees can be given an infinitely broad interpretation, while the development of the multiparty system objectively demands the strengthening of any party's internal discipline.

There must be a rigid stipulation of the impermissibility of political "dualism"—concurrent membership of other parties.

At the same time, the statutes must specifically enshrine the rights of communists representing the party in organs of people's power at all levels. This must focus on their right to participate in the work of elected party organs, to

receive party information in full, and to enjoy the corresponding party committee's support and social protection.

Activity in conditions of a multiparty system, struggle for the broad strata of the population, and concern for the party's growth—all this dictates the need to make the statutes not only politically clear, precise, logical, and streamlined but also what I would describe as an attractive document.

It must be noted, however, that the document which has been presented offers room for many ossified definitions rooted in the old thinking, along these lines: It is incumbent upon CPSU members to take an active social stance, to be industrious, to be truthful and honest with the party and the people, and so on.

These demands of party members are hardly objectionable in essence, but a communist's behavior in society should be determined by his inner beliefs and the norms of a rule-of-law state, not by the statutes' exhortations.

Proceeding from the interests of the population strata united within the party, the statutes must clearly define its social borders.

It is already clear today that the CPSU cannot remain a party of the whole people, in the same way as it cannot be a party expressing the interests of those who cast doubts on the country's socialist choice and preach the ideas of national exclusiveness and racial hatred, of those who exploit other people's labor for the sake of their own gain. All this constitutes the social base of fundamentally different parties.

Political pluralism makes it necessary to give serious thought to many things, to change the strategy and tactics of actions. It is necessary to shape effective structures and reorientate the content of political activity literally at street, square, and residential district levels. After all, one of the party's basic functions will be to wage a political struggle for representation in the organs of power, for the voters' votes.

Work in labor collectives must be organized differently, taking into account the new conditions, with the right to monitor the administration's activity receding into the past. The ability to conduct ideological work among the masses is changing from a declaration into an urgent necessity.

All this must be reflected in the party statutes, and specific proposals have been passed on to the editorial commission.

In connection with the new version of Article 6 of the Constitution, there will inevitably arise the question of reviewing the role of political organs in Army collectives and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] organs. Educational work there must become a state function and it should be headed by a deputy defense minister. At the same time, there must be protection of the rights of those who serve the state, their right to unite in parties and organizations and to take part in the work of their territorial committees. This demand must also be reflected in the party statutes.

I want to back Comrade Churilov's suggestion that the whole of the statutes must be geared toward the implementation of power by the party masses, and their content must prove this. The statutes must define how communists will influence the process of elaborating party decisions, how they will monitor the activity of party organs, and how the institution of debates and referenda will function within the party.

The draft statutes provide that the structure of supreme organs will comprise six agents of political leadership: Central Committee, Central Control and Auditing Commission, CPSU Central Committee Presidium, Central Committee commissions, party chairman and his deputies, and secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee. Is this not too much for a self-managing party? Will this not lead to an even wider gap opening between communists and the party leadership, will it not lead to even greater bureaucracy in the higher echelons of party power, are we not likely to clash with the demand by the party masses that the entire system of management in the party be simplified?

Another point. This is the question of the party apparatus. Its formulation, as presented in Paragraph 14 of the draft statutes, is unfortunate. It shows the effect of a simplistic approach toward the solution of this problem. The statutes must enshrine the functional principle governing the shaping of the party apparatus. Its main task is to provide forecasting, analytical, sociological, and consultative services to elected organs. It is necessary to abandon the rigid structure of the apparatus along office, section, and department lines. An elected party organ must have the right to call on the best trained and most authoritative scientists and specialists for the performance of various tasks.

I would like to once more draw your attention to the address to the CPSU Central Committee by participants in the enlarged plenum of the Moscow city party organization. It is highly important for us, in Moscow's conditions, that rayon party organizations be given the right to autonomously determine procedures for the election of congress delegates, while rayon and primary party organizations should schedule their own report and election meetings.

The city's communists persistently demand that provisions in the statutes now being discussed which expand the rights of primary organizations and local party organs, including the provision whereby up to 50 percent of membership dues is left at their disposal, be brought into force even before the congress.

Some people might feel that this sounds too importunate, but it has to be repeated because there must be a prompt response to communists' proposals.

There must no delay in repealing current Central Committee instructions which impose financial and organizational restrictions on the activity of grassroots party links. It is necessary not just to pass an enabling declaration but actually to create real conditions for autonomous economic activity by party committees. Comrades have already said here that the amendment to Article 6 of the Constitution will raise the question of property, and that funds will be needed for ideological work and even to just provide material and technical backup for party committees at all levels.

The crisis of confidence in the party can be overcome only by actual deeds. It is impossible to delay decisions which are already overdue. This would only aggravate the serious situation. We will either help the party to catch up through our resolute actions, or we will lag hopelessly behind. We will, to put it simply, remain in the past.

While on the subject of lags. The question of convening a congress or party conference of Russia's communists is now being widely debated in many of Russia's party organizations. We know that organizational committees are already being set up in many cities. It seems to me, Mikhail Sergeyevich, that the Russian Bureau must not let the initiative slip out of its hands. We must immediately create preparatory committees and get down to work, otherwise other forces might hold the congress instead of us.

One more point, comrades. The Presidium received a written note from Svyatoslav Aleksandrovich Medvedev, first secretary of North Kazakhstan Obkom. He asks the Moscow party gorkom to declare its stance concerning Yuriy Nikolayevich Afanasyev and to announce why we have still not broken with him. We broke with him a long time ago. Conversations were repeatedly held with Comrade Afanasyev at the party raykom, party gorkom secretaries had meetings with him. Some time ago we engaged in quite a long debate with him in the pages of MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA but, unfortunately, this was not picked up by a single central party press organ. I can understand why not. Because any break should be on an ideological basis whereas our party—as many comrades said here—has for a long time lacked a political platform and we have not finally agreed on the outlines of the society we are building. Proof of this can be seen in the fact that the draft statutes lack even a provision about a communist society. It is this long drawn-out adoption of the party Central Committee platform that prevents us from finally breaking with Comrade Afanasyev. Once we have a political platform and party statutes, the break will inevitably occur.

V.V. Chikin (Secretary of the Minsk Clock and Watch Plant Party Committee)

Comrades! This CPSU Central Committee plenum can be compared to a consultation by physicians gathered at the bedside of a gravely ill patient to determine how to save his life. This is, of course, a somber analogy, but it is only too close to the truth. The Communist Party is experiencing a crisis without precedent in all its long history. It is seriously sick and is, furthermore, suffering from numerous complaints simultaneously. They include profound deformations of intraparty relations and the pollution of our ranks by a series of timeservers, careerists, and simply unworthy people. Our prestige has been seriously eroded by mistakes and errors committed even during the stage of perestroyka. The last vestiges of the credit of confidence which we retained after the years of stagnation were virtually wasted on the campaign to combat drunkenness, the election of economic leaders, and the introduction of multishift work and state acceptance, and consequently we now find ourselves face to face with the real threat of the party completely losing the people's confidence.

All this is very serious. But the party has run up against similar problems in the past. To run up against and to emerge from complex readjustments with honor. Why is it that the powerful self-regulating mechanisms built into its structure are not functioning now? In my view, because this time the sickness has affected the basic foundation on which any political party is built, the ideological foundations for the sake of whose implementation the party was actually created.

Let us honestly admit that the CPSU has already ceased being a league of like-minded persons. Its ranks now unite people espousing diametrically opposite positions. Nina Andreyeva's supporters and those who support Comrade Yeltsin; supporters of a renewed socialist federation and those who stubbornly speak of it as "Stalin's empire." They all hold the same party membership cards. The fallout of ideological discord is more powerful than that from Chernobyl. It affects the party's vitally important centers, its organism, and paralyzes the energy of the still healthy section of party members at both central and local level. We party secretaries are at times told from sundry rostrums, including even the highest, that we have sat long enough in the trenches. As a matter of fact, one can still argue about who is sitting in the trenches. It is much harder to find safe shelter in a labor collective than it is, for example, inside the Staraya Ploshchad complex [CPSU Central Committee headquarters].

But the point at issue concerns something else: Where are we to go once we get out of the trenches? Forward, backward, to the right, to the left? According to military regulations, the immediate objective and direction of further offensive ought to be determined by the person in charge of operations. In our case—the CPSU Central Committee at whose initiative perestroyka was actually launched. This is why we so eagerly awaited the Central Committee February Plenum decisions and the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform.

I must be blunt and say that this long-awaited document was greeted with a certain amount of disappointment in our party organization. Of course, it does contain a series

of new approaches and fundamental elements. A certain step forward has been taken. But can the platform and the draft statutes we are discussing today provide a basis for consolidating the party ranks in the forms in which they have been presented to us? In my view, the answer is depressing. Let me cite a specific example by way of confirmation of what I said. Twenty-seven people surrendered their party membership cards in our plant's party organization during the whole of last year, and yet 40 Communists declared their unwillingness to remain CPSU members just in the period between the Central Committee February and March plenums [this year]. As you can see, this process is snowballing and has nothing to do with the self-cleansing process in the party. I personally found it sad to part company with so many comrades.

What do the plant's communists perceive as the draft's weakness? The fact that, as someone put it rather aptly, it was written by two hands simultaneously—the left and the right. The draft is the rather unfortunate product of compromise. Nor could it have been fortunate, seeing that compromises are useful in the selection of tactics. They are useless and probably even harmful when determining strategic objectives.

One would automatically ask: Could it be that the draft's authors and the party's leadership fail to understand that the main point which excites passions today is the question of allowing private ownership of land and means of production in our relations. Some people go wild in their approval and believe this to be a breakthrough, without, true enough, actually saying in which direction. Others categorically oppose any return to what we left behind 72 years ago. I may appear to be something of an oddity, not an altogether typical Soviet person, seeing that I do not believe that private ownership will save us and help us get out of the quagmire in which we have been driven by unskilled party and state figures with the help of timeserving scientists who are still afloat and are still offering "words of wisdom." Some people probably have a diametrically opposite opinion. This is perfectly natural.

It is, however, important both for me and for my opponents to be clearly aware of the center's position, to know where it is leading us. If for no other purpose, then at least to be able to decide whether its path is suitable for us or not. For the time being, everyone—be they on the right or on the left—can do nothing but rack their brains over the essence of maneuvers being performed by our party leadership and try to solve the puzzles and crosswords contained in the program documents offered to us.

Tell me, how is it possible to reconcile the thesis of pluralism of ownership forms with the stipulation about the impermissibility of exploitation of man by man? What is the humane and democratic socialism, is it not a relation of developed socialism? In what specific regard do the values of the working class not coincide with universal human values? How is the teaching of Marx-Engels-Lenin to be creatively developed once the class approach which comprises its core is cast off? Why is it that the Communist Party's draft document altogether avoids any mention of communism? The Central Committee has opted for silence on all these fundamental questions associated with the problem of private ownership and our movement's ultimate goals. I am very much afraid that this silence could become a real omen of misfortune for the party.

We would like to have a base for consolidation right away. Otherwise the process of rupture for ideological reasons will reach its peak during the postcongress period. In this event, it seems to us pointless to hold the report and election meetings of primary and local party organizations before the congress. This is not just my own personal stand, it is also the viewpoint of the Minsk party gorkom expressed at its latest plenum.

There is one more aspect to this problem. Our party is still a ruling party and consequently bears full responsibility for the state of affairs in the country. Since matters are not progressing too well, my colleagues and I have simply no time left to work. We spend all our time apologizing for Stalin's repressions and the shortages of goods, for some people's privileges and the plunder by cooperatives, for the increased salaries of the state and party apparatus and the interethnic conflicts.

We are even reproached for the collapse of the socialist camp, the international communist movement, and the Soviet federation. We also have to listen to rebukes for much else in addition, for matters in which we are blameless. This is why I would like to address the following suggestion to communists holding leadership positions in the state, and primarily the USSR people's deputies from the CPSU: Let us embark on the practical implementation of the principle of power by the party masses without waiting for the congress and the ratification of the statutes. Let us not forget that next time you have to make yet another momentous decision you should consult the party's base, its grassroots.

After all, at the Congress of People's Deputies you represent not just yourselves and not even just the Central Committee which elected you, but also all of us—the country's 19 million communists. In this context, it would not be bad to elaborate some sort of system whereby this category of deputies would account to the entire party, and a mechanism to recall those among them who cannot cope with their duties and do not protect the party from the malicious attacks against it which can be heard with growing frequency inside the Kremlin Palace of Congresses.

Now a few words about the draft CPSU Statutes. They do not match the draft platform in every single respect. For example, the platform says that the party cleanses its ranks of those who reject its ideological and organizational foundations. But the statutes do not formulate these foundations. For some reason, the draft's authors

found it somewhat awkward to mention the principle of democratic centralism as an organizational foundation, even though all its tenets are enshrined in the document's text. Therefore would it not be better to honestly admit that this paramount principle of the party's organizational building as conceived by Lenin was not observed in the last 60 or 70 years, and to restore it to the position it deserves in the statutes?

About the party's social base. Of course, the thesis about a "party of all working people" has an alluring sound to it, but it is also closely related to the stipulation about the proletarian party evolving into the vanguard of the whole people, which brings sad memories to mind. Would it not be better to return to our sources—a party of the working class? True enough, scientists now talk a lot about the erosion of dividing lines between classes. This is fine for scientists, but the workers themselves—as I have repeatedly seen for myself—clearly perceive these dividing lines. This should probably be our starting point. In any event, paragraph 1 of the statutes ought to say that membership of the CPSU is incompatible with the exploitation of other people's labor in any form, thus protecting our ranks from the emerging Soviet bourgeoisie.

Taking into account the decisions of the Third Congress of People's Deputies, it is necessary to immediately introduce clarity in the mechanism for implementing the territorial-production principle of party building in the conditions of a multiparty system. Party committees are already being kicked out of enterprises in Lithuania. A similar campaign has been launched by our own informal organizations. Where is the guarantee that we will not find ourselves out in the streets tomorrow? You must agree that a desire to find out what the future has in store for us is perfectly natural.

There is no total clarity as regards the purpose of changing the name of the Politburo and the office of general secretary. It is, after all, not a matter of names. This can do nothing but bring a smile to communists' lips.

About membership dues and the financial autonomy of primary party organizations. This step must not be postponed until the congress. We in particular need funds to publish our own newspapers. It will hardly be possible to preserve the present influence of in-house plant newspapers in the conditions of a multiparty system.

My other remarks on the text of the draft statutes have been passed on to the editorial commission. I think that some additional work ought to be done on the statutes and that it is not worth being in a hurry to publish them.

A.A. Ruzhitskiy (First Secretary of the Cherkassy Party Obkom)

Esteemed comrades! Of course, virtually no time has been allocated for a broad discussion of the draft statutes in the party organizations before the Central Committee plenum, but we have still been able to discuss them with the majority of obkom members and party gorkom and raykom secretaries. That is why it is not only my own opinion I am expressing, even if in some respects I may repeat myself.

In assessing the draft as a big step forward on the path of the party's democratization and the expansion of the independence of party organizations and communists' rights, at the same time I believe that substantial additional work must be done on it.

Now about individual positions.

It seems unjustified, in defining the party's program aim in the preamble, to restrict ourselves only to the creation of a humane democratic socialism, omitting the communist perspective substantiated in the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. This is a blatant concession to those who are trying not only to revise but also to abolish, I repeat, to abolish, the ideological foundations of the party. I think that it is of fundamental importance to write the following: The CPSU builds its activity on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and creatively develops this revolutionary materialist teaching on whose basis and all-human values the party member's political and moral nature is formed.

It is indisputable that the new statutes should reflect more clearly the fact that the CPSU is a party of internationalists and resolutely rejects the federative structural principle, that is, the decisions of the Central Committee September (1989) Plenum should be enshrined in the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th congress.

There is no need today to say how fundamental this question is. We would not have had so much trouble and grief in our multinational home if the communists everywhere had acted primarily from the positions of what brings them closer, links and unites them. Taking this into account, it would do not harm to write that the CPSU member defends and propagandizes internationalism and consolidates friendship between the peoples by every means.

A key element in the discussion which has been launched about the new CPSU Statutes is the attitude toward the principle of democratic centralism. The basic viewpoint is recognition of the need to ensure its truly democratic nature. No one denies that. But in the draft under discussion the above-mentioned principle, however strange it may seem, is not reflected at all, particularly with regard to party discipline. Yet without discipline, voluntary, aware discipline, of course, without unity of actions in all-party interests we cannot count on success in the very hard political struggle which awaits us in the very near future.

The dispute on the organizational foundations of the party's structure will of course be resolved by the forthcoming 28th CPSU Congress after all-party discussion

and consideration of the opinion of millions of communists, the mechanism for which still has to be worked out. Individual comrades spoke very correctly about this today.

But the present plenum could make specific and substantial amendments today. Many comrades believe, not without justification, that the draft statutes in individual places suffer from slogan-mongering and the detailing of communists' rights in isolation from their duties. I am convinced that they must be linked, if only broadly, with those tasks which are reflected in the draft platform for the congress. We cannot separate two aspects of a single process. It is possible to speak more extensively about the procedure for electing delegates and the functions of the elected party aktiv.

In taking account of the fundamental transformations which are taking place and which are expected in politics, the economy, legal relations, and the formation of a qualitatively new federation, it is of course essential to adopt new statutes as rapidly as possible. They are called on to consider the opportunities for work if the party moves to the opposition, and in theory that is not ruled out in a multiparty system.

In addition the statutes objectively cannot envisage, still less adequately reflect in the relevant points, all aspects of the problem of the party's role and place, its structural echelons in a renewed society, and its methods of activity. That is why it seems to me that it would be correct to enshrine a number of positions in specific instructions and decisions of Central Committee plenums. This proposal should be reflected in appropriate wording in the draft statutes. Thus it is possible to consider the changes in sociopolitical life and to link them with statutory norms.

Individual comments on points of the statutes. Subsection three. Obviously we cannot agree that membership of the party does not envisage the commitment that CPSU members fulfill party decisions. I am convinced that this approach in general will not help to resolve the tasks which the renewed party sets itself and will lead to the weakening of party ranks.

In our view the fifth subsection should include demands that the CPSU purge its ranks of those who reject its ideological-political and organizational foundations and take part in nationalist, anti-Soviet organizations and actions, that is, it should be brought into line with the CPSU Central Committee Platform.

People may tell me that these ideas are included in the fifth section but, Esteemed comrades, it talks about something completely different.

Of course, it is necessary to simplify the procedure for admission to the party and it will be justified to renounce the candidate stage and the compilation of unwieldy questionnaires. But regarding recommendations, let's have a think. Perhaps we will even expand the range of referees, delegating this right to the labor collectives and Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] organizations. This could also be enshrined in applications, which, as I understand it, are nonetheless being retained.

In connection with the fact that a multiparty system may be established in the country and that we are advancing toward this, the exercise of certain duties, for instance those of the judge, prosecutor, and some others, will obviously rule out membership of any party, and the term for suspension of membership of the CPSU in these cases should in no circumstances be limited only to a year. After all, according to the procedure established by law these posts can be assigned to party members, as to any citizens, for several years.

In the second paragraph of subsection six it should be noted that debates and referenda are held at the decision of the majority of party committees or at the demand of one-third of the CPSU. It should specify the questions on which they are held because the concept of "topical" is very vague and too general.

The provision that all elected people in the party are elected for no more than two successive terms in my view places them in unequal conditions at the level of the raykom, gorkom, and committees which rank above them. For some this will mean five years, for others 10 years. Let's think about whether we should now be abandoning the thesis of establishing a single term formulated in the resolution of the 19th All-Union Party Conference "On the Democratization of Soviet Society and the Reform of the Political System": five years for elected party organs from the CPSU Central Committee down to the party raykoms. After all there is no difficulty in formulating ways of renewing them should the need arise.

I support the draft's idea regarding the election of party committee first secretaries, including CPSU Central Committee secretaries, by all delegates to conferences and congresses. But we should discuss whether we should necessarily have multiple candidates. How democratic is this? Can several candidates be reviewed for the post not only of first secretary but also of any other secretary? I am sure that is what will happen. But it may happen that by virtue of various circumstances and reasons only one candidacy will be left. What will happen here? Is it not better to record that any number of candidates can be included on the lists for secret voting in elections of party committee secretaries?

A last point. It seems necessary and expedient to expand the rights of party gorkoms and raykoms, giving them the right to create primary organizations and not only to register them. This will accord with their role as mentioned in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's report at this plenum.

We must also discuss the question of removing a party organization secretary from the collective. It seems to me that this thesis has no legal foundation and can be completely ruled out.

One last thing. If we are to determine the terms for holding party gorkom and raykom plenums, then it may be recommended that they be held as necessary but no less than once every four months.

I unequivocally support the arguments already voiced to the effect that councils of party organization secretaries, theoretical seminars, debating centers, and others cannot be counted as organizational structures. They are forms of communists' work, especially in elaborating party decisions and executing them in the implementation of party policy.

S.A. Niyazov (Member of CPSU Central Committee and First Secretary of Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee)

Esteemed Comrades! Perestroyka is in its fifth year and much is changing in our life. Many speakers here leveled charges against the Central Committee Politburo. I shall not try to defend it. But here is what I want to say: On meeting with Central Committee secretaries and Politburo members I noted that they are seeking and considering new forms of work under present conditions. Yet we all remember how at a certain stage our ruling party switched to administrative-edict methods. As a first secretary who had been working for over four years now I immediately sensed these changes. We had grown accustomed to being told from above what to do and how and to having everything assigned for us. As of 1986 we began to notice that no one from the Central Committee was giving us orders as to how to work and what to do. I think that all the country's party organizations felt that they must find for themselves effective methods and forms of work taking local conditions into account.

I remember how in the period of preparation for the election of USSR people's deputies I telephoned G.P. Razumovskiy, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and asked him to advise me what to do—there will be elections soon, I said, and we have no instructions as to which direction we should take, whom to nominate, what the percentage of workers and collective farm members should be. I heard in reply: Decide for yourselves—in the light of the people's opinion, you can see more clearly locally. It was then that we realized that there were no more Central Committee instructions, that with the arrival of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev the union republic party organizations had been given complete independence. We had to think and decide for ourselves. Under these conditions some party organizations, I say this as a CPSU Central Committee member, were dismayed and came to a halt in the expectation of new orders. Having consulted with the republic's party committees, we decided to hold elections freely, democratically, and openly [glasno] although the republic Communist Party Central Committee had its own position on each candidate.

At that period we held meetings of communists sent as delegates to district election meetings to defend the candidate nominated from the party organizations. They went without embarrassment and spoke openly. In all the districts the elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet in our republic took place democratically, with alternative candidates. This initiative of the republic Communist Party Central Committee resulted in over 80 percent of the 48 people's deputies being communists. And the representatives of the party committees won prestige on this basis.

We embarked on open dialogue with all public forces but where the law was being broken—on a national or interethnic basis—people were expelled from the party. Several dozen people were subjected to this strict measure. If you add that over 7,000 leaders in the republic have been elected on a democratic, alternative basis, then all this has borne good fruit.

Although the sociopolitical situation in Turkmenia is quite calm that does not mean that we have no interethnic disputes. They do exist. There are also those who want to organize informal movements. But we are all conducting dialogue with them together and openly. Through the soviets we have decided to perform specific work with them.

Comrades! The examination of the draft CPSU Statutes at the present plenum and their submission for nationwide discussion in the very near future should influence the revelation of the party's intellectual potential and show all the totality of the views and opinions which exist in it and create the necessary basis for the CPSU to reach the level of the demands of society as it is being renewed.

It is difficult to fail to notice the merits of the draft under review: Many of its provisions are of a truly innovatory nature and accord with the spirit of our time. This applies primarily to the democratization of internal party life, the power of the party masses, and the establishment of the autonomy of party organizations as Lenin understood it.

At the same time some provisions of the draft statutes are in my view in need of deeper analysis and further work.

We agree with the idea voiced here by V.M. Volodin. This applies primarily to the understanding of the nature and the definition of the actual concept of the party. In the present wording this has been done somewhat timidly and does not look entirely convincing.

In this connection we consider it correct to include in the draft statutes and to enshrine Lenin's definition of the Communist Party according to which the party primarily serves the working people and does not only lead the masses.

Considering the development of perestroyka processes, the recognition of the right to existence of diverse forms of ownership in our country, and the numerous demands of communists and nonparty people, the statutes could make special note of the following: "The party's function

consists in defending the working man from attempts to bring back the system of exploitation of man by man and in protecting people from group, departmental, and national egotism."

This obliges the party organizations not to slacken their attention toward questions of social policy, people's working and daily living conditions, and their mutual relations and constantly to strengthen the arsenal of political means of influencing the solution of the problems which arise here.

In brief, the legislative enshrinement of the main provision of the precongress platform—the priority of man's interests—in a way guarantees its implementation.

There were, as you know, many proposals on the procedure for electing party committee first secretaries and the CPSU chairman.

Is it necessary to proclaim, as subsection 10 does, the compulsory provision of alternative candidates in electing members of elected organs? In my view this is an extreme which could in a number of cases entail an artificial search for alternative candidates. We must trust the communists and give them the right to determine for themselves how to hold elections of plenipotentiary organs. That is why I believe the second proposal in this subsection could be drafted as follows: "They are elected with a broad discussion of candidacies and the maximum consideration of communists by secret ballot, predominantly on an alternative basis."

Comrades, we all continue to be seriously perturbed by the question of the principles on which the party will be based. We are primarily worried about the fate of the main principle—the principle of democratic centralism. Unfortunately, in the draft as submitted it has been replaced by ideological commonality and party comradeship. The majority of Turkmenistan's communists are in favor of retaining the principle of democratic centralism as the foundation of the CPSU's organizational structure and the basis of intraparty relations. The party's winning of genuine authority and leading positions in Soviet society is inconceivable without the unity of will and full and unconditional unity of action of the party members. It is scarcely necessary to prove that the existence in the party of several platforms, factions, and groupings which do not recognize a decision made by the majority leads to the formation of several centers and that means the leveling down of the very concept of the center, the absence of a single leading and coordinating nucleus, and the weakening of discipline—especially under the conditions of a multiparty system.

This question seems very complex. After all it was certainly no accident that V.I. Lenin, as a result of hard thought, under threat of a real split in the party, reached the conclusion that organization is impossible without the subordination of the minority to the majority. The party is unity of will, a single system of party organizations with supreme and grassroots organs of leadership, with the subordination of the minority to the majority, with decisions binding for all party members.

I agree with Comrade Rafailov, secretary of the "Sovetskaya" mine party organization, who suggested retaining as the basis of the party's structure the principle of democratic centralism, having, of course, reconsidered it in depth and transformed it in the direction of the intensification of democracy.

We must recognize the right of the minority to have and defend its own position so that there is an opportunity, after a while, to return to the examination of disputed proposals. The communist must have the opportunity to publicly defend his viewpoint when it does not coincide with the decision made by the majority as long as it does not contradict the CPSU Program and Statutes.

Of the other provisions included in the draft we regard as extremely important those like the substantial expansion of the rights of communist parties and party committees of all levels in pursuing the political line locally while at the same time strengthening their responsibility for the practical results of their activity.

It is a good thing that the protracted problem of the development of the party committees' independent production and commercial activity has been resolved.

Comrades! In his report Mikhail Sergeyevich said that some norms of the draft statutes could be put into operation by a decision of this plenum. But I think complete clarity is needed here. We would suggest granting party organizations the right to determine for themselves the principles by which they should be guided in the forthcoming reports and elections. The republican party organizations themselves should be given the opportunity to resolve questions connected with reports and elections and the schedules for holding them.

Yu.N. Shogin (First Secretary of the Zhukovskiy Party Gorkom, Moscow Oblast)

Esteemed comrades! The communists of Zhukovskiy City have asked me to bring to the notice of the members of the party Central Committee plenum their resolution on the procedure for electing delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress. It is brief, and I shall allow myself to read out just the resolution part.

"The CPSU Gorkom believes that the procedure for electing delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress must include the following principles:

"1. Candidate delegates are nominated only by primary party organizations.

"2. Direct and secret elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress held on an multiple-candidate basis are held for single-seat or multiple-seat party districts created on the basis of the rayon or city (without rayon divisions) party organization and also in those primary party organizations where the number of communists

corresponds to or is in excess of the representation norm established by the CPSU Central Committee.

"3. The question of holding elections under the single-seat or multiple-seat system and also the procedure for organizing the elections themselves is decided by the rayon or city party organization in light of the opinions of the primary party organizations.

"4. If the elections are inconclusive or if vacancies have arisen, the decision regarding the further procedure for electing delegates to the second round of voting and repeat elections and the submission of the question to a party conference is made by the party organizations within the electoral district.

"5. A central electoral commission should be created under the CPSU Central Committee with a view to organizing and coordinating work on the election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress. The commission's composition should be published in PRAVDA."

M.S. Gorbachev: Thank you. Have you anything more to say?

Yu.N. Shogin: Yes, a few words.

M.S. Gorbachev: Go ahead. Gorkom secretaries do not address plenums that often.

Yu.N. Shogin: Comrades, we are living in a very complex time. It has already become fashionable now to criticize any document which is submitted for discussion by our party masses, and many people, without giving themselves the opportunity to familiarize themselves in depth with a particular document but, on the contrary, reading in the mass media provisions which are, I would say, planted there, begin to inflate them out of proportion and to draw various conclusions. I therefore believe that, in publishing the draft statutes in the central press, it was essential immediately to give explanations of the basic elements of the statutes: Why they are like this and not otherwise, what premises were used, who suggested these formulations, and so forth. In my view this will enable communists to draw their own conclusions more precisely.

There is one more point on which I should like to dwell. Today the primary party organizations are very seriously concerned by the fact that in connection with the abolition of Article 6 of the constitution, the possibility has not been ruled out, but rather it will happen, that criticism will begin, all kinds of statements will begin and the task will be set of ensuring that these party structures are not present at production enterprises. [sentence as published] At the same time the draft statutes, which reveal the basic provisions regarding the work of primary committees and gorkoms and raykoms, do not contain the elements written for oblast party organizations. To wit: That in light of specific conditions the party committees elaborate and propose to the organs of state power and to the population programs for solutions for political, national, social, economic, ecological, and cultural and moral tasks in the region. It would seem to me that these things should be written down for the primary party organization and for the city and rayon party organization so that they too have the right to elaborate these programs and to submit them for discussion by the labor collective, defend them, and ensure their fulfillment.

One more fundamental point. This is not the first time that such what I would call heated debates have taken place in this auditorium. Each time the communists expect some fundamental decisions from the next plenum. But time is passing yet the situation in the party is not changing. This is most likely happening because the economy is not working today. Whatever we may say here, whatever we may address here, as long as the economy does not work, as long as there is no improvement in the position of our working people, we will be criticized since today this is to the advantage of certain forces. Despite the fact that there is no longer a diktat of party power, that there is today a Congress of People's Deputies, that the deputies adopt laws, that they have approved the government and approved the program for our country's socioeconomic development for 1990. Yet everything connected with errors in the economy is ascribed to the party. The party is obliged to accept this criticism today because it is the ruling party. Since that is so we must say that the program which was approved at the Congress of People's Deputies will be fulfilled only when everyone, the party and the soviets, the Komsomol and the trade unions, and our country's entire population, engage in earnest in its implementation. But what is happening today is that the get-rich principle is in operation. Individuals are getting rich, some collectives are getting rich, and so forth. What is to be done? I believe that we must organize really serious principled party work to fulfill this program, since we have adopted it. Here, too, the responsibility of each communist to whom this matter has been assigned should be determined. If the soviet, I have in mind the Congress of People's Deputies, cannot make answerable the ministers it has appointed or the people who have been assigned the fulfillment of the program, then the party should make them answerable. We cannot sit today and calmly wait for the collapse of our already ailing economy.

One more point. I am deeply convinced that sooner or later a division in the party or a demarcation will occur—either before the congress or after, or at the congress. Today the party organizations are discussing both the democratic platform published in PRAVDA and, even without PRAVDA, it has been distributed quite extensively in the primary party organizations, and also the platform of the party Central Committee.

I must tell you, comrades, that we even have the first trial statistics. By the start of the discussion of the platforms in the primary or shop party the correlation was as follows: Approximately 60-70 percent were in favor of the party Central Committee platform and the

remaining comrades were in favor of the democratic platform. That is why today we must work seriously in our party organizations to explain particular positions on which we differ, explaining why this is happening in order to consolidate our ranks. We must elaborate our tactics on demarcation. There is no other way out today. In conclusion I should like to thank you for your attention.

Justice Minister Views Presidential Power

LD2103143690 Moscow TASS in English 1423 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 21 TASS—The institution of an executive presidency gave the country a head of state instead of the previous collective governing body, Soviet Minister of Justice Veniamin Yakovlev said in an interview with PRAVITELSTVENNY VESTNIK (Government Herald).

Commenting on this important event, he pointed out that it did not redistribute power between the legislative and executive authorities. "Misgivings that the president can arrogate to himself the functions of the legislative authority—the Congress of People's Deputies or the USSR Supreme Soviet—are groundless. No functions will be transferred from the government to the president, and he will not replace it," Yakovlev said.

The government's functions did not change or changed very little, without affecting seriously its jurisdiction. For example, the government will no longer be in charge of the general development of the armed forces, because this will be the duty of the president, as the commander-in-chief.

The president will have the right to remove or appoint members of government, on agreement with the prime minister. His decision is to be submitted for approval to the USSR Supreme Soviet. He is also authorized to suspend resolutions and instructions from the Soviet Council of Ministers. Although the exact use of this power is not specified, it could perhaps be used when government resolutions violate the law or run counter to policy guidelines set by the Congress of People's Deputies.

The president will coordinate the work of legislative and executive authorities and will be a link between them. "The Soviet model does not copy either the American or the French system. I believe that it is closer to the American one. The Soviet president will occupy its own special place in the structure of state power," Yakovlev said.

Professor Questioned on Presidential Power

PM0903152990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Mar 90 First Edition pp 1-3

[Interview with Professor V.G. Strekozov, senior official in the CPSU Central Committee State Law Department, conducted by own correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Kosarev: "Presidential Power: Interview on the Eve of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies"—time and place not indicated]

[Text] Quite a few lances have already been broken in the debates in parliament and in the mass media over the question of establishing presidential rule in our country. But be that as it may, the USSR Supreme Soviet has voted in favor of it. An extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies is to be held in a few days' time which will decide the question of electing a president of the USSR.

Our correspondent converses here with Professor Vladimir Georgiyevich Strekozov, doctor of legal sciences and senior official in the CPSU Central Committee State Law Department, about the reason for the establishment of a presidency in our country, what it will entail, and whether we are ready for the new system of supreme power in the country. Professor Strekozov is a leading specialist in the field of Soviet state law and is playing a direct part in the working party preparing the draft of the new USSR Constitution.

[Kosarev] Vladimir Georgiyevich, voices were raised in favor of establishing presidential rule back at the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies. They did not receive support at the time. What then has made it necessary to introduce the institution of the presidency now?

[Strekozov] The idea of a presidency has come up more than once before. But it was turned down. The chief argument was that it is an undemocratic idea. Now both the structure of supreme power in the country and the real processes of social life are prompting us to make this decision. Political stability and the creation of guarantees of the irreversibility of the processes of perestroyka are essential if the democratic transformations started in the country and the improvement of the Soviet federation and strengthening of order in all spheres of vital importance to us are to be continued. This is principally why many deputies see the need to introduce presidential rule under the control of a democratic parliament. The creation of a new structure of political management should help overcome the acute contradictions existing in the sphere of interethnic relations and the socioeconoomic and political life of the country.

This, however, is an important, but not the main, reason. The establishment of presidential power is a logical step toward forming a rule-of-law state. We are building the mechanism of sovereignty of the people upon the principle of the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial functions of power. To start with, legislative power was radically improved. The strengthening of executive power is on today's agenda. The introduction of the office of president means the establishment of the institution of an individual head of state. Strictly seeking, the use of the term "head of state" in respect of the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet is unjustified, since these functions under the USSR Constitution

belong to USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, which under current legislation represents a kind of "collegial head of the USSR state." The establishment of the post of president gives embodiment to supreme power—accountability for the tardy adoption or execution of state decisions will henceforth reside in an actual person. As was rightly stressed at the USSR Supreme Soviet session, we are not talking about the strong hand without which, it is claimed, order cannot be instilled in society, but about strong executive power that is accountable to the people and capable of taking competent operational decisions.

[Kosarev] You will agree, it is highly illogical, but our USSR people's deputies have operated to date without a law on their status. Is it not perhaps more logical to begin with thorough legislative preparation for the introduction of the institution of presidential rule. Are we not making mistakes again?

[Strekozov] Mistakes can, of course, never be ruled out. But life itself and the difficult situation which the country has found itself in forces us to hurry and take extraordinary measures. Today strong executive power is needed, I will stress this once again, more than ever before. But in our country it is essentially nonexistent. The measures, I repeat, are extraordinary, but they do not bypass the legislator, they offer a constitutional solution.

[Kosarev] In other words, the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" is disappearing into history?

[Strekozov] It is ceding its place to another: "All Power to the People! I am convinced that this sovereignty—the will of the people—should be the sole lawful source of power in the USSR. The people should exercise state power directly or through representative bodies—the soviets and the head of state (the president)—elected by universal, equal, direct, and contested elections with a secret ballot.

[Kosarev] Some champions of presidential rule see this as a kind of panacea for all our misfortunes....

[Strekozov] Yes, similar arguments are heard at parliamentary sittings—introduce the post of president, they say, and we will solve all our problems. Certainly not. This must be regarded only as another step toward stabilizing society, creating a rule-of-law state, and extricating the country from its precrisis state.

Of course, our political system will become even more complex in the initial period. We have the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet. The post of president will be introduced and a presidential council ar ouncil of the federation created. There is the Council of Ministers.... It is said that the more complex the system, the more quickly it cracks. But the whole crux of the matter resides in who operates in this system and what kind of mechanism there is to ensure its viability and effectiveness.

[Kosarev] What specific powers then is it proposed be vested in the head of state in the USSR Constitution?

[Strekozov] If the Congress of People's Deputies adopts the submitted draft the president will act as the guarantor of the observance of the rights and freedoms of Soviet citizens and of the Constitution and laws of the USSR and will ensure collaboraton between the supreme organs of state power and management of the USSR. There is probably no need to list all the provisions of the draft enshrining the president's powers. I would like to draw attention to a few provisions that are fundamentally new for our constitutional legislation. First and foremost, the granting of the right of suspensive veto to the president. It means that the president has the right to send back a law to the USSR Supreme Soviet accompanied by his objections within a period of 2 weeks for it to be debated and voted on again. If the Supreme Soviet confirms the adopted decision by a two-thirds majority, the USSR president may sign the law or appeal to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

The right to dissolve the USSR Supreme Soviet will also become a very important constitutional innovation if the draft is approved. If there are disagreements between the chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet which cannot be resolved by means of the conciliatory procedure existing under the USSR Constitution, the president will be able to present a proposal to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies to elect a new USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Kosarev] Nonetheless, let us take a look at what is within the power of the president in practice. In enumerating his powers, the draft law states as item number one that he acts as the guarantor of the observance of the USSR Constitution and Laws. Let us imagine the following situation. A law on leasing has been adopted. It is not working. What can the president do?

[Strekozov] He can issue a decree instructing the leaders of all executive and administrative organs, governments of union and autonomous republics, and soviet executive committees to strictly implement the law on leasing. And that is all.

[Kosarev] This means another decree, another.... Is this likely to produce results?

[Strekozov] I agree, we still have no mechanism to ensure the implementation of our own laws. It will have to be created.

[Kosarev] Vladimir Georgiyevich, both at the Supreme Soviet session and in the press fears have been expressed that the introduction of presidential powers may lead to authoritarian rule, to a regime of personal dictatorship which has inflicted colossal damage on our society in the past. Are there any grounds for these misgivings in your opinion?

[Strekozov] This is a most important question. Incidentally, some people are trying cunningly to exploit it in order to further their interests—I am referring to certain

deputies' speeches at the session. Nonetheless, I do agree that misgivings are justified here. A system of political power and state rule must not be designed with a specific individual in mind. Such a system must guarantee that anyone who is elected to this high post will be answerable to the law. And only to the law. The new draft law makes provision for the president to swear an oath on taking up office. He can be removed from his post before his term expires by decision of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies on the initiative of the Congress or the USSR Supreme Soviet by a vote of a minimum of two-thirds of the total number of deputies, and in the light of a USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee conclusion to this effect, if the president violates the USSR Constitution or Soviet laws. USSR People's Deputies are authorized to put questions to the USSR president at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

Notheless I believe that all this has not yet been worked through thoroughly enough. For instance, according to the draft law the USSR president is answerable to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. However, what does "answerable" mean? At what intervals is he answerable? And there are quite a few such imprecisions and vague formulations.

[Kosarev] To military readers the question of the USSR president's powers in the sphere of ensuring the country's defense capability and security and his leadership of the USSR Armed Forces cannot be a matter of indifference.

[Strekozov] According to the draft law the USSR president is the supreme commander in chief of the USSR Armed Forces and coordinates the activities of the state organs in ensuring the country's defense. It should be noted here that this is the first time that Soviet constitutional legislation incorporates a clause devoted the commander in chief. The USSR president is responsible for ensuring the sovereignty of the USSR and the union republics and the country's security and territorial integrity. He appoints and replaces the supreme command of the USSR Armed Forces, confers the highest military ranks, and appoints military tribunal judges. The president declares war in the event of a military attack on the USSR and submits this question for consideration by the USSR Supreme Soviet without delay, he also announces general or partial mobilization; in the interests of the protection of the USSR and the security of its citizens he can declare martial law or a state of emergency in specific regions with the obligatory consideration of this question with the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the relevant union republic; he is authorized in these circumstances to introduce temporary presidential rule. Martial law, a state of emergency, or presidential rule are introduced by law. The president heads the presidential council whose task it is to elaborate measures to implement the main directives of the USSR domestic and foreign policy and to ensure the country's security.

[Kosarev] Does it matter that a civilian may be the Supreme Commander in Chief of the USSR Armed Forces—after all, this cannot be ruled out?

[Strekozov] Traditionally this is the practice in all the countries in the world where the presidential system is in operation.

So far the division of the functions between the president, the Defense Council, and the Main Military Council is not clear, nor is it clear whether these organs will remain in existence. I believe that all this will be specified in the Law on Defence work on which is drawing to a close.

Decree States Kremlin as Presidential Residence

LD2103172890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1646 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 21 Mar (TASS)—A decree by the USSR president on the place of residence of the USSR president, the USSR Presidential Council and the USSR Federal Council has been distributed here today. It states that the place of residence of the USSR president, the USSR Presidential Council and the USSR Federal Council will be in the Kremlin, in the city of Moscow.

First Secretary Criticizes CPSU Platform

PM0803114990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 90 Second Edition p 4

[Article by S. Potapov, first secretary of the Moscow Volgogradskiy CPSU Rayon Committee, under general rubric "Discussion Page No. 12": "Learning To Listen"]

[Text] Moscow—I do not know how the current draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the congress was born, but in my opinion it reflects the real situation which has taken shape in life and in the party only slightly. We thank the CPSU Central Committee, of course, that the plenum materials have been published; many speeches indicate that there are people who are equal to the tasks facing society. But as to the plaform itself, we expected that it would contain precise assessments of, first, the place of the party in society; second, the Central Committee's view of the party after the congress; and third, how we are to dissociate ourselves from anticommunist forces and join up with healthy forces. What is more, we thought that it would be geared to the congress rather than being a discourse about life in general, so to speak.

And what did we get? Essentially, deliberations about paths toward a "humane, democratic socialism." However, socialism does not require any epithets. It seems to me that it either exists or does not exist. It seems that the time has come to simply grasp that socialism is not an ideal society. It has its shortcomings just like any other society. And only people who are not familiar with Marxism refuse to understand this. Incidentally, how can we be familiar with Marxism if it is not being taught properly anywhere. What is more, certain people in our

country today reject everything that is connected with the word socialism and Marxism with the same zeal with which they attacked capitalism five or six years ago.

Then, when it is necessary to resolve pressing economic problems, and I mean resolve, rather than engage in futile debates, suddenly the idea of the introduction of presidential rule is raised. This is a question of such importance that it cannot be resolved without consultation with the people, without a referendum. For the same reason, he should be elected by all the people rather than their representatives. We are copying the West enough as it is. Will we now proceed to change the title of the chairman of the council of ministers to "prime minister" perhaps? If only we were able to explain to people why we have not made any headway for such a long time.

As the saying goes: What is said, is half-done. But why, when exhorting us to report regularly to communists, the working people, and the population, has not one member of the Politburo given us an account of his activities? You get the impression that many of our leaders are only able to lecture and instruct.

At the same time we feel that no one is listening to us, or indeed is willing to listen to us. At the plenum virtually all the speakers said that the reports and elections in party organizations should be held after the congress, at which dissociation from antisocialist forces is inevitable and after which another election campaign will also be inevitable. Yet the plenum did not adopt any decision, and preparations for the reports have started. If people are worried by what has happened, or rather built up in a number of oblasts, the events of recent days show that wherever the party organ is in step with the times, it has the confidence of the people.

Finally, the CPSU Central Committee plenum must not be postponed. Urgent decisions are needed on the date of the convocation of the 28th CPSU Congress and the Congress of the Russian organization of the CPSU and on the rates of representation at these congresses; on the establishment of the size of levies from party membership dues (presumably 50 percent at the most) to superior party organs; on the authorization of city and rayon party organizations to engage in economic, commercial, and publishing activity and to use the entire profits to meet the needs of party organizations or to contribute to charity funds; and on the authorization of rayon party conferences to decide themselves their budget, structure, staffing, and rates of pay to personnel.

Plenum Elects New Deputy From CPSU 11 Mar

PM1203113090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "At the Electoral Commission To Elect a USSR People's Deputy From the CPSU"]

[Text] The election of a USSR people's deputy from the CPSU took place at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 11 March 1990. A total of 578 participants in the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, or 92.8 percent, took part in the election.

As a result of a secret ballot, Nikolay Petrovich Kustarev, CPSU member, a smith at the Gorkiy Truck Plant, Gorkiy City, was elected USSR people's deputy from the CPSU, having received 532 "for" votes, or 92.0 percent of the number of participants in the CPSU Central Committee Plenum who participated in the ballot; there were 46 votes "against."

Role of Press, Objective Reporting Discussed

LD0903153790 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 9 Mar 90

[Text] One of the keenest controversies in the Soviet Union today is over the role of the press in the country's life and the process of reforms. The press is waging hard battles for a right to report the true objective facts, comments our analyst Vitaliy Gurov.

Journalists working in the newspapers, magazines, on radio and television, are involved in dramatic conflicts with the old bureaucratic system. Many subjects have long been a taboo: the situation in the Army, the activities of the KGB, the facts of homelessness, of helpless invalids, of prostitution, drug abuse, of the elite's priveleges. Now all that has burst onto the pages of dailies and periodicals, is filling radio and television broadcasts, and every such publication is preceded by a skirmish.

And the press is sometimes far from being on the winning side. The victims are either an author or an editor or the entire editorial office. In some cases the press wins the day. The most popular weekly, ARGUMENTIY I FAKTI, is holding out against heavy- handed attempts to victimize it. Its chief editor, Vladislav Starkov, who has led the magazine to a world-record circulation of 32 million copies, is refusing to relinquish his job, though the (?higher) Communist Party authorities tried to sack him for publications contrary to their taste.

Why should there be so much drama? Why is the press treated not so much as a source of information but of action? The point is that it's no longer tractable but increasingly independent, more like [the] free democratic press it should be. Journalists wish to express their own opinion, even if it differs from that of the (?higher) authorities.

That's the origin of the controversoy over the press. Can the bureaucrats in the corridors of power easily accept the blame for the economic failure, for ethnic conflict, for absurd shortages of most elementary goods, for corruption that has pervaded whole regions like cancer? The press is exposing their involvement in that corruption. They find it expedient to put the blame on the press. The press is fanning conflict, sensation mongering, calling for indiscipline. Those accusations are a step

towards persecution, sacking from jobs, closing down newspapers and magazines, intefering with the personal decisions. But on the other hand the mass media have made great progress, achieved a qualitative change under the current restructuring initiated by the Communist Party. What's more, at the initial stage it was the press that largely piloted the reforms. Then the mass media, particularly central, outstripped the other structures in their rapid development.

That explains their conflict with the leadership. What's to be expected next? It's hard to predict now. This is still an open question, like many others in this country. We hope to develop further on a democratic basis.

Lack of Anti-Pogrom Action Criticized

PM0903133090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No. 9, 27 Feb-5 Mar 90 pp 33-34

[Leonid Mlechin article: "Rumours Unconfirmed? Why Can't Law-Enforcement Agencies Prevent Pogroms?"]

[Text] Just one day after the KGB had reassured the public through the national papers that the rumours about the coming pogroms of Jews, Azerbaijanians and Armenians were totally groundless, and said it followed the developments closely and would take action if the situation became aggravated, pogroms actually started in the capital of Tajikistan. The tragic events in Dushanbe, which took place within a mere month of the pogroms in Baku, have dashed the hopes that Ferghana, Sumgait and Novyy Uzen were just accidents never to happen again.

Some high-ranking KGB officials claim that those who spread rumours are to blame—they have been too hard at it, and the persistent rumours finally incited terrorists to act. Therefore, the main conclusion the KGB arrived at on the eve of the events in Dushanbe was that "the press should not spread unconfirmed reports."

The convenient logic removes responsibility from those who in the performance of their official duty had to protect human lives. For all its convenience, however, this logic is below criticism: Armenian refugees were massacred by people who do not read Ogonelc, Literaturnaya Gazeta, Moscow News or any paper, as a mater of fact. They have highly educated leaders, of course - a pogrom is impossible without the proper ideological conditioning. But ideological pogrom-makers, having learned degrees in philosophy or philology, have long come to the conclusion that it is necessary to make short work of the "aliens."

As for the brilliant presumption that Armenians, Jews and probably Azerbaijanians driven out of Armenia, and Meskhetian Turks, who were murdered in Ferghana, actually killed themselves in order to obtain the refugee status or to gain some other advantages—well, who can take that seriously?

A critical situation in the country, rationing, housing shortages, no hope of changes for the better—aren't these the ideal prerequisites for pogroms? Armenian apartments in Baku were ransacked by Azerbaijani refugees from Armenia, for the most part, who had been denied support and assistance by the government and vented their spite on the Armenians. The situation in Dushanbe is reminiscent of Ferghana—the same chronic social ills—unemployment, the housing problem—but it is the "aliens" who take the blame for the mismanagement by the republic's leaders.

Certain quarters are not averse to presenting the pogroms as "spontaneous outbursts of popular emotions." This version is intended for the gullible. A pogrom should be well prepared. How is one to find out Armenians' addresses in Dushanbe? In the Ferghana Valley, the houses of Meskhetian Turks were marked out in advance.... It is necessary to find trusted thugs, to explain their "patriotic mission" to them, to put the planned action on an ideological basis.... This gives rise to the rumours which rile the law-enforcement agencies so much. In Baku, the exact date of the pogroms was named a few days in advance... It was heard by all except those who were obliged to hear it and prevent bloodshed. Presumably, the reaction was like the one already mentioned: "There is no evidence to confirm the rumours."

True, after Sumgait, Ferghana and Novyy Uzen, KGB representatives said they had warned the political leadership.... I have not seen any documents on that score, so I cannot tell. Such documents could probably be obtained by a people's deputy commission determined to find out why such an efficient law-enforcement body is in no position to prevent pogroms. But judging by the statement published on February 9, the KGB headquarters had, indeed, no information about the coming pogroms. Why? Could it be that the KGB men-on-the-spot (there are KGB departments in every region) are not prepared to face the new danger? Does that apply to our entire law-enforcement system which has been fighting entirely different enemies for decades?

The militiamen, summoned to the Central House of Men of Letters to placate the hoodlums who had threatened to bring tommy-guns along next time, let them go. In a short while, however, they detained the participants of a peaceful demonstration in front of the TASS building. Militia is accustomed to protecting government buildings. Those picketing the TASS building are breakers of the peace—you do not have to explain that to a militiaman. As for the writers' club incident, top-ranking limbs of the law later confessed they had hard time telling hoodlums from their victims then... A district militiaman knows from his course of training that a bespectacled intellectual is a "dissident," or worse still, a "Zionist." Anyway, he is more dangerous than the "good guys" who have smashed somebody's glasses. So what? The Pamyat society is allowed to hold its meetings right in the Red Square. Notably, militia has no scruples about dispersing the meetings held by, say, the Democratic Union, arresting its leaders and having them put behind bars for fifteen days. You see, the Democratic Union levels sharp criticism at the government and the CPSU

and calls for a multiparty system. These are criminal offences, and no mistake! As for Pamyat, it calls for order and demands that aliens be brought to book....

The KGB of the U.S.S.R. has set up recently the Department for the Protection of the Soviet Constitutional System - the successor to the Fifth Department, which fought against the dissidents like Sinyavskiy, Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn. Its staff is said to have been renewed by so many percent. But surely it does not consist of novices! What about the local departments? Many are probably baffled by the drastic revaluation of values in the country. How are you to treat a dissident whom you used to fail once and who is now running for people's deputy? Who is of danger to the "Soviet constitutional system?" Those who call for a multiparty system? They seem to have been dangerous yesterday, and now they report on the results of the plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee....

Persecuting those who read "taboo literature" or "denigrate Soviet power" is one thing, but combating real criminals, such as pogrom-makers with obvious mafia connections is something else. This is a different profession.

The Army is honestly doing its duty. But observing law and order in cities and preventing pogroms are functions reserved for other departments. Who can compel these departments to do their duties? Only public opinion and the press, so far. Tomorrow their appeals will draw a response from the President, we hope. As distinct from the region and district "appanage princes," whom Armenian, Jewish and other pogroms suit fine, he will realize that the pogroms do enormous harm to the country's prestige and put all the nations of our multinational country in jeopardy. It was not only Armenians who died in Dushanbe, and not only Meskhetian Turks who died in Ferghana. Russians are fleeing from Baku, too....

Baku, Sumgait and Ferghana have revealed a terrible thing: local militia is not to be relied upon. It either stands idly by or joins pogrom-makers.

This calls for some drastic decisions, such as that to make riot troops professional, to restructure and amalgamate certain KGB and Interior Ministry units, to turn them into federal police....

In the meantime, the press keeps talking to the utter displeasure of the law-enforcement bodies' top-ranking officers. It would not keep silent, because all evil deeds are committed in silence. Pogroms begin when there is no one to stand in for the victims.

Railway Crime Problems Highlighted

LD0603222390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1430 GMT on 6 March carries a 4-minute report stating that a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists has been held at the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry on the campaign against crime on the railways.

Correspondent Anatoly Fedorov reports on the work of the Moscow internal affairs administration operating on the Moscow railway network. "Most of the transport militia's efforts are expended on detecting theft of state cargoes: people steal everything which is described as being in short supply in everyday life." rolling stock is frequently obsolete and in a state of disrepair, there is a lack of the proper sealing and locking devices, freight is poorly guarded en route, and railwaymen rarely receive the freight in the proper manner when it arrives from another rail network. This all makes it easy for people to tamper with and steal freight unhindered, and leads to increasing crime in regard to freight transport. The thieves include railwaymen themselves, and the militarized guard, which Fedorov says should long ago have been replaced by militia personnel. This is a matter which has been raised in the Ministry of Railways for years, but to no effect.

Another aspect of railway crime is one which worries the 2-2.5 million people who travel into the capital every day. Fedorov asks a question of Militia Colonel (Anatoliy Vasiliyevich Romakh), head of the Moscow internal affairs department for railway transport, regarding the high level of crime on suburban railway lines: One in six killings and one in five robberies, and 30 percent of thefts from passengers occur on Moscow's suburban electric trains. Checks have shown that half of the intercoms linking passengers with the militia are out of order (Romakh) replies that the criticism is justified: However, the state of technical repair of communications equipment on the trains is the responsibillity of the Moscow railway department, not the transport militia; further, passengers are linked not with the militia, but with the train driver, who then passes on the alarm. Equipment must be repaired, and there should be a transport militia presence on trains, particularly at nights, when the majority of crimes occur. But with 4,200 suburban trains coming into Moscow, at present only about 20 percent have a militiaman on board.

Petitions, Complaints Overwhelm Procuracy

90UN1042D Moscow TRUD in Russian
22 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by A. Pankov: "One Complaint, Two Complaints...."]

[Text] We are turning into a country of complainers.... Alas, this is not so much a metaphor as some might believe. The facts and figures were cited at yesterday's session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Glasnost and Citizens' Rights and Appeals, where the work of the USSR Procuracy with petitions and complaints was discussed—in just the past year the number of appeals to the USSR Supreme Soviet tripled. Especially numerous today are letters dealing with the fight against crime and complaints regarding court orders.

The number of complaints about violations of the procedure for examining petitions has increased sevenfold! Responsibility of the procuracy is increasing in connection with this. People are attempting to find protection of their interests in procuracy organs. There we have seen a sharp increase in the flow of letters and petitions—more than two million across the country overall each year, and an equal number of personal appointments.

Deputy committee chairperson N. Reshetova stated, however, that the level of the work effort with complaints in the central apparatus of the USSR Procuracy and in its subordinate organs does not meet requirements; radical changes are necessary. Red tape and carelessness are far from isolated events. Even committee members had to encounter these. For example, it is several months now that the USSR Procuracy has not responded to certain of their specific queries. What can be said about the petitions of "simple" citizens? It is often the indifference of that first official, the individual who was originally approached for assistance, which constitutes the cause of walking around in a vicious circle year after year. And repeat requests often elicit blunt, formal replies which restate the previous answer. "Shuffling people around," the committee noted, has taken on a massive nature. B. Derevyanko states it is the feeling of many that you won't get the truth in these organs....

Where is the prosecutor's attention being focused? This age-old question disturbs us all even more now, when the socio-political and criminal situation in the country is growing worse. Committee members A. Yezhelev, A. Potapov, A. Yaroshinskaya, and others spoke of the lack of operational effectiveness shown by procuracy organs—in particular, with respect to such burning issues as the emergency situation in railroad transportation, interethnic conflicts, and the chauvinist appeals of certain extremist organizations.

Agreeing in principle with the criticism, USSR Deputy General Prosecutor A. Pobezhimov spoke about certain practical steps to correct the critical situation regarding petitions, and about attempts to ward off the flow of complaints which appear following the illegal actions of departments, their resolutions and directives. He noted the extremely low level of legal standards. Thus, in certain union republics one out of every three or four individuals was discharged without the consent of the trade union committee, inhabitants of Kirghizia were prohibited from taking their fruits and vegetables outside the borders of the republic, in Yaroslavl Oblast they were forced to donate blood....

Committee members agreed that the procuracy was ill-prepared for such a flow of petitions. Let us say that each functionary in the central apparatus handles 1,200-1,800 complaints per year. To talk about high quality of analysis here would be out of the question. Nor are there any normal conditions for making personal appointments. And this is in Moscow! Yes, we must expand the staff and allocate more space. But at the same time, the procuracy could improve its operation at present with a change in structure, believes committee member N. Ignatovich. It is evident that those sections which work on the procuracy's internal needs are overstaffed.

The abundance of complaints concerning labor conflicts is primarily related to the fact that these are examined pro forma at the work place. This is the opinion of AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] legal department director V. Kleptsov. The commissions on labor disputes have equal numbers of administration representatives and "ordinary" workers, and conflicts are most often resolved in favor of the management. "Under-the-thumb" trade union committees are aggravating the situation as well. People therefore do not believe such "protectors" and are attempting to send their letters to higher authority, to the attention of the individual directly in charge. Finally, we must revoke the existing "blacklists" No 1 and No 2, under which 23 million functionaries currently fall—hostages, in essence, to arbitrary departmental will. We must abolish the departmental regulations on discipline.... It was 10 years ago that the AUCCTU introduced a proposal to change the practice of examining labor conflicts, but the departments stubbornly opposed it. A draft version finally reached the USSR Supreme Soviet last fall. Perhaps it will eventually be adopted?

We would like to expect that the discussion which took place will not only help change the situation in procuracy organs, but will also speed up adoption of the Law on Procedures for Examining Citizens' Complaints in Organs of State Government, at Enterprises, in Institutions, and Organizations. This should protect organizations from the uncontrolled flow of complaints, and provide us with legal protection in the highly complex intricacies of our life.

MVD Chief Discusses Candidacy, Curbing Arrest

90UN1071A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 1 Mar 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Colonel P. Studenikin: "A Commander's Lot—Features in the Portrait of Colonel General Yu. Shatalin, candidate for people's deputy of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic"]

[Text] "Moscow. To the Chief of the Internal Troops of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Colonel General Shatalin." Yuriy Vasilyevich has begun to receive a lot of letters with this terse address lately. Mainly from the "hot spots" of the country, where his subordinates are maintaining public law and order. Different people write, mainly those who are seriously troubled by the situation in the country, by the outburst of national passions, and by the increase in crime. However, messages of another kind also should be read. For example, like this:

"For shame! You fought in Afghanistan—you commanded a division there. Now you are at war in your

own country, and you now command many divisions. The people will not forgive you for this. If we run into you, we will hang you on the first bough! You should know this."

"Dear Uncle General! We, young prostitutes of the Country of the Soviets, earnestly request that you bring order to the state. You see, it has gotten to the point that it is terrifying to go to work at night...."

Shatalin shoved these letters to the edge of the table with disgust, and he said:

"I understand with the mind that it is not worth paying attention to them, but the heart does not want to accept the fact in any way that such scum has come to the surface in our country...."

Yuriy Vasilyevich is 55 years of age. He is a Russian. He is a native of the Moscow suburb town of Dmitrov. From a simple working family. He is married and has two children. He served 20 years in remote garrisons of the Turkestan and Transcaucasus military districts. He fulfilled his international duty in Afghanistan. No, General Shatalin's life and service can in no way be called easy. We counted: Last year he spent 220 days on temporary duty assignments. And what kind! The itineraries of his temporary duty ran through Armenia and Azerbaijan, Fergana and Abkhaziya, and Moldavia and Nagornyy Karabakh—there where explosions thundered, fires blazed, and blood was spilled. He did not spend his time sitting in the quiet of offices—with two conscript soldiers he went into hell itself, and he frequently conducted dialogues with the opposing sides to the accompaniment of automatic and machine gun rounds of the volunteer fighters. This in itself prevented what seemed to be quite inevitable blood-spilling.

Because of his readiness for self-sacrifice (he himself, incidentally, does not think this way, and he said: "No, I was not afraid that I would be killed. I was going to my own people, to Soviet people), and for this openness, he is loved and respected in the ranks by soldiers and by officers. Not only among the troops. Again, here are some lines from letters addressed to him:

"Only the soldiers of the internal troops can curb thugs that are intoxicated with blood and protect us from massacres and bandit robberies. Now, owing to your decisive actions, it would seem that everything has quieted down here. But we must not trust this silence—everything can repeat itself at any moment. Don't leave our children without protection. We beg you!"

"Our Dear Yuriy. Son of Vasiliy, you are our Russian person! Explain to us why our Russian boys had to perish in Afghanistan, and now in their own country...."

"What answers do you order for such letters?" Yuriy Vasilyevich did not succeed in ending the thought. Our conversation was interrupted by a demanding ring of the governmental communications apparatus.

...I had counted on meeting with General Shatalin back in Afghanistan, in Herat—that wasp's nest of Afghan counterrevolution. It did not happen—three days before my arrival, he finished his tour of duty honorably and left for the Motherland. Looking through my old Afghan notebooks I repeatedly came across entries about him—remarks of soldiers and officers about their commander: "You understand, he is a very demanding commander, but he is a human being! His favorite introduction to a story: Do not feel sorry for a soldier, take care of him—Colonel V. Sutulovskiy"; "Colonel Shatalin (he was then still a colonel) carried out 22 combat raids with us—this is the commander of a division! We, honestly, simply idolized him—Private Pavel Kichigin...."

So this meeting in his official office in Moscow after several years, but the situation reminded me vividly of the one in Afghanistan: Telephone calls from Baku, Nagorno Karabakh, and Yerevan brought alarming news.

"Yuriy Vasilyevich," I ask during a minute when the telephone is quiet, "the question was persistently raised at the congress about the impossibility of combining high positions with deputy titles. You gave your consent to be placed on the ballot for RSFSR People's Deputy in Moscow. Does this mean that you are prepared to give up your, I will put it frankly, very responsible and worrisome position?"

"In no way. Let us speak bluntly: A real campaign is going on for power, on whose outcome very much depends. And to me as a communist and a Russian patriot, I am not indifferent to who comes to power. You yourself see that forces have made themselves known in our country—and very strongly—that are attempting to wreck the union of our peoples. Continuous attacks on the party, the army, and the internal troops—including stirring up inter ethnic conflicts—unprecedented humiliation of our history, the increase in crime, the destabilization of the economic situation, a vigorous ideological process in the Western spirit—all of this, of course, pursues far-reaching aims. And these aims are becoming more and more distinct."

"I do not think," he continued, "that the deputy position will interfere with the performance of the main task—the restoration and maintenance of law and order in the state. Rather the opposite, the deputy tribunal will facilitate bringing urgent and burning issues of the day to the court of society, and this means that they will be resolved much quicker. For me, however, as for everyone else, one thing is obvious: It is no longer possible to live the way we have been living. But there is this question: What will our tomorrow be like? Will we be able to preserve our gains, and, after overcoming the crisis situation, move forward, or will we slide downward, losing our state independence in the process? It—our tomorrow—depends to a great degree on what the higher organ of authority will be like in Russia, and what its local soviets will be like."

"Yuriy Vasilyevich," I ask, "we now have problems that require immediate resolution, and, as they say, there are more than enough of them. But what, in your opinion, is the most important one?"

"The restoration of legality in the country. The striving for democracy in our country frequently turns into the usual anarchy. It has come to the point that the constitution no longer works. Thugs and looters go unpunished, and frequently efforts are made to present them as national heroes. The Mafia runs wild. The cooperative movement often turns into real economic sabotage against the state. The mind cannot comprehend it: Workers in a cooperative organized the sale abroad of the newest tank models! I am convinced that there must be state procedures in the state. Only on this condition will we be able to come out of the crisis all right, any crisis—economic and political."

"But here, as they say, you have the cards...."

"That's it, some managers, especially local ones, also think that way: To secure their own position, they try to involve more troops. They think that this will resolve all conflict situations and stabilize the atmosphere. But troops, if they were nonetheless able to involve them, are a temporary phenomenon. Sooner or later they will leave, and the managers will be left no better off than before. The local militia, as a rule, shuns the fulfillment of its duties under various pretexts, and it often has to be replaced by our troops. We need a clear law on the rights and duties of the internal troops."

"You seem to have said that the Ukase on the Duties and Rights of Internal Troops was adopted without your opinions and desires being taken into account."

"We now have completely reworked this ukase. It was considered by all of the commissions and committees of the Supreme Soviet of the country. As they say, only the bare bones of the original version remains. Now the troops, if it can be put this way, will have more rights to defend the rights of the Soviet people."

"You declare in your preelection program that you give preference to professional internal troops. Do you think that our army should be professional in general?"

"No, our army, in my opinion, should not be professional. In the internal troops—not all, but only those who are engaged in the guarding of corrective labor establishments. Why should we send 18-year-old lads to guard inveterate murderers and swindlers?"

Our interview was not completed—rapidly developing events in Baku interrupted the meeting. The next day Colonel General Shatalin flew out to where automatic and machine gun bursts of the Azeri and Armenian volunteer fighters were crackling, where vehicles with invalids were being burned, where apartments were being sacked, where property was being thrown out of multi-storied buildings, and frequently live people as well.... He flew out to stop the slaughter.

In conclusion, I would like to quote an excerpt from one more letter. It was written by soldier-internationalists, brothers-in-arms with the general in Afghanistan. "Comrade Commander," the letter states, "we, your former subordinates, are now in the reserve, and you, our combat division commander, are again in the 'forward area.' It is sad to realize that explosions are resounding in our land and that bullets are knocking our soldiers out of the ranks. Yes, we understand that our country is being threatened by a grave danger. Therefore, we are pleased that it is someone like you—a strict but fair person—for whom blood is thicker than water—on whom this lot has fallen to put out the fire in our home. If need be, we will join the ranks under your command. Be alert, take care of yourself!"
This letter was signed by 27 persons.

Further Reportage on Preliminary Election Results

PM0603141190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed report under the rubric "Elections: First Results": "Assertion of Power"]

[Text] The election results are of concern to us all today. Indeed, the question of who will be on the soviets tomorrow directly affects the future of every Soviet family. The final result will become apparent in the very near future, but for the time being our correspondents report:

RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]

At the Central Electoral Commission for Elections of Russian Federation People's Deputies we were told that the teletype machines have already conveyed the first news. Telegrams marked "election" are coming in one after another. Specialists of the RSFSR State Committee for Statistics are intensively summing up the elections region by region. This work is really difficult. The results have to be summed up for 1,068 okrugs, and the work is all the more voluminous if you consider that more than 6,700 people are aspiring to a seat in the Russian parliament.

Central Electoral Commission workers informed us that the mass of aspirants to a single seat promises a hard life for the electoral commissions and also for the voters themselves—there is to be a runoff, and even repeat elections in many okrugs. You see, more than 10 candidates were running in 300 okrugs.

A runoff is to take place over the next two weeks. Well, pluralism and democracy demand considerable mental work of voters, too.

We were told at the Moscow City Electoral Commission that more than 64 percent of the electorate participated in the 4 March vote. Out of 498 seats on the Moscow City Soviet, 35 candidates got through—463 seats are still vacant. Just eight candidates acquired the right to a mandate of an RSFSR people's deputy—V. Starkov, S.

Druganov, N. Travkin, V. Shinkaretskiy, T. Koryagina, and others. Muscovites have been allocated 65 seats in the Russian parliament, which means that 57 remain vacant.

A new round of voting lies ahead.

The elections in Kuybyshev took place in an inflamed atmosphere—there were even pickets outside the obkom [oblast party committee] building. The thing is that there are too many single-candidate okrugs in the oblast. It turned out, moreover, that only one voter in every 10 definitely knew who he would vote for. In the electoral precincts themselves they had to analyze the programs of some 20-30 candidates for the republic soviet and the local soviets. One can only sympathize with the voters. No wonder that a runoff and repeat elections will be a practically obligatory condition.

The inhabitants of Kamchatka were among the first in the country to arrive at the electoral precincts last Sunday. What are the first results? Alas, elected representatives have not been named in a single one of the six republic okrugs. Only those who will continue the struggle here for RSFSR people's deputy mandates in the 18 March runoff have been determined. The local soviet elections have proved equally inconclusive. In particular, just 33 of more than 500 candidates have become deputies of Kamchatka Oblast Soviet. There will be a runoff in 100 okrugs, and repeat elections in 26 because more than half the voters failed to turn out. In all, 69.5 percent of the electorate here participated in the vote.

The Ukraine This morning millions of yesterday's voters were glued to their radio sets. Although the results of the elections of Ukrainian people's deputies have not yet been finally summed up, the first preliminary results of the counts which took place all night in electoral precincts have already been given out.

Many hundreds of candidates were aspiring to 450 deputies' seats on the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. The people's first elected representatives have already been named. They include V. Golovach, breakage face miner; S. Batyushko, senior teacher at Kharkov's Gritsevets Higher Military School; and V. Petina, chairman of the the 22d CPSU Congress Collective Farm in Kherson Oblast's Genicheskiy Rayon. According to preliminary data, the following have also become people's deputies of the republic: V. Masol, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers; S. Gurenko, second secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee; N. Bagrov, first secretary of the Crimean Obkom; and Yu. Smirnov, chairman of Donetsk Oblast Soviet Executive Committee.

Belorussia

As expected, the first round of voting has determined only some new Belorussian SSR people's deputies. More accurately, 100 out of 310. Let us remind you that previously, in accordance with the republic law on elections, 50 mandates had been allocated to representatives of four public organizations.

More than 80 percent of the electorate participated in the voting. For whom did they cast their votes? Those who achieved victory include Ye. Sokolov, first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee; N. Dementey, chairman of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; and M. Kovalev, chairman of the republic Council of Ministers.

The public observed with particularly close attention the struggle of V. Leonov, first secretary of Mogilev Obkom, and A. Kamay, former first secretary of Gomel Obkom and now secretary of the Central Committee. The point is that these two oblasts suffered the greatest blow from Chernobyl, and people took an ambivalent view of the actions of party and soviet organs in the course of eliminating the aftermath of the accident. Suffice it to say that both first secretaries lost the previous elections to the country's parliament. But times change. Today Vasiliy Sevastyanovich and Aleksey Stepanovich were receiving congratulations on a convincing victory.

Those who are faced with a second-round struggle include V. Pechennikov, secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee; V. Mikhasev, chairman of Minsk City Soviet Executive Committee; I. Lishtvan, vice president of the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences; and others.

Academician Considers 'Russian Chauvinism'

90UN1117A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 6 Mar 90 p 3

[Report on interview with Professor E.F. Volodin, doctor of philosophy, department chairman at the Moscow Higher Party School, academic secretary of the USSR Academy of Sciences Academic Council for Problems of Russian Culture, by S. Kredov: "Without Insulting the Righteous One—About 'Russian Chauvinism' Without the Blinds and Russophilia"; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Kredov] Eduard Fedorovich, as we have agreed our conversation will have a political lining to it. We will probably touch on the interethnic relations problem. If one can judge by your recent publications in the press, these relations have become a source of continuing concern for you. Now you have put aside for a while your peaceful work as a researcher, an expert in the field of Slavic culture, and you have gotten involved in the emotional newspaper debate.

[Volodin] As for my "peaceful work," I have not put it aside. For instance, I am taking an active part in the work of the International Foundation of Slavic Writings and Slavic Culture; now we are organizing in Minsk an all-union celebration of Francis Skorina's jubilee. Another important feature of the Foundation is that it is not confined to the problems of just one nationality. By understanding ourselves we try to better understand

other nations. It is a noble and moral cause; it enjoys big public support and there is no place in it for chauvinism.

But the ethnic problems of today became a banner for political activity. They are robbed of their deep meaning through politicking, which separates people.

[Kredov] Your use of the word "chauvinism" was, probably, not unintentional. It is heard very often now and, without fail, it has the description "Russian." The label "Russian fascism" is used even more often. It is amazing, don't you think, that at the time when mass pogroms and even ethnic murders were being committed in some republics and Russia was receiving the refugees, public attention was drawn entirely to the action of hoodlums in the Central House of Writers. (Of course, this action cannot be justified in any way.) Everything is more or less clear with the hoodlums who insult the people's ethnic pride; the hoodlums have names and the appropriate law should be applied to them. But what can we do about "Russian chauvinism?" Does it exist as a phenomenon anyway?

[Volodin] Let us do some analysis. Chauvinism suggests that one nationality stands superior to all others—think of German National-Socialism. There is no trace of this in the history of Russian philosophy and culture. There is no foundation even from which the chauvinistic concept could have arisen. The Russian nation emerged as the result of historic interaction between Eastern Slavs and Finno-Ugrians. A lot later it acquired some ethnic Turkic traces. I can assure you that if our ancestors had had "fascist tendencies," then you would not have found any Finno-Ugrians on the territory of Northern Russia today. After Siberia was conquered there would have been no minor ethnic group left. In short, I do not see in Russian history any real basis for the appearance of chauvinist philosophy or ideology.

It is another whole story that the ideas of ethnic superiority arose at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century when the Russian bourgeoisie was striving to grab power. Nationalistic slogans appeared then right away. The reactionary wing of the October party nurtured itself on the idea of the Russians' superiority over all others. As we know they did not gain any mass support. The infamous Black Hundred and the Archangel Michael Union involved few people in their movement and they could not last. I made my own conclusion from this: Chauvinistic slogans did not meet with any understanding among the people themselves.

[Kredov] But you cannot erase Jewish pogroms from our pre-revolutionary history.

[Volodin] These were atrocious but still episodic events in the contradictory life of Russia at the beginning of the 20th century. Every decent Russian knew that to participate in them was shameful and unnatural. But I want to reiterate that chauvinism as a theoretical concept or as a policy is not limited to the relations between any two nations (for German National-Socialism slaughtering Jews was just a concrete indication of their global policy). Otherwise we will practically assume a Zionist point of view that the world is divided into two unequal blocs—Jews and all the others.

It would be impossible for other nationalities to unite around the one which was oppressing them and distorting their ethnic awareness. We cannot attribute acts committed by some hoodlums to the so-called "Russian chauvinism." This term is incorrect from the theoretical point of view and it is insulting for all the nationalities of our Motherland in practice.

[Kredov] So you think that there was no chauvinistic tradition in Russia. Is this "smoke without fire?"

[Volodin] There is a very deep tradition which is being maliciously tied with chauvinism. I mean the realization of our national uniqueness and defining Russia's place in the world. In pre-Petrine Russia they thought a lot about the role of Orthodoxy in world history. Later this tendency went beyond the religious-philosophical boundaries and was developed very fruitfully by the Slavophiles. But no Slavophile of the 19th century, however critical he was of bourgeois Europe, ever said a bad word about its nations and culture.

It is humiliating now to hear our liberals who consider the national movements in all the USSR republics as symbols of democracy but try to label the growth of consciousness in the Russians or, rather, in the Russian ethnic groups, as chauvinism or even give it the insulting name of "fascism."

[Kredov] What do you think about Pamyat'?

[Volodin] It is hard for me to say anything concrete about this movement. Its name became something like a curse. But I, as a theoretician, need some of their program papers to evaluate them. I have not seen any and I doubt that they exist. The information on their actions that is available to me is extremely contradictory. I heard that its members participated in the restoration of the Nativity of the Virgin Church. In this case I vote for them with both hands. But if it turns out that a hooligan action was organized by Pamyat which Russian would not condemn it?

I am quite convinced that any person who wants to help his nation should first of all locate its inner problems. He should not look for the enemy outside. As soon as you find one you start fighting him and forget about your other obligations to the Motherland. Where you find one enemy, you will without fail find another one, and then another, etc. And now some person starts running around the squares with a slogan. Everybody is prepared to draw a slogan: Some support Zionism, some support Pamyat, some the great Armenia, still others support Islamic Azerbaijan. But I am not at all sure that the one who wants to unite Muslims has a deep knowledge of Islam, or the one who wrote "Greater Israel" on a sheet of paper has read the books of the great prophets with all their depth and power.

[Kredov] That means that the main mission of the Russians is....

[Volodin] To understand themselves. To formulate clearly and precisely their own problems. And not to be hypnotized by the events in the Baltic republics or in Transcaucasia. Unfortunately, the only ray of sunshine for some people is the Western style of life, only Western-type democracy, as if there are no other forms of it, as if we do not see the wonderful experience of Japan, which preserved its national tradition.

[Kredov] Let us focus again on the problems of Russia as you suggest in full fairness. So, the insulting label is spread over the country. It sticks not only to a hoodlum who insults somebody's ethnic pride but to any person, it seems, disliked by someone. Are you against private ownership? You are a chauvinist. Are you for a Russian state? A chauvinist. And what is most surprising—we are almost getting used to the word.

[Volodin] For me, there is a well-outlined division: those who scream insults at people of different ethnic origin and those who do peaceful work and who are no part of any nationalism. Every nation has its own kindness, otherwise we would not have made it to 1990. The fact that the meetings of many thousands near Red Square cannot pronounce one good word about a Russian indicates the level of the politicians who are ready to lead the crowd and country God knows where. Lately I have been watching the actions of various political forces. Here is what amazes me. Our liberals yell about the increased national consciousness but they have not uttered a word about the specific problems of Russia which was and is, by the way, the core factor. Many of them are actively moving now into the Supreme Soviet of the republic. Do they have an understanding of Russian history, of the people's life, and of the tragedies that befell them? I look at the program of the interregional deputies' group, for instance, and all I see are the abstract democratic ideas that could be equally applied to a city or to the whole globe. As Engels put it, things that are meant to be applied always and everywhere can be used never and nowhere.

Plunging the country into chaos is becoming a reality and we have to do some tough talking about it, without gloating and without fear. It is hard to forecast the future. I know just one thing: There will be no antagonism in Russia bred by ethnic reasons. The Russian people are incapable of uniting of such a basis.

[Kredov] You do not believe in pogroms?

[Volodin] They will not happen. But, if you want, I will tell you about some provocations. In 1988 we were preparing to celebrate an all-union festival of Slavic writings and culture in Novgorod, in honor of the Millennium of Baptism in Russia. The things we heard while our organizing committee was at work in Moscow. They said that a congress of the Black Hundred was planned in Novgorod and from there they were to march in formation all over the country to catch non-Russians. If similar campaigns continue in the future I do not think it impossible for some idiot to report to a given location at the time announced by the media. Let us assume that somebody was really scared of the pogroms and decided to take some preventive measures. There are civilized ways to accomplish this! Let us educate the people. Let us show them: Here is Zionism which according to UN definition is a version of racism. Here is the ethnic, cultural, and religious life of Jews which should be widely presented. But no, one only hears about the pogroms and chauvinism.

[Kredov] Eduard Fedorovich, our reader must have understood that you are rather far from idealizing the Russian people even though you defend it from slander. Let us conclude with some self-criticism.

[Volodin] Dostoevskiy said: Do you think I do not see that the people are drinking? That the mother is taking her seven-year-old daughter out to work the streets? Do you think I do not see what is happening to the people's spirit? Yes, I do see. But I know that the people are kind in their hearts, that they preserve the highest moral values. Once he even said more than that: If just one out of 100,000 "saved" himself, it is already a lot. And now we have to be honest and say: There is drinking. There is our own prostitution. And the bums in the streets are not somebody else's, but ours. However, the spirit of the people lives.

[Kredov] There is a righteous man in every crowd?

[Volodin] Exactly, very precisely put. We have more righteous men than one out of 100,000. They are the ones we should follow.

Islamic Leader Interviewed on Jewish Emigration

LD0203235990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Interview with T. Tadzhuddin, chairman of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the European regions of the USSR and Siberia, by correspondent K. Gerasimov in Cairo; date not given—recorded; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Gerasimov] Cairo—an international Islamic meeting has taken place in the capital of Egypt—the Third General Congress of the Supreme Council on Islamic Affairs. Eminent Muslim figures from more than 30 countries participated in it. You know better than I do that there is a very complicated situation in our country. In a certain part of society calls are being made to solve the grave problems facing society by extremist and violent means. As religious figures and spiritual pastors, what is your attitude to this issue?

[Tadzhuddin] Well, we too are, of course, very concerned about this issue. One can never resolve anything by force, and violence only breeds violence. We have gained our union through suffering, and for this reason

we naturally need to solve more rapidly the socioeconomic problems which have been created in our society, and to take into account all of the legitimate national interests which every population group, every nation, and every ethnic group in our country has; and after that we will be able to strengthen our union and our state even more.

[Gerasimov] If I am not mistaken, the issue of the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel was, I think, raised at the conference. Can you say anything about this issue?

[Tadzhuddin] This issue was, of course, raised at the conference. Muslim representatives from Palestine are participating here, too. This really is giving rise to great concern throughout the Islamic world. At the same time we explained that this issue of emigration from our country does not affect one nation alone, but is a common law for all people. Many Soviet Germans, Armenians, and other nations are also emigrating from our country. The law cannot be applied to one nation alone.

The issue, however, is that this is deepening the concern of our foreign brothers in the Islamic world, because these emigrants are settling in the occupied territories, the legitimate territories of the Palestinian people. This issue must, of course, be resolved in order that relations between the Soviet Union and the Muslim and Arab countries should not be complicated. This demand was voiced at the Islamic conference that has been held. [video shows Hotel Meridien, with a sign which states that the conference is taking place there; the correspondent interviews Tadzhuddin outside the hotel; another unidentified Muslim clergyman is also present]

Emergencies Panel Discusses Pollution, Aral Sea

PM0603153190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Mar 90 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Through the Year 2005. At USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Emergencies"]

[Text] The draft state program for environmental protection and the rational utilization of the USSR's natural resources for the 13th Five-Year Plan and the period through the year 2005 has been examined and largely approved at a routine session of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Emergencies.

It is planned, in particular, to implement urgent measures during 1990-1995 to improve the natural environment in cities and population centers in regions with the highest constant atmospheric pollution, to stop the discharge of polluted effluent into all the country's water basins by the year 2000, to carry out large-scale work on improving the state of bodies of water, and to implement a package of measures for the protection and rational utilization of land, forests, flora, fauna, the earth's interior, and mineral resources.

By way of monitoring progress in fulfilling the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution of 19 September 1988, the question of measures to radically improve the ecological and sanitary situation in the region of the Aral Sea was examined. The attention of the councils of ministers of the Central Asian union republics and Kazakhstan and of the USSR Ministry of Water Resources Construction was drawn to the fact that they have failed to resolve a number of the region's basic problems. As a result, the sanitary-epidemiological and ecological situation in the Aral region remains strained.

The commission instructed the councils of ministers of the corresponding union republics, the USSR Ministry of Water Resources Construction, and the USSR Ministry of Geology to ensure the priority construction of a whole number of major drinking water supply projects, extend the use of existing stocks of underground water, and accelerate the delivery of packaged drinking water to the population. A package of other measures aimed at improving the state of the environment and the health of people in the region is planned.

It was decided to additionally examine the region's ecological problems in March with a visit to the site.

Reports were heard from the USSR Ministry of the Medical Industry, the USSR Ministry of the Chemical and Petroleum Refining Industry, and the State Agrochemical Association on their fulfillment of the commission's assignment on the question of providing medical industry enterprises with raw materials for the production of medicines.

The commission session was chaired by V.Kh. Doguzhiyev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Meskhetian Turks Official Voices Demands

LD1203120790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Text] A press conference devoted to the plight of the Meskhetian Turks took place in Moscow today. Our correspondent Yuriy Korotkov reports:

[Korotkov] According to statistics 207,000 Meskhetian Turks live in our country. Until the ill-fated events in Fergana in June last year hardly anybody knew about the existence of the Meskhetian Turks and their problems, about their struggle to return to their historical homeland which they were forced to leave 45 years ago. This hard-working and friendly people lived quietly and peacefully. But the events in Fergana and Tashkent Oblast, in Parkent, have forced the Meskhetian Turks to leave their homes and settle in other regions where they are guaranteed normal living conditions and safety. As a result, there are only about 30,000 Meskhetian Turks left in Uzbekistan. Others have found shelter in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, Kabarda-Balkar, and Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, in Astrakhan,

Belgorod, Voronezh, Kursk, Kaluga, Rostov, Smolensk, and other oblasts of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. Of course, the Meskhetian Turks are grateful to all who showed humanity and noble-heartednes, who extended a helping hand to the displaced people, who offered them temporary shelter. But, alas, it is not everywhere that they are greeted with an open embrace. Yusuf Sarvarov, the chairman of Votan [homeland], the provisional organizing committee of the Meskhetian Turks society, says:

[Sarvarov] For us, the Meskhetian Turks, the road is closed to Krasnodar Kray, to Stavropol Rayon, everywhere exept these oblasts in the Russian Federation: Orlov, Kursk, Voronezh, Smolensk—all the non-chernozem areas. These are the only places we can go to. They brought 16,000 people here from Fergana, scattered us in 156 rayons. Tell, us, please, what national culture and language can we talk about if 16,000 people are scattered over 156 rayons, in nearly 3,000 different enterprises these little groups of people are scattered.

[Korotkov] Well, but what do you suggest, what is to be done?

[Sarvarov] Not just suggest, but these are our demands, out sacred demands: to restore our rights; to reinstall us in our historical homeland, Meskheti-Dzhavakheti. In this lies the salvation of this people.

[Korotkov] Yes, Russia helped the Meskhetian Turks in their hard times. It did this calmly and naturally, as if it did not have its own problems. But they took the second place, seeming small and insignificant in comparison with the troubles of the small nation. Now, after the temporary consolation, the new pain, new worry about the fragmentation and living conditions to which they are not accustomed has stricken the Meskhetian Turks. The fear of losing national identity, language, is why, with ever-increasing insistence, they demand to be returned to their historical homeland, to the Akhaltsikhe Rayon of Georgia. But how is this to be done? Where can one find enough place for the 207,000-strong nation in the heavily populated republic? How can one consider the interests of all sides involved and not hurt anyone? How can one help, and who will be able to help?

NOVY MIR To Publish Solzhenitsyn's Works

LD0503221790 Moscow TASS in English 1704 GMT 5 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Ruben Shirinian]

[Text] Moscow March 5 TASS—A publishing centre has been established at the NOVY MIR magazine.

"We did not start from scratch. Over the 65 years that our magazine has existed, we have put out 750 issues, which can without exaggeration be described as an anthology of Soviet literature," the centre head, NOVY MIR Deputy Editor-in-Chief Feodosy Vedrashko told TASS.

"Our task is to select the best works from this rich heritage and publish them in book form for contemporary readers."

"We decided to begin our activity by publishing a seven-volume collection of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's works. The collection will include the novel 'In the First Circle' (two volumes), a volume of short stories, comprising 'One Day of Ivan Denisovich' and four other stories never before published in the Soviet Union. The fourth volume will contian 'The Cancer Ward'. The last three volumes will contain 'The Gulag Archipelago'.

"It should be stressed that the publication has been prepared by the author himself. The NOVY MIR publication centre's Vadim Borisov is the author's representative in the Soviet Union.

"The centre encountered difficulties from the very outset," Vedrashko said. "The main difficulty is the shortage of paper in the country. We have appealed to paper mills, printing centres and public organisations inside the country. We do not rule out cooperation with foreign partners, including joint ventures."

Vlasov Meets With Yakut Touring Theater Company

PM2302110990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 18 Feb 90 Second Edition p 6

[Vl. Kondakov report: "Friendship Tour"]

[Text] The All-Russian theater festival "Federation-90" opened in Moscow's Pushkin Theater 17 February with a performance of "Kudangs the Great" by the P. Oyunskiy Yakut Drama Company. This play, which is premiering, is a philosophical parable based on the themes of the popular legend of a man who mistakenly thinks he has the ability to resolve the destiny of a whole people but finds that very heavy burden too much to bear.

Before this event the Yakut visitors met with A.V. Vlasov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Council of Ministers.

"It is very noteworthy," he said, "that the Federation-90 festival is being opened by a Yakut touring company. This collective, which goes back 65 years, bases its quest for creative innovation on the fine traditions of the Yakut people and, being deeply original, finds understanding among a multinational audience. That is why the theatrical collective's great success is perfectly logical—it has been awarded the USSR State Prize, for which it was nominated by cultural representatives from Georgia, which is also very symbolic."

Economic

Commission To Draw Up Market Economy Laws

AU2103171990 Paris AFP in English 1607 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, March 21 (AFP)—The Soviet cabinet has asked a parliamentary economic commission to draw up the laws needed to move to a planned market economy, Radio Moscow publication INTERFAX said Wednesday. It said a working group headed by First Deputy Premier Leonid Abalkin had been given until May 1 to draw up "29 laws and other state and government documents" to carry out the cabinet's plan, citing commission member Yuriy Broukhin.

INTERFAX said Monday, without citing any source, that the Soviet Union was planning to introduce a series of radical economic measures from July 1, aimed at "de-nationalising and de-ideologising the economy and the life of society." Mikhail Gorbachev had said after being appointed Soviet president the previous Thursday that "radicalising the reform programme" and "de-monopolising the economy" would be his priority task.

INTERFAX said that the package being drawn up would consist of 12 laws, three Supreme Soviet resolutions and 14 cabinet decrees. The laws would include texts on moves towards a planned market economy, free enterprise, price reform, foreign investment, banking, customs, employment, and inflation-linked wage rises. The Supreme Soviet resolutions would cover social security, particularly reorganising the supply system in the new market conditions, and aid for the most disadvantaged.

The third area, which would include a possible change in the ruble exchange rate system and taxes, is the most sensitive, and would be passed by cabinet decree, thus avoiding a parliamentary vote, observers noted. The ruble currently exchanges at several different rates, with the official rate for business transactions 10 times higher than the official rate for tourists.

Some MP's [members of parliament] have said that the reforms will cause massive inflation and impoverish the population. They predict that the number of Soviet citizens living below the poverty line would rise to more than 40 million in the first two years.

The new programme is far more stringent than the five-year "economic redressment" plan adopted by parliament in December, and represents a "180 degree turn" according to some MP's cited by INTERFAX. Like other far less stringent measures adopted in the past five years of perestroyka, implementation is likely to be the hardest problem.

Nikolay Petrakov, an economic adviser to Mr. Gorbachev, recently criticised what he said was "a kind of paralysis of the powers that be" in an interview with INTERFAX. "If a decision is taken to raise prices, the businesses and the unions oppose it, and the government cancels it. Our government is in some ways inconsistent, and in addition it continues to carry out an insane (there is no other word for it) investment policy." "You cannot begain building 150 factories if you only have enough bricks to put up 100."

Voronin Views 1990 Economic Performance

904A0262A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK in Russian No 11, Mar 90 pp 1-3

[Report on interview with L.A. Voronin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, by L.A. Voznesenskiy Central Television observer; first two paragraphs are PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK introduction: "Only Through Joint Efforts"]

[Text] How is the implementation of the government program to improve the economy going? This question is bothering all Soviet people—for we link to its implementation our hopes for changes for the better in the life of the society and in each of our own lives. This program, which was supported by the Second USSR Congress of People's Deputies, can truly be considered nationwide. Its implementation depends on our efforts. But what is the overall picture here? The people have a right to have a clear idea of this. They must also know the steps that have been taken by the government so that against this background they can objectively evaluate their own contribution.

The government is open to such a frank discussion before the country. On the initiative of the USSR Council of Ministers its leaders speak every month on Central Television discussing the work that has been done and analyzing the processes taking place in the economy and the tendencies in the development of the national economy. Unique government reports prepared on the basis of these statements will be published in our newspaper. We offer our readers a discussion between Central Television political observer L.A. Voznesenskiy and L.A. Voronin, the first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

[Voznesenskiy] Lev Alekseyevich, the results from January have shown certain positive strides in individual areas of economic life and at the same time it is clear that on the whole they have not satisfied us. How were things in February?

[Voronin] We do not yet have complete statistical data. But one can already say that the operation of the national economy improved somewhat in February. As compared to January the average daily industrial production increased by 6.5 percent. In particular there was an increase in the average daily production of rolled metal, pipes, and many kinds of machine building products, including complicated household equipment.

During January-February of this year as compared to the corresponding period of 1989 we produced 12 percent more color television sets, washing machines, and radios and 18 percent more tape recorders and cameras. The

enterprises fulfilled the plan for the output of passenger automobiles, videotape recorders, and also such necessities that are now in short supply as bath and dish soap, bed linens, hosiery items, electric irons, creams, tooth paste, safety razor blades.... Taking into account the additional imported goods, all this made it possible during January and February to increase the volume of sales to the population by almost R8 billion or 13 percent as compared to the corresponding period of last year.

[Voznesenskiy] All this is gratifying, of course, but still on the whole industry has reached a level one percent below that of last February...

[Voronin] Yes, unfortunately. As a result of the breakdown of planning and contractual discipline, many branches and many republics failed to deliver R2.2 billion worth of products during the first two months of the year.

[Voznesenskiy] This is exactly twice as much as in January-February of last year.

[Voronin] The Council of Ministers just received precisely these figures. The shortages in the deliveries of products on such a scale has had a very harmful effect on interregional, interbranch, and interplant ties and, of course, it had dealt a strong blow to industry as a whole, as a result of which we have not reached the rates and volumes we earmarked.

[Voznesenskiy] Let us now, Lev Alekseyevich, move on to the food problem. Have there been any positive strides in solving it?

[Voronin] In January of this year the increase in food production was 4.2 percent. In February it was at approximately the same level. These rates are quite inadequate. The government works on the concrete problems of the food supply for the population literally every day.

One must say that we are having difficulty in solving this problem, and it is different in various regions of the country.... And here a great deal depends on the councils of ministers of the union republics since they are now in charge of all the agroindustrial enterprises. And I must frankly admit that the possibilities and reserves that exist for increasing food production in the local areas are far from being fully utilized.

The USSR Government has made a decision to increase imports of food and grain. More than R13 billion have been allotted for these purposes in 1990. But it is impossible to cover all of the population's unsatisfied demand for food through imports. We must solve this problem through our own forces, through priority development of agroindustrial production.

[Voznesenskiy] How are things developing in agriculture? After all, spring has already begun....

[Voronin] The first condition for achieving positive strides in the food supply is organized spring field work. For it is not without reason that the people say that "a spring day will feed us for a year." This year the government has found it possible to allot to the kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms] additional fuels and lubricants and certain other material resources. Now it is very important to make sure that they are delivered to the rural areas on time and in the intended volumes.

This pertains equally to the delivery of equipment for the processing branches. I must say frankly that deliveries from a number of machine building plants and plants of defense branches and agricultural machine building are not meeting their deadlines. Therefore I should like to appeal to the labor collectives of these enterprises to do the maximum possible since the solution to the food problem depends largely on their work.

In this connection quite new possibilities for producing food are opening up because of the laws on leasing and land. The USSR Government has adopted decisions that make it possible to achieve results from the implementation of these laws as early as 1990. Thus, in order to stimulate the creation and operation of leasing collectives, peasant farms, and cooperatives, amounts owing from previous loans of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes whose property they are leasing are being written off. The rate for electric energy is being reduced for the rural population. Agricultural and processing enterprises and also enterprises of consumers' cooperation are relieved of taxation on the increase in funds used for wages. Beneficial interest rates on credit have also been preserved for them.

Primary significance is attached to social restructuring of the rural areas. It is intended to use about R19 billion in capital investments for these purposes this year. This is almost 3 billion more than last year. In the future these volumes will increase even more.

[Voznesenskiy] And how is the fulfillment of other sections of the social part of the program to improve the economy going? Has anything interesting happened in this respect in February?

[Voronin] I shall tell you about one aspect of the fulfillment of the program, going somewhat beyond February so that the picture will be more complete. I can say without exaggeration that a number of large measures have already been implemented. Pensions have been increased for 22 million pensioners. Since 1 January of this year stipends have been increased for people who have been disabled since childhood and we have introduced the payment of old-age pensions for workers and masters in the full amount without taking their earnings into account.

Recently a decision was made to increase the minimum amounts of pensions for families of military servicemen on active duty who have lost their breadwinners and there are also new regional coefficients for pensions for citizens who live in regions of the Far North and locations on an equal footing with it. We are now

finishing the development of a USSR draft law, "On Pension Support for Citizens of the USSR." More than 500,000 suggestions have been generalized. The same kind of work is being done on the draft law on leave. We have received 4,000 suggestions regarding this law. They have also been generalized and are now being considered in the corresponding work groups. A broad complex of measures was prepared in February for improving the position of women, protecting maternity and childhood, and strengthening the family. In particular, it is intended to raise to the level of the minimum wage the stipends for caring for children until they reach the age of 1.5 years and the stipend for non-working women caring for children will be raised to 50 percent of the minimum wage; the amount of the stipend for children of military servicemen on active duty will increase. It is also planned to increase the stipends for people disabled since childhood.

A number of other measures have also been envisioned. On the whole we intend to spend more than R3 billion from centralized sources for these purposes. Moreover, with the changeover to the principles of regional economic accountability, the councils of ministers of the union republics and the local soviets of people's deputies will have an opportunity to independently introduce a wide range of additional benefits for the social security of the population.

[Voznesenskiy] The many good decisions in the social sphere are still not producing the effect we expect from them because of the continuing increase in prices....

[Voronin] Yes, this problem is bothering the government as well. The USSR Council of Ministers has made a long list of goods that are in mass demand on which state retail prices are frozen, and corresponding compensation is envisioned for enterprises that produce these goods. Basically these are goods for children and the elderly. Additionally, they have restricted the sphere of application of contractual prices both in terms of the range of goods and in terms of the amount of the permissible increment. The fulfillment of these measures is being carefully monitored. To these ends the USSR Council of Ministers has created a special commission and the corresponding subdivisions have been reinforced in the state committees for prices of the USSR and the union republics. Inspections have been initiated everywhere. We have seen the first results. Thus a decision was recently adopted to reduce unjustifiably high prices on 13,000 items. About R200 million in profit obtained through raising prices has been taken away from the enterprises.

[Voznesenskiy] Sometimes one hears the opinion that the government's decision to introduce auction trade and to create commercial stores for the sale of consumer goods stands in contradiction to the policy of increasing the social protection of the population....

[Voronin] There is no contradiction here. The purpose of this decision is to find additional funds for solving social problems. Now with the participation of the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Trade Union Council] we have refined the list of goods subject to this kind of sale. Basically they are luxury items. As concerns goods sold in auctions held by Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply] organs, here the essence of the matter is the following. At the enterprises there are many goods for production purposes which frequently lie around as dead weight. At the same time there is a demand for them. And above all among people engaged in individual labor activity, cooperators, and gardeners. That is, we are speaking not about narrowing but, on the contrary, about expanding the consumer goods market.

[Voznesenskiy] Since we have touched upon this issue, can you say something about the measures that are being taken to improve the work of trade?

[Voronin] We deal with problems of the work of trade all the time. We are now investigating the work of the trade network in a number of regions and sometime in the middle of the month we want N.I. Ryzhkov to hold a special meeting with trade leaders of Moscow and one of the republics in order to develop practical measures to improve trade. There are very serious shortcomings there and they must be rectified as quickly as possible in order to relieve the social tension that arises because of them. We shall deal with all this very attentively.

[Voznesenskiy] And what is being done to protect our domestic market from unscrupulous exporters?

[Voronin] Because of the situation that has developed in the consumer market the USSR Supreme Soviet on 20 November 1989 made a decision that in 1990 it would curtail the conclusion of economic agreements and contracts for the export of consumer goods and raw materials for their production in excess of the volumes established by the national economic plan, and it also deemed it expedient to introduce the licensing of exports of the aforementioned goods and raw materials.

A decision was also made to curtail until 1 July 1990 the issuance of licenses for exporting scrap metal and wastes of ferrous and nonferrous metals. This is linked, on the one hand, to the critical shortage of this raw material for domestic metallurgy. And, on the other, to the fact that attempts are being made to ship abroad prepared items, including consumer goods, under the guise of scrap metal.

[Voznesenskiy] In connection with the discussion of social problems, please tell us something about how measures are being implemented to improve conditions for the labor and life of such a category of workers as miners.

[Voronin] I would say that there is more and more mutual understanding and interaction between the miners and the government.

This has produced positive results, including economic ones. In two months they have extracted more than three

million tons of coal in excess of the plan, including in the Pechora coal basin where the above-plan output exceeded 300,000 tons. I also wish to note that the fulfillment of the agreements that were reached is continuing. In order not to allow violations of the time periods for the implementation of the coordinated measures—and this has occurred in the past with individual ministries and departments being to blame—state social commissions have been created and are now operating centrally and in the local areas. In addition to the leaders of the branch and territorial management organs, representatives of mining collectives have also been included. I think the situation here will improve more and more.

[Voznesenskiy] What has the government done in February, Lev Alekseyevich, to bring order into rail transportation?

[Voronin] Labor collectives of many branches and the citizens as well have serious and justified complaints against rail transportation, and the government is now devoting a great deal of attention to this. In the first place, measures have been taken to strengthen the material and technical base for rail transportation. The volumes of deliveries of cargo cars, rails, ties, and other resources have been increased. A policy has been introduced for priority shipment of products by other suppliers for the needs of rail transportation. Second, approximately an additional R850 million have been allotted to the Ministry of Railways for the wages of railroad workers and for hiring the full complement of workers in the basic occupations. Third, the responsibility of all enterprises for the use of cars and above-normative idle time has increased sharply.

It would be unfair not to mention that the railroad labor collectives themselves have now done a good deal of work to improve the utilization of equipment, to raise the level of accident-free traffic, and so forth. And I am very glad to say that for the first time in many months it was in February that we not only fulfilled the plan for transportation of national economic cargo but also shipped 700,000 tons in excess of the plan. As compared to January the residuals of cargo not shipped on time decreased by more than 7,000 units.

But these are only the first steps. There are still many shortcomings in the work of rail transportation. This pertains especially to passenger transportation. We have now developed a special program which envisions modernization and technical retooling of rail transportation.

[Voznesenskiy] And how are things with the work in the Moscow and Leningrad transportation hubs?

[Voronin] As a result of the measures that have been taken the situation here has improved significantly. While previously, for instance, each day up to 2,500 cars were waiting to be loaded on the sidings of the Moscow transportation hub, now this is not the case. The leftover cargo which had to be shipped from these transportation hubs by truck has been reduced to the technologically necessary level. The USSR Council of Ministers with the participation of leaders of the Moscow city executive committee, leaders of the October Railroad, and enterprises and organizations of Leningrad have considered questions of further improving the work of the Moscow and Leningrad transportation hubs. I think this will make it possible to solve the problems here completely.

[Voznesenskiy] And are the economic ties among the republics, which were violated quite fundamentally because of the interethnic conflicts, especially in the Transcaucasus, being restored?

[Voronin] In January-February I had occasion to spend a fairly long time in Azerbaijan and I saw a lot with my own eyes. Interethnic conflicts in the Transcaucasus have caused serious harm both to the republics participating in it themselves and to the country's national economy. In January-February the production of industrial goods in Azerbaijan dropped by 40 percent and in Armenia—by 16 percent. Direct losses of industrial output exceeded R700 million. Associated workers in other regions of the country have been placed in the most difficult of circumstances.

[Voznesenskiy] And how could it be otherwise when in February contractual commitments were fulfilled by Azerbaijan industry by 75 percent and Armenian industry—by 80.5 percent?

[Voronin] Yes, and were it not for these failures we would have been able to receive many more refrigerators, foodstuffs, television sets and other products of the electrical equipment industry, and so forth. True, during the last days of February there was a certain change for the better. In the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic all the enterprises went back to work. In Baku the machine building plants began to operate and in Sumgait—the chemical and petrochemcial plants (except Sintezkauchuka). On the whole more than two-thirds of the enterprises located in Azerbaijan are now in operation.

Now the task of the councils of ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia and the ministries and departments is to take all the necessary measures so that all the rest of the enterprises in these republics can begin to work in the near future.

[Voznesenskiy] And the last question, Lev Alekseyevich: What is keeping the government from implementing the program for improving the economy and carrying out its intentions?

[Voronin] First of all there are the factors that destabilize the economic and also the political situation. A great deal of harm is caused, as was already said, by interethnic conflicts. This is exacerbated by the strikes, which are continuing in a number of regions. Because of the increasing ecological requirements, the local organs have curtailed the operation of more than a thousand large productions, including those that produce raw material for the production of medicines and other goods for the people.

Based purely on their own group interests, certain enterprises are unwilling to increase the production of goods the country needs very much, including consumer goods. As I have already said, there continue to be interruptions in deliveries under agreements. Unpleasant as it is, I must say that labor and production discipline is not only not increasing but is even decreasing. This is caused to a significant degree by the fact that far from all enterprises have chosen as their leaders competent specialists who have good organizational capabilities and the proper demandingness.

Successful implementation of the program approved by the Second USSR Congress of People's Deputies for improving the economy is impeded by the activity of certain political forces which for the sake of their claims to power are following a course toward destabilization of the society and are operating according to the principle "the worse, the better."

But is the situation that has developed in the national economy hopeless? I am firmly convinced that it is not. A number of additional measures must be taken immediately. The USSR Government has prepared the appropriate proposals and will bring them up for discussion at the third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

At the same time it is extremely important for everyone to be deeply aware that unless order and discipline are imposed directly in the labor collectives, unless our entire society is consolidated, it will be impossible to make changes for the better. We all have one goal: to make our society humane, democratic, and flourishing. And this can be provided only through our joint efforts, through the conscientious, self-sacrificing work of each individual in his place.

Military

Arbatov View on Military Spending Challenged

PM2103151190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Mar 90 First Edition p 2

[Doctor of Military Sciences, Major General G. Kirilenko article under the "Point of View" rubric: "Is Defense Sufficiency Easy?"]

[Text] The title of Academician G.A. Arbatov's article "The Country's Army or the Army's Country?" (OGONEK issue No. 5, 1990), which appears rather witty at first glance, can—in our complex time—be used with equal sarcasm and irony in other articles. For example: a) "The Country's Agriculture or Agriculture's Country?" (in view of this sector's poor profitability); b) "The Country's Transportation or Transportation's Country?" (in view of the annual loss of up to 60,000 lives on the country's highways); c) "Institute of the United States and Canada or USSR Academy of Sciences Institute on the United States and Canada?" (in view of the aforementioned OGONEK article); and so on.

Even though, in my view, the overtones of irony in each one of these renditions would be justified to a certain extent, it would, at the same time, be extremely improper to apply them to the majority of workers employed in agriculture, transportation, and the USSR Academy of Sciences United States of America and Canada Institute.

As far as mutual relations between the Army and the country are concerned, I deem it superfluous to state the obvious. Namely the fact that the Army's life is governed by the interests of its country and its people. But I would also like to mention the following: The Army accepts this, fully aware that the country is appropriating as many resources as possible for its Army in the present economically difficult time.

Today it is obvious to everyone that perestroyka in the USSR, just like any other revolution, is comprehensive in nature, which means that it cannot but extend to all spheres of the state's activity, including of course the military sphere. The main objective of perestroyka in the military aspect of our foreign and domestic policy can be formulated as being to bring the country's military and military-economic potential in line with the principle of reasonable defense sufficiency. This is unquestionable.

Academician G. Arbatov's article raises another question. What should be done with the "surplus military might" of the USSR Armed Forces so as to bring them to a level of reasonable sufficiency? If the article's logic is applied, unilateral and total cutbacks are called for. But is this really so? And do we really have a "surplus"?

Seeing that the academician finds the existence of 64,000 tanks in our country so staggering, one should be allowed to ask why G. Arbatov is not staggered by NATO's superiority over the Warsaw Pact Organization in tactical aviation strike aircraft (by a factor of 1.5), naval forces (by a factor ranging between five and 12), long-range radar detection and vectoring, intelligence-gathering and communications means, and radioelectronic struggle?

There is another amazing fact. On the one hand, Academician G. Arbatov accuses General A. Ovchinnikov of supposedly attempting to raise doubts about the Soviet policy of reducing the Armed Forces' numerical strength and defense expenditures when arriving at the numerical strength of U.S. Armed Forces by adding on those of the NATO allies while, on the other hand, he himself frankly raises doubts about government reports on our military expenditures ("if the official military budget figures were to be accepted as 100-percent correct"). Where is the logic?

Another amazing point is the academician's euphoria caused by the 10-percent reduction of U.S. military appropriations over a five-year period (with allowances for inflation).

So, if our military budget were to be "compiled scientifically in terms of real prices and with adjustments for inflation," the following circumstances ought to be borne

in mind. First, the growth of inflation in our country today is approximately three times faster than the U.S. level, which means that the military budget is reduced by almost 10 percent every year without any formal reductions. Second, I would like to remind readers that last year alone the USSR officially cut back its defense expenditure by 8.2 percent without taking inflation into account. Third, it must be borne in mind that, as our defense industry sectors started switching to economic accountability and self-financing, the cost of military equipment and certain types of work increased by a factor of two, three, and even more. Fourth, reductions of the Armed Forces' numerical strength, the withdrawal of troops from abroad to the USSR, and the military industry's conversion will necessitate additional appropriations rather than cutbacks during the first few years. Fifth, it is necessary to heed the statements by participants in the All-Army Officers Assembly, which expressed alarm caused by the fact that military pools are overflowing with obsolete equipment while newly arriving models, even though expensive, are often "mediocre."

All this, taken together, does not in any way promote the buildup of "surplus military might" and "safety margin"; it rather makes it possible to answer the question: Is defense sufficiency easy in these conditions?

Having fought in the Great Patriotic War and proceeding from its experience, Georgiy Arkadyevich could have attempted to identify the defensive operation in which such sufficiency was created. Was it the battle for Kiev, Smolensk, or Sevastopol? No? Was it the Kursk salient? I think so, too. Let us recall, however, that this sufficiency was achieved in conditions when we were on par with the enemy in terms of weapons and combat equipment quality.

Can it be said today that we enjoy advantages over the United States or other NATO countries? I am certain that G. Arbatov would answer this question unequivocally.

The following must also be borne in mind when assessing U.S. military expenditure.

First, it is necessary to more rigidly differentiate between appropriations and military expenditures, and to be more cautious when using deflators to convert current prices into fixed prices.

Second, the issue concerns not only the size of the military budget but also its structure. The Americans have recently reduced somewhat the expenditure on arms procurement (seeing that the latest rearmament cycle is approaching completion), and have substantially increased expenditures on military research and development—in other words on the development [razrabotka] of new, more sophisticated, and more powerful weapon systems. A corresponding rise in appropriations and expenditure on their procurement is to be expected in the long term.

Third, it must not be forgotten that the slight reduction of U.S. military expenditures which is now being declared will occur (if it actually does occur) following a significant increase which almost doubled them during the Reagan presidency.

There is a somewhat strange look to Academician G. Arbatov's unconditional trust in U.S. official statistics ("I fully guarantee this") and his evident mistrust in official publications by Soviet leaders. There is probably no need to hurry in accusing the military of "concealing" or "falsifying" information, nor should it be forgotten that U.S. military expenditure statistics are by no means completely open—they have contained and still contain secret expenditure categories, and it is by no means easy to "unravel" their real structure.

For the time being, G. Bush's administration does not intend to abandon the "nuclear deterrence" strategy or the policy of constant strongarm pressure during the conduct of talks. It does not completely rule out the possibility of reverting to a state of direct confrontation between armed forces under certain circumstances. Despite the changes taking place in the world, U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney maintains his stance. "Even if we reach agreement on strategic offensive arms," he claims, "we must continue to pursue the modernization of our strategic forces."

Academician G. Arbatov complains that we have allowed a militarization of many aspects of our life which does not befit a socialist society, and perceives this phenomenon as a natural legacy of Stalinism.

There are two reasons why I cannot agree with this view. First, it is well known that we have still not succeeded in building a socialist society and, second, human society was not militarized just under Stalin; it has been militarized throughout its history. It is a fact that mankind's history is the history of wars. The new political thinking is called new precisely because this is the first time that thinking has been geared to the demilitarization of human society and contemporary civilization. Therefore, it is not altogether proper to accuse one's country today, with hindsight, of having "not always lived up to its lofty principles and ideals."

And it is altogether improper to accuse all the marshals, generals, and general designers in the military industry of having been "given a completely free hand and become uncontrollable" during the stagnation period. Even some famous figures among them, like G. Zhukov, S. Korolev, and A. Sakharov, would hardly agree on this with Academician G. Arbatov. As regards the high military ranks and awards he mentions, it is true that numerous scientists were by no means overlooked when it came to awards, titles, and honors during the stagnation period.

Let me briefly answer some of Academician G. Arbatov's other "more specific" questions.

"What did we achieve by creating this giant?" he asks with reference to our Armed Forces. My answer is: We gained 45 years of peaceful life and retained the status of a great power.

"Why do we have the numerically largest Armed Forces?"

First, because ours is the largest country with the longest land border (60,000 km). Second, the geographical distance separating U.S. territory from possible theaters of war and the existence of its land borders with Canada and Mexico do not justify even the present numerical strength of its Armed Forces. Third, it ought to be borne in mind that soldiers in the U.S. Army are not even involved in domestic chores like KP duty, whereas our Armed Forces are 20-40 percent self-sufficient in food requirements and, furthermore, play an active part in the solution of national economic tasks like "Housing 2000," "Non-Chernozem Highways," land reclamation, annual harvests, and so on. Therefore, without revealing any secrets, I can give assurances (and the Americans know this) that our actual Armed Forces (and I emphasize the word armed, in other words permanently engaged in combat training) are no larger than the American.

To continue. "Why does our expenditure for military purposes represent the largest percentage of GNP among the major powers?"

Because our GNP is not only 2.2 times smaller than the U.S. GNP, it is smaller than even Japan's GNP. And if military expenditure per capita were to be "scientifically calculated," it emerges that we spend 250 rubles [R] against $1,250 in the United States. This is probably reasonable for us. But is it actually sufficient?

As far as arms sales are concerned, foreign estimates (which the academician fully trusts) indicate that arms exports represent one of the most profitable categories in Soviet foreign trade. They provide the country with up to 15 percent of all hard currency revenues (compared with 60 percent from oil sales).

On reading Academician G. Arbatov's article in OGONEK, one question automatically springs to mind: Whose specific hopes are let down by the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions? G. Arbatov's personal hopes, or someone else's? The academician raises doubts even about the objective need for setting up this committee, describing it as "a lobby rather than a parliamentary monitoring organ." It is too late to question G. Arbatov's propriety in this case, but I would like to ask him to accept full or partial blame for this "sin" in his capacity as USSR people's deputy. After all, it was not the Ministry of Defense that elected this committee.

The polemics with Academician G. Arbatov may be continued on other matters, but I would like to agree with him on the fact that the other side's intentions should be judged not so much by its words as by its potential. It is, after all, sufficiently obvious that the danger of war still exists in the world, U.S. and NATO concepts which are far from defensive still remain in force, their multimillion armies and multibillion military budgets are still in existence. It was no accident that this was raised at the CPSU Central Committee February (1990) plenum, which emphasized that we need well trained and well supplied Armed Forces. The price to be paid for quality is no less than that payable for quantity.

The country's defense costs R70.9 billion today. G. Arbatov writes that this amount goes beyond the framework of reasonable sufficiency. It would be interesting to find out by how much, in his opinion? Specifically in view of the fact that more than 173,000 servicemen's families have no apartments at present, while even a regimental commander's official salary is no higher than that of a city bus driver. As regards the quality of arms and military equipment, today it is sufficiently obvious that, for the time being, we have no justification to effect savings there. Reports about submarine and aviation accidents graphically testify to the immoral nature of such proposals.

Of course, taking the present socioeconomic situation into account, the sum of R70 billion is considerable. Nevertheless, against the background of the total nonproduction expenditures and losses in the national economy and the existence of criminal capital in the country (including the "shadow" economy) running into hundreds of billions of rubles, the funds appropriated for the country's defense do not look all that impressive.

Today it is perhaps hard to find anyone who would reject the new political thinking, the policy aimed at reducing the level of international tension. This is why a certain perplexity is caused by the search for dissenters, for people who supposedly strive to "raise doubts about the Soviet policy of reducing the Armed Forces' numerical strength and military expenditures." Moreover, for some unknown reason the search for arguments in favor of creating an image of opponents to "military perestroyka" is conducted (and on a highly selective basis, at that!) in the arsenals of Western, rather than Soviet statistics, including official figures.

A debate on military policy and the building of the Armed Forces primarily requires soberly considered appraisals backed by the best possible arguments, rather than polemical ferocity or fabricated charges against opponents.

Kiev Military District Exercises Begin

PM2003124990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by Sergey Tsykora under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Exercises Have Begun"]

[Text] Kiev—The second round of elections in central oblasts of the Ukraine is taking place to the roar of mock

ground and air battles. This "surprise" was presented to voters by the army command, which decided to conduct troop exercises at precisely this time.

Mock battles have started up in the region of the population centers of Belaya Tserkov, Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy, Grebenka, Shchors, Loyev, and Vyshgorod. Around 12,000 personnel, including those called up from the reserve, are taking part in them. The ground forces' operations are being given air force support.

The presence here of a large number of foreign observers may be regarded as a special feature of the current manuevers. The operational-tactical exercises on the territory of the Ukraine are the first to which the USSR Government, in accordance with the Stockholm Conference document, has invited observers from all CSCE states. Representatives of the United States, Canada, Britain, Italy, Spain, the GDR, Poland, France, the FRG, and other countries have come.

The Kiev Military District command gives assurances that the troops are well trained not just in performing basic tasks. Much effort has been put into ensuring that the exercises are not detrimental to the environmental situation or forest and agricultural land. The exercise area was chosen on the basis that the troops would be deployed and conduct maneuvers within the bounds of the ranges. If asphalt roads do have to be crossed by tank columns they will be protected with special coverings.

But the so-called damage commissions set up in every unit, which along with servicemen also include representatives of local organs of power, will serve as the main protector of nature during the exercises. It is their job to monitor observance of the environmental protection measures. When the troops leave the exercise area, the commission members will inspect it and draw up appropriate documents. Only when documents stating that there are no claims against the participants in the exercise are available will the exercise be considered officially over.

Moscow TV Shows Footage

LD2103185290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 21 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video report by V. Lyaskalo]

[Text] [Announcer] Operational tactical exercises of the troops of Kiev military district are taking place on the territory of the Ukraine. [video shows helicopter; a soldier running and firing an automatic weapon; tanks in tree cover; and camouflaged communications installations]

[Lyaskalo] Starting on 16 March, over three days the troops moved out into the starting regions. More than 24 hours were spent on engineering equipment in the locality and only yesterday, 20 March, were the first shots heard, and, as military people say, the dynamics of the battle began.

Combat action is taking place exclusively within the boundaries of the Chernigov training center. This is between the Dnepr and Desna rivers. There are no settlements here, only sand and pine trees. [video shows correspondent speaking to man in military uniform identified by screen caption as Major General A.I. Kuznetsov, assistant leader of the exercises]

[Begin video interview] [Lyaskalo] Anatoliy Ivanovich, well, we all know that the Chernobyl zone is not so far away here, across the Dnepr, and so everyone is interested in the radiation situation here at the site of the exercises. And I see you have a radiation meter with you.

[Kuznetsov] The radiation situation in the exercise area is normal. The natural background reading does not exceed the background reading in the city of Kiev. We may be convinced of this after taking measurements in the locality, together with you.

[Lyaskalo] And during the actions there should be no change in the situation?

[Kuznetsov] There will be no changes during the combat action. [end video interview]

[Lyaskalo] Observers from 23 countries are present at the exercises. [Video shows group of foreign observers in military uniform] On the first day they paid a visit to the front line of defense of one of the battalions, and observed the defensive actions of the units and also saw a helicopter assault. The tactics and equipment for defense—this is the main theme of these exercises. [video shows troops engaged in training exercises, leaving helicopters]

Defense Ministry Fined Over Phosphorous Disposal

LD2103175890 Moscow World Service in Russian 1044 GMT 21 Mar 90

[From the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program; report attributed to INTERFAX]

[Text] A military tribunal of the Kaliningrad Garrison has reached a verdict on the so-called phosphorus case. It arose in the fall of 1988 when people on holiday on a Baltic beach began to find pieces of a yellow stone similar to amber. They would suddenly ignite in people's hands. It emerged that this was phosphorus from smoke bombs withdrawn from service. The investigation established that during their destruction there was gross violation of technology. As a result, pieces of phosphorus ended up in the sea. The Ministry of Defense will pay a fine of over 500,000 rubles.

Military Leaders Sign Gen. Dementyev Obituary

PM2103161790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Mar 90 First Edition p 4

[Obituary of A.A. Dementyev]

[Excerpts] Colonel General, Retired, Aleksey Alekseyevich Dementyev, veteran of the Great Patriotic War, died after a serious illness. He devoted all his conscious life to selfless service of the socialist motherland and the cause of the Communist Party, whose ranks he joined in 1942.

A.A. Dementyev was born 15 March 1921 in Kemerovka Village, Kozlovskiy Rayon, Chuvash ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]. [passage omitted]

D.T. Yazov, M.A. Moiseyev, P.G. Lushev, K.A. Kochetov, A.D. Lizichev, Yu.P. Maksimov, V.I. Varennikov, I.M. Tretyak, A.N. Yefimov, V.N. Chernavin, M.I. Sorokin, V.M. Arkhipov, V.M. Shabanov, N.V. Chekov, V.L. Govorov, D.S. Sukhorukov, Yu.A. Yashin, V.N. Lobov, A.V. Betekhtin, N.A. Moiseyev, D.A. Grinkevich, I.N. Rodionov, N.V. Kalinin, V.G. Serebryakov, A.I. Makunin, L.B. Kuznetsov, M.I. Bezkhrebtyy.

Baltic Republics

Vilnius Radio Carries 22 Mar Council Session

Media Committee Debated

LD2203093890

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0800 GMT on 22 March begins a live relay from the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

At 0803 GMT Bronius Kuzmickas, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council, declares the work resumed. The session chairman then announces the agenda of today's work, which includes debates on the state of the republican television and radio committee. Following this, the editing commission will present the edited version of the government law.

The chairman says that the chief of the republican Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy (DOSAAF), General Taurinskas, is reportedly on the way to the Supreme Council to make a report on the property of the Lithuanian DOSAAF and the allegation that it is to be transferred to the Soviet Army.

At 0810 GMT Deputy Emanuelis Zingeris reports on the reorganization of the Radio and Television Committee. He says that from now on this body will be called the Lithuanian Radio and Television. The general director of the body will be appointed by the Supreme Council.

At 0825 GMT Deputy N. Rasimavicius proposes to change the management of the radio and television because, he says, they are against the Lithuanian cause.

At 0836 GMT the debates continue. Proposals concerning the status of the Radio and Television Committee stress strongly that the state committee status should be abolished.

At 0849 GMT Deputy Ceslovas Jursenas takes the floor. He says that the content of radio and television programs have improved during recent years.

At 0853 GMT Deputy Sadreika urges the house to slow down in making decisions on radio and television.

At 0904 GMT a vote is taken on the proposal to establish an editing commission which would be responsible for the preparation of the final version of the document concerning the reorganization of radio and television committees. The proposal is adopted and an editing commission is established.

Order To Surrender Weapons Discussed

LD2203102590

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian on 22 March continues broadcasting a live relay of the Supreme Council session being held in Vilnius.

At 0907 GMT Domijonas Sniukas, chairman of the state Radio and Television Committee, is given permission to speak. He assures the house that there are no enemies of Lithuania among radio and television journalists.

At 0910 GMT Deputy Zigmas Vaisvila asks about the allegations concerning the Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy [DOSAAF]. He wants to know about the position of the head of the Lithuanian DOSAAF concerning these allegations.

At 0913 GMT General Taurinskas takes the floor. He says that he has received orders to return the weapons, otherwise these weapons will be taken away by force.

At 0925 GMT following this, questions to the general are given. One of the questions concerns the subbordination of the DOSAAF, to which the general says DOSAAF is subbordinated to the USSR. Many questions are asked concerning his loyalty to the republic; for example, if tomorrow he was asked to give the republic's trucks or other equipment, would he comply with the request.

At 0930 GMT Barauskas the procurator general of the republic, announces the arrival of a commission from Moscow. He says that he understands the aim of the commission.

At 0935 GMT questions to the procurator general reveal that Barauskas is loyal to the republic. Z.Vaisvila proposes to prepare a statement concerning the aforementioned two issues.

At 0939 GMT the session is adjourned until 1008 GMT.

Text of Media Law Read

LD2203115490

[Editorial Report[Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1011 GMT on 22 March resumes broadcasting a live relay from today's session of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

E.Zingeris announces the version of the edited text of the document on the status of the Radio and Television Committee. The document states that the present state committee has now been abolished and that the director general of Lithuanian Radio and Television and a board of managers will be appointed by the Supreme Council.

At 1022 GMT the registration of deputies is carried out. There are 97 deputies in the house.

At 1026 GMT debates begin on the proposed text of the document. The text of the law on radio and television is read and a vote taken.

AT 1034 GMT votes are counted: those in favor (figures indistinct); against five; and 12 abstentions. The decision is therefore adopted by the majority of votes.

At 1036 GMT Deputy Simenas speaks on the refinement of the structure and functions of the Supreme Council

which concern the appointment of the prime minister and the cabinet of ministers, legalislation, and others.

At 1045 GMT a draft law on the status of a deputy of the Supreme Council is discussed. Primary concern is voiced on the part of those deputies who have to carry out the duties of a deputy, and to remain in their posts. This causes considerable difficulty to some deputies because some deputies want to remain in their profession.

At 1106 GMT Z. Vaisvila proposes that Eionoris, deputy chief of the DOSAAF, be allowed to make a report.

At 1109 GMT Einoris says that the information given by General Taurinskas is not all true to life.

At 1118 GMT various procedural problems are discussed.

At 1121 GMT congratulations from the Jewish community in Kaunas and workers from the cardboard factory in Klaipeda are read. Messages from Dushabe, Baku, and other places are read.

At 1126 GMT the session is adjourned until 1300 GMT.

Debates Continue

LD2203145190

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1300 GMT on 22 March resumes a live relay from today's session of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

Debates on the government law continue. Deputy Antanavicius presents the results of the editing commission. He gives a detailed account of proposals which the editing commission has included into the Law. As each deputy has a copy of the draft law on their tables, Antanavicius therefore refers only to specific passages in each article. The text of articles of the law is not presented to the listeners.

At 1316 GMT debates continue in progress.

At 1336 GMT a vote is taken on each article of the draft law.

At 1354 GMT a debate ensues on article nine of the government law, which regulates the procedure of expressing a vote of no confidence in government.

At 1435 GMT the session is adjourned until 1500 GMT.

Reportage on Order To Hand Over Weapons

General Relays Order

LD2203100390 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0913 GMT 22 Mar 90

[Statement by General Taurinskas, chief of the Lithuanian Republican Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy at 22 March session of the Lithuanian Supreme Council in Vilnius—live relay]

[Text] Good day, esteemed deputies. Concerning this question by Deputy Vaisvila, I received an order two days ago from my superior [word indistinct] of the Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy [DOSAAF] to hand in all weapons [words indistinct] to military units, by enactment, for temporary safekeeping. [Words indistinct] from all primary organizations, commissions, and enterprises. I issued such an order, and all organizations [word indistinct] in Siauliai, Kaunas, Panevezys, Vilnius, and Alytus today handed over all weapons to military units by enactment, and they will be returned after a certain period of time. [passage indistinct].

Yesterday, at 2100, I was summoned by Army General Varennikov, commander of the ground forces, who told me to inform the Supreme Council that if the weapons are not handed over, they will be taken by force. This is all I can tell you.

Decree Termed 'Illegitimate'

LD2203114290 Moscow TASS in English 1126 GMT 22 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Kazis Ustsila]

[Text] Vilnius March 22 TASS—The chairman of the Lithuanian parliament last night rejected the package of measures spelled out in President Gorbachev's Wednesday decree as "illegitimate".

Vytautas Landsbergis' statement, read out on local television, responded to such measures as the taking of all firearms from the Lithuanian population within seven days, stepping up security on the Soviet state border, and tightening controls over the entry of foreigners into the Republic.

The decree was prompted because the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, which declared on March 11 "the restoration of an independent Lithuanian state", continues to pass bills violating the rights of Soviet nationals and the sovereignty of the USSR.

Landsbergis explained his opposition to the package by saying that "the Sovet Union has itself recognized as null and void the secret protocols to the agreement between Stalin and Hitler" and thereby "condemned the annexation of Lithuania".

The path chosen by Lithuania now, he stressed, could be changed "only by force of arms".

Further Landsbergis Comment

LD2203113390 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 2200 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Excerpts] Late tonight the chairman of the Supreme Council, with the participation of Vilnius Radio and Voice of America correspondents, made the following statement [passage omitted]

Some explanations followed this statement:

[Begin Landsbergis recording] I think that, together with protests on the limitation and separation of Lithuania from the world, which we will have to regard as the continuation of aggression and the imprisoning of the whole state, it will be necessary very simply to advise every old person on some farmstead in Lithuania who has an old hunting gun to defend himself against robbers, to hand it peacefully and without opposition to the new robbers.

General Questioned

LD2203103390 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0925 GMT 22 Mar 90

[Exchange between Deputy Kazimieras Motieka and General Taurinskas, head of the Lithuanian Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy, from the live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius]

[Text] [Motieka] We have adopted a resolution at the Supreme Council that everyting on the territory of Lithuania is the property of the restored Lithuanian state. Do you know about this resolution?

[Taurinskas] I do.

[Motieka] Then tell me why you yourself are deciding what to hand over and what not to hand over? Are you aware that you are violating this resolution?

[Taurinskas] I am a general of the Soviet Union's Armed Forces and my superior is the minister of defense [words indistinct].

[Motieka] But this is incompatible with your statement that you are Lithuanian and Samogitian. Therefore I ask you whether you violated the resolution of the Supreme Council?

[Taurinskas] I do not think I violated it.

[Motieka] Has the government instructed you to hand over property to the Soviet Union, property which you have already handed over?

[Taurinskas] We have not handed over anything yet.

[Moltieka] But the weapons have been taken.

[Taurinskas] They have been taken over temporarily. Comrade Motieka, you should put these questions to the commander of the ground forces, Army Gen. Varennikov.

[Motieka] I ask you these questions. This property was under your management and you should contact the Lithuanian government. You failed to do this.

General Criticized

LD2203143390 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1109 GMT 22 Mar 90

[Speech by Einoris, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy, at the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live relay]

[Excerpts] You just heard a report by Gen. Taurinskas, which was incorrect. [passage omitted] Our organization is a public organization; it obtains its funds itself. [passage omitted] Our organization is engaged not only in the development of technical branches of sport. We train some 30,000 experts for the national economy; they are mainly drivers. All these organizations maintain themselves; they purchase machines like all other ministries and departments through the center and we pay for all this machinery. [passage omitted] We only receive machines of the A group for the training of experts; we train at present some 3,500-4,000 of them. These machines we receive free of charge. But we train experts for the Army and train them free of charge. [passage omitted]

Recently at a plenum of the Central Committee we stated that we would like to set up a demilitarized organization, a union of sport and technical branches of sport for the benefit of the Republic of Lithuania. [passage omitted]

But several military men, above all Gen. Taurinskas, although he stated that he was Lithuanian and Samogitian, are acting against our proclaimed reorganization and our decisions. A commission which has arrived is abolishing some sub-units, dismissing depty chairmen who, as they say, are nationalists and carrying out some nationalist reorganization in the Republic. I wish to tell you frankly that Comrade Radzevicius who takes part in the commission for the defense of servicemen, has been dismissed. I, too, have been included in this list, because, as they said, we joined the Lithuanian Communist Party [passage indistinct].

At present, in nearly a half of the rayons, a commission has been set up, and during the plenum I was elected chairman of the commission. We have already, in nearly a half of the rayons, given up the name DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy] and set up a board of the Lithuanian Union of Sport and technical branches of sport. [passage omitted] Now, it seems, they want to take over all this and hand it over to the Ministry of Defense.

Therefore I ask the deputies to rule that this public organization, whose funds and everything else have been created by oursleves, hotels, several enterprises which maintain this technical sport, the aviation sector which is heralding and will herald the name of the Republic in the whole world, be subordinated to the Republican Council of Ministers.

Supreme Council Working on Antistate Draft Law

LD2203112190 Moscow World Service in Russian 1030 GMT 22 Mar 90

[From the 'Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program; report attributed to INTERFAX]

[Text] A draft law has been submitted to the Lithuanian Supreme Council on criminal liability for antistate appeals. It is envisaged that the law itself will be adopted next week. The text of the draft says that appeals for the forcible violation of the independence of the Lithuanian Republic and the integrity of its territory, or for the overthrow of legitimate power, will be punishable by deprivation of liberty for up to three years. Such appeals circulated with the aid of publishing or the mass media will be punishable by deprivation of liberty for up to six years. If such acts are committed at the behest of foreign states or their representatives, then the term of deprivation of liberty rises to 10 years with confiscation of property.

Commenting on this draft law, Vladislav Shved, second secretary of the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania adhering to the CPSU platform, stated that in the event of its being adopted it will be used for repression against dissidents. The leaders of Sajudis consider that the supporters of unity with the USSR fall into the latter category. The appearance of such a draft law is no surprise after the first protest meetings held in Vilnius, Snieckus, and Klaipeda.

Lithuanian Party Official on Antistate Appeal

PM2203111990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 22 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1

[Interview with I.I. Kuolyalis, secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU Platform) Central Committee, by N. Nadezhdina under the general heading: "Protecting The People's Genuine Interests"]

[Text] Anxiety and alarm about the future of Lithuania—one of the country's 15 republics—and for the future of hundreds of thousands of Lithuanians, Belorussians, Russians, Jews, and Poles all inhabiting Lithuania are constantly with us these days. The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet's decision to secede from the USSR and revive the 1938 bourgeois Constitution, a decision made in contravention of the USSR Constitution, caused a storm of indignation in our country. Yesterday we called I.I. Kuolyalis, secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU platform) Central Committee, and asked him to talk about recent events in the republic.

"It has been reported in the press that our party's Central Committee held a plenum the other day," Iozas Iozasovich said. "It discussed with great earnestness the results of the CPSU Central Committee March (1990) Plenum and the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the political situation in the country, and ways out of the political crisis. The communists were outspoken and made it very clear in a plenum statement 'On the Political Situation in Lithuania' that there has been a coup d'etat in the republic and that reactionary forces have come to power and essentially started dismantling socialism. The 'Sajudis' government and Supreme Soviet are far removed from the genuine concerns of the people. The proclamation of Lithuania's secession from the USSR contradicts the genuine interests and concerns of the Lithuanian people."

[Nadezhdina] Iozas Iozasovich, do the communists supporting the CPSU platform sense the support of various nonparty strata in the population?

[Kuolyalis] I believe that not only here, in the USSR, but also abroad, the millions of people who watched the 18 March rally in support of the Third Congress of People's Deputies' decisions on Lithuania could see that our position is the position of the broadest people's masses. The republic's leadership talks in vain about alleged accord and loyalty here. Polarization has taken place not only in the party, but in society as well. At rallies in various cities in the country the people have come out powerfully in defense of Soviet power, in favor of Lithuania's remaining in an overhauled Federation of Soviet republics and in favor of the building of a life worthy of human beings.

[Nadezhdina] What proportion of the population of Lithuania wants to remain in the USSR?

[Kuolyalis] I can say in all seriousness that the vast majority of the population of Lithuania regard themselves as citizens of the USSR and will accept nothing else. A referendum would show more accurate data, but the "Sajudis" authorities have categorically refused to hold one, obviously frightened that the results might not be in their favor. In fact, in the election "Sajudis" had the support of less than one-third of the electorate and cannot speak for the people.

[Nadezhdina] There was a report in the press to the effect that the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet intends to present a draft law "On Criminal Liability for Antistate Appeals." What kind of draft is this?

[Kuolyalis] Well, it is a document that is worth citing. It clearly describes the Lithuanian leadership's "democracy." It literally says: "First, calls for the violation of the Lithuanian Republic's independence or of the integrity of the republic's territory, for the overthrow of legal power or the commission of a serious crime to that end are punishable by up to three years imprisonment. Second, such appeals made by a group of organized people or involving the use of printed materials or other media are punishable by up to six years imprisonment. Third, actions stipulated in Articles 1 and 2 of this law, committed while carrying out tasks for foreign states or their representatives, are punishable by up to 10 years imprisonment and confiscation of property."

[Nadezhdina] What does the formula "foreign states or their representatives" mean?

[Kuolyalis] The Soviet Union and the CPSU—that is quite obvious. In this way, the authorities are trying to block actions by all healthy forces in Lithuania, who are struggling and will continue to struggle for the country's unity, for Lithuania to remain a Soviet republic. We will not retreat. The first editions of the revived newspaper of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU platform) Central Committee—TARYBA LIETUVA and SOVETSKAYA LITVA—will be coming out in the next few days, and this will break through the blockade against glasnost.

Landsbergis Rejects Secession Referendum

LD2203123890 Moscow World Service in Russian 1030 GMT 22 Mar 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, has again categorically rejected the need to hold a nationwide referendum in this Republic on the issue of secession from the USSR. This decision had been adopted by the Republican parliament, but it provoked protests among non-Lithuanians. Landsbergis stated that the recognition of Lithuania's independence would not damage the interests of this section of the population. As for those who want to leave Lithuania, he said, a system of compensation would be created for them. The USSR Congress of People's Deputies has, however, found the Lithuanian parliament's decision illegal, and has instructed the USSR Supreme Soviet to elaborate a democratic mechanism for a union republic to secede from the USSR.

Commentary on Support for Lithuanian Independence

LD2203124590 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 22 Mar 90

[Vitaliy Gurov commentary]

[Excerpts] Events in Lithuania are still of prime concern to Soviet people. Vitaliy Gurov comments on the situation:

The latest reports from Lithuania produce a dual impression. Following the highly emotional splash of public activity at mass rallies last weekend, absolute calmness has descended on Lithuanian towns and villages. All the industries and offices, schools and colleges are functioning in their normal if not sluggish rhythm. This may be just another manifestation of the Lithuanian national character, reserved and imperturbable.

On the other hand, we see booming activity of the new legislature and government of the Republic. This is not confined to mere declarations such as changing the state symbols or noticeboards on the official buildings. There is intensive legislative activity, a bill for instance on criminal responsibility for anti-state agitation. I can't go into details now, but even calls for staying within the Soviet Union may entail long prison terms. The Sajudis movement is beginning to register volunteers for a state security service.

In view of Lithuania's legislation violating the rights of its citizens, President Mikhail Gorbachev has issued a decree on additional measures to safeguard those rights and the sovereignty of the Soviet Union on Lithuanian territory. [passage omitted The chairman of the Lithuanian parliament, Vytautas Landsbergis, has rejected the decree as having no legal force in Lithuania, for it was issued by a foreign state.

So, Lithuania is bent on sailing alone. But many things are still unclear. What is in store for the crew of that vessel? Since it is far from everyone in the Republic that approved the latest decisions, it is not clear how far the captain's commands are going to be obeyed, nor where is the ultimate destination. But it is quite clear that Lithuania's problems can be solved only through dialogue within the framework of the Soviet Union's constitutional structures.

Lithuanians Urged To Respect, Abide by Treaties

LD2203113590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 22 Mar 90

[Text] Treaties must be abided by. Such is the well known axiom of international relations. Obviously this unwritten rule should be all the more seriously complied with within one state. However, to all appearances, certain people in Lithuania are attempting to flout generally accepted standards of communication and community and give their own arbitrary interpretation to such concepts as law and right.

Excerpts from the remarks by Landsbergis, who hastily and kindly put one of the deputies of the Lithuanian parliament at the disposal of AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, lead to precisely such thoughts. Despite the fact that Landsbergis is proposing that the country agree with his statutes rather than the Constitution, at the same time, he by no means avoids referring to support from abroad for the position of certain Lithuanian leaders, thus evidently attempting to create notions of the extent and essence of this support, though, to be truthful, not quite adequate ones.

Incidentally, most foreign agencies reported without any comment at all that the Soviet president, making use of his powers, has given instructions on halting the unlawful actions and violations of the clauses of the Soviet Constitution in Lithuania.

Christian Democrats Appeal for Trust, Unity

LD2203130490 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0940 GMT 22 Mar 90

[Summary] The board of the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party has published an appeal to the citizens of Lithuania asking them to trust people who have been elected to the Supreme Council, and to be united.

Council Urges Replacement of Media Chiefs

LD2203093990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0825 GMT 22 Mar 90

[Statement by Deputy N. Rasimavicius from the live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council Session in Vilnius]

[Excerpts] Esteemed deputies, yesterday I had an opportunity to meet a group of sociologists, pysychologists, and lawyers and they convinced me that at present a general campaign is under way in Lithuania to undermine people's confidence in the Lithuanian parliament. In the Sajudis break-away press, radio and television broadcasts are used for this purpose. [passage ommitted] In radio broadcasts, especially at 4 o'clock, open statements against government decisions are made. [passage omitted] Attempts are being made to present purposeful anti-parliamentary propaganda as a fight for democracy. Attempts are also made to present the escapades of Leningrad television as the introduction of censorship. It is high time for our Republic to start defending itself; above all, finding information media workers who are not hostile. At present the situation in Lithuania is like that in England before the well-known air battle. Then, each step by the government was criticized, and the anti-government criticism was camouflaged by slogans of defending democracy. [passage omitted]

We are not a state yet, we are only building the state. It would be naive to think that the enemies of our aims do not make use of our naivety. [passage omitted]. The present leaders of radio and television must be replaced immediately.

Official Discusses Visit of USSR Procurator

LD2203103190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0930 GMT 22 Mar 90

[Statement by Republic of Lithuania Procurator General Barauskas at Supreme Council session—from the live relay]

[Excerpt] Esteemed chairman, esteemed deputies. This morning it has become absolutely clear that a team of 11 people from the all-Union Procurator's Office is to arrive in our republic. Well, we used to call them team, brigade, or commission. I was informed on the telephone that the aim of the trip is to implement or to inculcate the work plan drawn-up by the all-Union Procurator's Office which was confirmed in December of last year. This plan envisaged a visit to the republic in May to see how the republican Procurator's Office is restructuring its work in the light of new economic and political conditions.

This is the official motive for their arrival. I suggested to them that perhaps they should not do that; to which they replied, unfortunately, we are coming.

Concerning the underlying motives, of course I can see them, however, I do not think we should discuss them, because I can even be wrong in my judgement concerning their real intentions. I would not think their intentions are concerned with the restructuring. [passage omitted]

TASS Views Criminal Career of Lithuanians

LD2203123490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1138 GMT 22 Mar 90

[Text] Vilnius, 22 March (TASS)—Special TASS correspondent Stanislav Novrutskiy writes:

At one of its first sessions, the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania decided to form a commission for protection of the country. Its first session was reported by the majority of the republican newspapers, and a few even printed photographs of members of the commission. The latter were of interest to many residents of the republic. Among the members of the commission they saw Liudas Simutis and Baklys Gajauskas.

Many values are today being reassessed in the republic. The view of the postwar anti-Soviet armed underground is also changing. True, it is now more often called the "resistance movement." One of the articles in the latest issue of the Sajudis newspaper ATGIMIMAS wrote this of its participants: "Yes, these people killed. But for this, they would simply be saints."

Liudas Simutis and Balys Gajauskas were also part of the "resistance." Moreover, it is asserted that this is the very fact in their biographies that was decisive in their victory at the election. But did the voters know the whole truth? Did they know that it was not only attacking militiamen on duty and distribution of leaflets, but also ordinary robberies that, in the final analysis, became the main "resistance" activity of Simutas and the whole underground group led by him? Here is the "combat" career of this group in brief: summer 1952—theft of a radio reciever; January 1953—shop robbery; November 1953—armed robbery of a shop; same month—murder of a militiaman. In October 1954—armed robbery in a buffet and attempted murder of a militiaman.

The list of achievements of Gajauskas is much shorter. And typical are: distribution of anti-Soviet leaflets, armed robbery of the "Viktoria" bar, and killing a militiaman during arrest.

Participating in the Supreme Soviet sessions is another person who asserts himself to be a "member of the resistance," Stanislavas Ilgunas. His biography includes: robbery of an office, robbery of a village soviet, and armed robbery of a shop, part of the proceeds of which, according to Stanislavas Ilgunas himself; "I sold at the market, keeping the money for myself. I also kept hold of a watch, an alarm clock, a pair of boots, and a pair of slippers."

The court sentenced Ilgunas as a basic criminal, for theft of public and state property. Perhaps this is why he has

been included not in the commission for protection of the country, but the commission on culture?

Vilnius Radio Continues 21 Mar Council Session

Ministerial Functions Debated

LD2103152190

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian on 21 March continues its live relay of the Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

At 1343 GMT Ronius Kuzmickas takes the floor. He speaks on Article 25 of the law, which in the main deals with the functions of ministry of culture and education.

At 1350 GMT Deputy Ceslovas Jursenas says that specific period of time should be fixed concerning the confirmation of the government composition. He also states that a question time should be allocated in the council.

At 1356 GMT Deputy Algimantas Norvilas emphasizes the importance of stabilizing the situation in the republic and, in his opinion, the merger of the ministries does not help such stability.

At 1400 GMT Deputy Eimontas-Grakauskas objects to the old style of government and states that merged ministries should have precisely defined tasks and duties.

At 1410 GMT the chairman says that 31 deputies have expressed their wish to speak in the debates. However, at the moment only seven deputies have spoken.

At 1431 GMT Landsbergis takes the floor to make several remarks concerning merging the ministries. He says that the Ministry of Culture could be reorganized into some departments within the Ministry of Education at some time in the future.

At 1437 GMT Landsbergis reads a telegram as follows:

"This telegram has been addressed to me and also to Vilnius, Republic of Lithuania: 'We support and congratulate the restoration of the state independence of Lithuania. We hope that all the republics of the USSR will follow your example and we will prepare a new all-union agreement by our joint efforts; peacefully and on voluntary basis we will set up a new union of sovereign states. We shall maintain friendly relations with those republics which will not be in the Union.

"Rally of the People's Movement of Uzbekistan—Birlik." Signed on behalf of the rally, by chairman [name indistinct]"

The session is thereupon adjourned until 1510 GMT.

Debate on Ministries

LD2103173190

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service on 21 March in Lithuanian continues its live relay of the Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

At 1510 GMT Gricius speaks about future state organs which would deal with ecological problems. He advocates leaving the Committee of Environmental Protection subbordinated directly to the Supreme Council.

At 1523 GMT a vote is taken on the list of nine ministries proposed to be set up in the independent Republic of Lithuania. The results of the voting are not announced; instead, there are debates on whether the Ministry of Culture should be merged with the Ministry of Education.

At 1545 GMT the debates on the issue are concluded and a vote is taken. The majority vote to have one ministry—the Ministry of Culture and Education.

At 1553 GMT a vote is called on the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Social Matters. The majority vote in favor of two separate ministries.

At 1556 GMT the deputies discuss whether environmental protection will be subbordinated to the responsibility of the government or merely to the Environmental Protection Committee.

At 1600 GMT debates on who should be responsible for ecological problems continue. A vote was taken that a nature protection committee be set up and be subordinated to the Supreme Council.

At 1608 GMT a debate began on the formation of a ministry of trade and material resources. A vote was taken that two ministries—trade, and power energy—should be set up. The majority of deputies voted for two ministries.

At 1611 GMT debates started on the ministry of trade and of foreign economic relations. The government proposed that three ministries be set up for trade, material supply, and foreign trade. Deputies voted for the setting up of two ministries—without the ministry of foreign trade.

At 1642 GMT a vote is taken to set up two ministries—agriculture and forestry.

At 1643 GMT an appeal to militia workers is read. It is adopted by 86 votes.

At 1650 GMT the session is adjourned until 0800 GMT 22 March.

Landsbergis Addresses 21 Mar Supreme Council

LD2103122290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1002 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Speech by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, from the live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius]

[Excerpts] Good day, esteemed deputies. I will not make a long statement, but only several remarks. I will not speak about any events, but about the continuing social and political situation.

One of the constant factors is pressure on the minds of our society's members and citizens in an attempt, it seems, to influence our position. We have all read and replied to the resolution of the Third Congress of People's Deputies, but it influences the minds both of ordinary people and of the high-ranking military men who are convinced or have received such an instruction, that, allegedly, the USSR Constitution is still valid in Lithuania; allegedly, USSR sovereignty also embraces the Republic of Lithuania abolished in 1940. This can sometimes encourage gatherings of our people to irresponsible actions and, what we especially do not want, encourage military men to aggressive actions.

The problem of young men who have left military service and, we stress, permanently, has so far not been solved by mutual agreement. Conflicts of local or individual nature, but of political and international content, can happen any day. Apart from that, we see a sad practice in the Soviet Union when military men, issuing orders which have very complex and difficult consequences, have hitherto not been punished for arbitrariness or for exceeding their authority, even when there have been human victims. The well-known General Radionov has even been promoted for the Tbilisi murders. Gen. Yazov speaks very favorably about the military and political qualities of Gen. Radionov.

Therefore it is obvious that yet another more detailed statement, a stricter and well-argued reply, which would demonstrate more thoroughly and comprehensively to all, the logical absurdity and lack of legal grounds of the resolution by the Third Congress of People's Deputies, is essential. My letter to Gorbachev was, I would say, diploamtic, explaining the situation but not criticizing. It seems this is not enough.

The calm situation in Lithuania is not helped by the spread of rumors that, allegedly, the state borders will be changed to the detriment of Lithuania; statements are encouraged that, allegedly, people wish to decide by voting or by other means which part of Lithuania's territory and where the borders should be put on the political map of Europe.

We have spoken here about the travels of military men in Klaipeda region and eastern Lithuania. Information about this is contradictory. One report states that some posts are being put in the ground marking lines on the ground. Another report, which I received from Minister Misiukonis, says that this is not so. But, it seems, there has been such news since the peasants report [words indistinct].

The political aim of this pressure is obvious. I state it once again to destabilize Lithuania's internal and, let us say now, international situation in order to hamper the recognition of our government which is being formed.

Therefore, I wish to repeat my request to the Council of Ministers that it thoroughly examine those surveys along Lithuania's borders; with some fantastic revisions of the borders, and ask Gen. Yazov very concretely about it.

According to the information in hand, this is the initiative of local military units; at least this was the case a few days ago. Anyway, they are subordinate to somebody, and higher authorities must feel and have responsibility.

I spoke yesterday about yet another necessity and I hope I will be able to submit to you or inform you about this problem, which also includes a protest to the Belorussian Supreme Soviet. A provocative statement by a deputy from Belorussia at the Third Congress of People's Deputies containing a claim to Lithuanian territory is sufficient to leave a destabilizing trace in the minds of inhabitants of eastern Lithuania. Our feelings toward the Belorussian people, toward the Belorussian national movement, are very good [words indistinct].

We should also describe in some way the provocations by Central Television. Our attitude has been expressed very clearly. To avoid some people in Lithuania being insulted and others incited, our Radio and Television Committee stopped a recorded broadcast of the Yedinstvo meeting from Leningrad. In spite of this, yesterday the same recorded feature was broadcast by the first television program. We had no opportunity to examine this and make a decision. I hope that we will decide not to broadcast the first television program. Our Television and Radio Committee, [word indistinct], it seems, did not decide to do this. Maybe we should draw a conclusion from this for the future and instruct the Television and Radio Committee to make such decisions without delay. These are urgent problems which require an answer but, on the other hand, we can state with satisfaction that the situation in the Republic is calm, people behave honorably, the mood of the people is positive, and I think that we are advancing very calmly toward our future planned by us.

As far as international politics are concerned, I wish to announce a brief but very important text. It is a statement by the White House in the United States which was read yesterday by a White House representative, [indistinct name]. [passage omitted]

There has not been such a serious warning to the Soviet Government before. This is very important support and reassurance to the people of Lithuania, who can feel that they are not alone in the great sea of world politics, and we must be grateful to the government of that state for such support. I thank you.

PRAVDA Reports on 20 Mar Council Session

FM2103114790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Session"]

[Text] Vilnius, 20 Mar—At the continuing Lithuanian Supreme Soviet session here, a resolution has been adopted which alters the existing procedure by giving the prosecutorial oversight of transportation in Lithuania to the republic's prosecutor. Deputies also instructed the republic's Council of Ministers to begin preparatory work to demarcate the borders of the Lithuanian state.

The Supreme Soviet has set up an interim parliamentary commission to try to resolve the problems of the eastern part of Lithuania. Most of the population in that area are not of Lithuanian origin and some of them do not approve of the Lithuanian parliament's decisions proclaiming independence or repudiating the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Constitution and the USSR Constitution.

The session ratified the membership of Supreme Soviet standing commissions and examined issues linked with drawing up a law on the Lithuanian state coat of arms.

As usual, the session participants heard a report from V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, on the political situation in Lithuania and the world. Talking about the Soviet Government statement published in the newspapers, the head of the Lithuanian parliament assessed this document as a kind of beginning, a negotiating stage, an exchange of opinions and provisions, which in certain cases contradict each other and reveal incompatible positions, but in other respects show that positions could coincide.

Gorbachev Issues Presidential Decree on Lithuania

LD2103185890 Moscow TASS in English 1856 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 21 TASS—President Gorbachev today issued a decree ordering extra measures to protect the rights of Soviet citizens and Soviet sovereignty in Lithuania.

The document noted that contrary to the Congress of People's Deputies' March 15 resolution, the Lithuanian parliament and government continue passing bills that violate the rights of Soviet citizens and the sovereignty of the USSR.

In this connection the president bound the Federal Government, the executive agencies of local governing councils in Lithuania, and law enforcement services with ensuring the observance of the Federal Constitution and laws and protecting the rights and legitimate interests of Soviet citizens living or staying in Lithuania.

The presidential decree ordered KGB forces to step up security on the Soviet border on Lithuanian territory and halt all illegitimate actions violating federal legislation on frontiers.

The president also ordered a temporary suspension in Lithuania of the Federal Government's resolution on the acquisition, accounting the keeping of hunting rifles, and banned the sale of firearms there for the same period.

The decree demands that citizens living in Lithuania turn all their firearms into temporary police custody within the next seven days.

The president ordered the federal Foreign and Interior Ministries to tighten control over the issuance to foreigners of visas and permission to visit Lithuania.

The decree bound the federal Interior Ministry and Procurator- General's Office "to take essential measures to stop violations by foreign nationals staying in Lithuania of regulations concerning the stay of foreign nationals in the USSR, up to their deportation in keeping with the USSR Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Nationals in the USSR."

The decree became effective immediately.

'Text' of Decree

LD2103185690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1800 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 21 March (TASS)—We are transmitting the text of the decree of the president of the USSR on additional measures to guarantee the rights of Soviet citizens and to protect the sovereignty of the USSR on the territory of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] published today. It says:

Despite the decision of the extraordinary Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies of 15 March 1990, legislative acts violating the rights of Soviet citizens and the sovereignty of the USSR are continuing to be adopted by the Supreme Soviet and by the government of the Lithuanian SSR. In connection with this, I resolve:

1. That the USSR Council of Ministers, the executive and administrative bodies of local soviets of people's deputies of the Lithuanian SSR, and the law enforcement bodies guarantee the observation of the demands of the Constitution of the USSR and of the laws of the USSR in defense of the rights and legitimate interests of citizens of the USSR living in or who are on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR.

2. That the frontier troops of the USSR Committee for State Security should adopt the necessary measures to strengthen protection of the section of the USSR state frontier which passes through the territory of the Lithuanian SSR and to cut short illegal actions which violate USSR legislation concerning the USSR state frontier.

3. That the operation of USSR Council of Ministers decision No. 646 of 23 July 1975 "on establishing a

common procedure for the acquisition, registration, and storage of sporting guns" is to be suspended temporarily on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR, with a simultaneous ban on the sale of firearms in the republic during this period.

Citizens residing in the territory of the Lithuanian SSR are to hand over all firearms in their possession to internal affairs bodies within seven days for transfer to temporary storage. The USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs is to ensure their confiscation in the event of the refusal by citizens to hand over such arms. The USSR Ministry of Defense is to receive the citizens' confiscated arms from the internal affairs bodies and ensure their storage.

4. That the USSR Foreign Ministry and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs are to strengthen monitoring of the issuing of visas and authorizations for foreign citizens to enter the Lithuanian SSR. The USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the USSR Procuracy are to take the necessary measures to stop violations by foreign citizens who are on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR of the rules for the stay of foreign citizens in the USSR, up to and including their expulsion in accordance with the USSR law "on the legal position of foreign citizens in the USSR."

5. That the present decree comes into force from the moment of its signing.
[Decree not signed—as received]

Landsbergis Condemns Gorbachev Decree

LD2103225690 Vilnius in English to North America 2230 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Radio Vilnius asked Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, to comment on this decree.

[Begin Landsbergis recording in Lithuanian fading into English translation] This decree, like any other adopted by a foreign state with pretensions to sovereign rights over Lithuania, has no legal force. It can only be implemented by brutal armed force in case the Soviet Union resolves to openly continue its 1940 aggression against Lithuania.

It's deplorable that this decree is a continuation of the principle mistake of the illegal decision on Lithuania made by the Third Soviet Congress of Peoples' Deputies, namely proclaiming unlawful sovereignty of a large powerful state over its small and defenseless neighbor.

The Soviet Union itself has declared null and void the secret protocols of the Stalin-Hitler agreement of 1939 and has condemned the policy of ultimatums and violation of international agreements, the annexation of Lithuania included. Now, once again, the Soviet Union is unable to let its prey go and reestablish lawfulness. The ghost of Stalin(?ism) is roaming about the Kremlin, casting its long shadow westward.

Will the world welcoming Lithuania and its free will, like this? Tomorrow will show. And like in the face of earlier threats we shall meet tomorrow calm and unified. [end recording]

Lithuanian Party Views Antisocialist Stances

PM2103121190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "For A Renewed Federation"]

[Text] Vilnius, 20 Mar—Ways out of the political crisis that has emerged in the republic and communists tasks in connection with the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee March (1990) Plenum and the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies, were discussed today at a plenum of the Lithuanian Communist Party Interim Central Committee on the CPSU Platform.

The opening speech by M. Burokevicius, first secretary of the Interim Central Committee, and the speeches by the plenum participants stressed that the republic's leadership—first and foremost, V. Landsbergis and K. Prunskiene—have adopted antisocialist positions and embarked on the path of reviving the basic provisions of the bourgeois 1938 Constitution.

It was noted at the plenum that the categorical rejection of a referendum on such a major step as secession from the USSR sounds strange on the lips of parliamentarians who talk about the democratic thrust of the processes currently taking place in Lithuania. The plenum speakers stressed that communists are particularly concerned today about the position of the republic's leadership, which is implementing a policy of completely rejecting the documents of the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies. The only way of getting the republic out of the sociopolitical crisis is to develop the republic's state, economic, and cultural independence within a renewed Federation. Today Lithuania is deciding the fate not just of Lithuania but of the entire USSR.

Plenum participant V. Khadunkin, secretary of the Vilnius Gorkom [city party committee] of the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU Platform, described the situation in the republic as follows: "A polarization of political forces is taking place. On the one hand, people are rushing to prop up the shaky declaration of Lithuanian independence with more and more laws; and on the other there is an increasingly massive and organized rejection of those decisions as unconstitutional and undemocratic. It has taken just one week for a gulf to form between the 'Sajudis' leaders who have now become legislators and a significant proportion of the population. There is a gulf between their recent populist, humanitarian speechifying and their by no means parliamentary practice."

Plenum participant K. Zherditskayte described the situation in the republic as tense and unstable. "In the event that the Lithuanian government ignores the Congress of People's Deputies resolutions it will be necessary to

declare presidential rule over the Vilnius region, most of whose inhabitants did not empower their deputies to vote for Lithuania's secession from the USSR," she said.

The plenum adopted the statement "On the Political Situation in Lithuania," which states that the adoption by the republic's Supreme Soviet of a package of documents on the question of "restoring an independent Lithuanian state" and the repeal of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Constitution and the USSR Constitution on the republic's territory mark a reactionary turnaround and an infringement of the Soviet social system. This is leading to the further whipping up of political tension in Lithuania. The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet's orientation toward the republic's secession from the USSR accords with the interests of antisocialist forces which oppose the revolutionary restructuring of Soviet society. The shaping, elaboration, and implementation of anti-Soviet plans is jeopardizing the republic's real sovereignty.

The republic's Supreme Soviet, the statement noted, is shaping a state structure which contravenes the USSR Constitution. Work has been launched on creating national military formations, and all anti-Soviet elements are becoming increasingly active. At the same time, Lithuanian SSR administrative organs have suspended their activity in defending Soviet citizens constitutional rights.

It is planned to submit to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet the draft law "On Criminal Responsibility for Antistate Appeals," which is aimed against citizens advocating the retention of Lithuania in the USSR. The plenum statement stresses that the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU Platform Interim Central Committee wholly approves the resolution of the extraordinary Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies in connection with the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet decisions and calls on all the republic's working people to take vigorous and resolute actions to defend their lawful rights.

Lithuanian Ethnic Groups Support Sovereignty

LD2203123190 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] The Lithuanian Inter-ethnic (?Co-ordinative) Association has made a statement to the Lithuanian Supreme Council. The association welcomes the decisions on the restoration of Lithuania's statehood and says non-Lithuanians are ready to stand by the Lithuanian nation in solving the urgent political and economic problems. The statement, signed by leaders of 21 ethnic communities in Lithuania, condemns (?the) forces which stir up ethnic discord and seek to destabilize the situation in Lithuania.

Council Reads Appeal to Militia Workers

LD2103174890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1643 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Appeal to workers at the Lithuanian Ministry of Internal Affairs read and adopted at the Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live]

[Text] An appeal to militia workers, adopted at the Supreme Council session:

An appeal of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania to the workers of the offices of internal affairs.

We have restored independent Lithuania. Its foundations are the ideals of justice, freedom, democratic, and people's well-being. One of the most important [words indistinct] the conditions of the state's life is a well-functioning system of maintaining public order—the militia. Each citizen of the republic, irrespective of his nationality or world outlook, having experience of this work and being ready to swear loyalty to Lithuania and to serve it, is very necessary to our state.

The Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania assures that social guarantees of the workers of internal affairs will be preserved. Pensions will remain irrespective of which state the service was carried out, the service grade will remain, and the average payment to the official will exceed the average wage in the republic. The government will strive to insure that persons bearing the emblems of the Lithuanian state will be respected in society and enjoy its support. The most important duty of the militia work is loyalty to the Republic of Lithuania, its people and its laws, the protection of public order and the citizens' rights.

The Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania invites all officials of the internal affairs organs to continue with their work conscientiously.

Prunskiene Sends Telegram to Gorbachev, Ryzhkov

LD2103231190 Vilnius in English to North America 2230 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] The Lithuanian prime minister, Kasimiera Prunskiene, has sent a telegram to the president of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, and the Soviet premier, Nikolay Ryzhkov. The telegram notes the great concern of the Lithuanian society over the recent acts by the Soviet military troops in Lithuania.

There has been an intensive movement of armored personnel carriers and tanks, increasing flights of Air Force planes, as well as raids of landing force of a reconnaissance character. The Soviet military authorities in Lithuania attribute this activity to be part of the regular military exercise program, although neither the beginning nor the end of the exercise has been made known to the Lithuanian government.

So far, the status of Soviet Army troops in the republic of Lithuania has not been determined, while special envoys

of Soviet ministries and departments arriving in Lithuania recently also do not contact the Lithuanian authorities. In spite of this, the general situation in the republic is stable and presents no danger to the population.

The telegram sent by the Lithuanian prime minister, Kasimiera Prunskiene, said that the Lithuanian government is confident that there are all preconditions for seeking mutual understanding and a calm discussion of the problem.

Supreme Council Discusses Administration

LD2103193590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1842 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] Vilnius, 21 Mar (TASS)—Deputies discussed issues connected with the structure of the republic's administrative bodies at the continuing Lithuanian Supreme Council session today.

The discussion on the draft law on "the government," which has been continuing throughout the day, has still not ended. Government head Kazimiera Prunskene proposed that the approximately 40 ministries and state committees currently in existence be reduced to 20. But some of the deputies did not agree with her proposal, feeling that "15 ministries are quite sufficient."

It is expected that the republic's parliament will decide on this and a number of other issues tomorrow.

Radio Program Heard on Shortwave Broadcasts

LD2103124390 Vilnius in English to Europe 2230 GMT 20 Mar 90 (tentative)

[Excerpt] Radio Vilnius listeners have informed us today that our broadcasts are being heard once again on shortwave. We are especially grateful to Mr. Yuki Sakagami from Radio Japan—and I hope I have pronounced your name correctly—for the fax that you have sent us detailizing [as heard] on hearing conditions. Up to now this is the only information we have from our listeners about these several days that our broadcasts on shortwave were stopped by Moscow.

We would be very grateful for this if you could just phone us or send us a fax. Our telephone number is 66-05-26; fax 66-11-17; area code 0122.

All the relay stations are situated in Moscow. Thus we depend on Moscow if we are broadcast or not. As we know it, shortwave transmissions from Vilnius were cut off on Saturday following the adoption by the Lithuanian parliament of an appeal to the governments of all the democratic countries of the world. So, we'll read this appeal once again today. [passage omitted]

Lithuania's Political Position Examined

LD2103141990 Moscow World Service in English 0810 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Excerpt] The highest government body of the USSR has declared invalid the decision of the Lithuanian parliament on the independence of that republic and it stated that in fact it is (?an act) to leave the USSR. Here's how Radio Moscow's Spartak Alekseyev views the situation:

[Alekseyev] Clearly the Lithuanian action had both subjective and objective reasons. Among the subjective reasons is that the Lithuanian parliamentarians representing the Popular Front decided not to miss their chance and to move events in the direction they wanted. They were unwilling to wait for the radical democratic reforms to gain momentum and ensure legal guarantees of the true sovereignty of all constituent republics within the Soviet Union. With these reforms, they could lose some of their popularity and find it more difficult to fight for power.

The secondary, objective aspect of the problem was spelled out by the leader of the neighboring Baltic republic of Latvia, who said that slow progress in the work for a new Soviet Federation at national level compelled the Baltic region to press for sovereignty in its own way.

Anyway, the latest decision of the Lithuanian parliament has put Lithuania in a very peculiar position. Emotionally, and to some extent, formally, the republic is already outside the Soviet Union, whereas economically and judicially it is still fully within and inseparable from the USSR.

There are other and more important factors which make Lithuania's decision look odd indeed.

The USSR Supreme Soviet qualifies the Lithuanian parliament's decision as unconstitutional. The Lithuanian lawmakers have decreed all industrial enterprises, organisations and offices which are situated in Lithuania to be under its jurisdiction.

Equally strange was the abolition in Lithuania of the national law on military service, and this is already an issue afflicting the security interests of the whole of the USSR.

The 1938 Constitution has been restored without a referendum. Both the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Soviet president are viewing the situation in Lithuania as a source of concern which is shared, by the way, by many mass media and government officials abroad, from the number of those thinking about European stability and (?favoring) successful restructuring in the Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

In welcoming Lithuania's soveriegnty in principle, the West does in no way want that republic's parliament to take decisions which may damage the democratic

reforms in the USSR or this country's national interests as a whole. [passage omitted]

Moscow Angry, Anxious About Baltic Region

LD2103151990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 2000 GMT 20 Mar 90

[Text] ELTA special correspondent Balys Brucelis reports from Moscow: A statement by the Soviet Union's Government is being examined in Moscow with great attention and interest and in some cases with (?resignation) and a certain anxiety. Members of the Soviet Union's Supreme Soviet which I spoke with are comparing it with [words indistinct] the August decision of the CPSU Central Committee on the situation in the Baltic republics. They say that not much will come out of it and that it is a routine propaganda shot. Other people regard this statement as almost an invitation to ideological, moral, economic, and psychological warfare, of course, [words indistinct].

I am also astonished at the fact that the statement by the country's premier was signed before Mikhail Gorbachev ordered this. It means they are in a hurry, even nervous, and in any case have acted without having considered the matter to it's end. Not only is Mikhail Gorbachev very busily engaged in the Baltic problems, a large group of presidential aides and advisers, and even whole services have been instructed to observe the state of affairs in that area. At present, for example, a thorough analysis of the results of incomplete elections to the Latvian and Estonian Supreme Soviets is taking place.

Mikhail Gorbachev's general policy toward the Baltic region will depend to a great extent on the distribution of the political forces of our neighbors. Provisional results there are not favorable to the center. Thus the center is angry; there was a flash of lightning but so far no storm. Whether it will come will depend on us, too.

More on Vilnius Rally Criticizing Council

LD2103201490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1846 GMT on 20 March, following the conclusion of the "Vremya" newscast, carries a 38-minute videoreport on the 18 March rally in Vilnius in favor of Lithuania remaining within the USSR. The report shows various speakers addressing the crowd, many of whom are holding banners. One of the banners reads: "The Army is the offspring of the people, the defender of the people."

The first speaker who is unidentified, is shown addressing the crowd to applause and shouts of support. He states that the USSR Constitution remains in force throughout the territory of Lithuania, and that the meeting has been organized by a number of public organizations and movements of the city of Vilnius, the Vilnius City Party Committee, which has not broken its links with the CPSU, and other republican movements and the servicemen of the garrison. He says: "I declare the pre-election meeting in connection with the decisions of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet and of the extraordinary Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies open."

The microphone is taken by Professor (Kucherov), doctor of juridical sciences, who says: "Dear fellow citizens. Exactly a year ago, on this square, warnings were heard of the danger which threatens the Lithuanian people and all inhabitants of Lithuania in connection with the campaign of nationalist euphoria that had been launched at that time. And perhaps it was our passivity, perhaps our indifference, indifferent attitude to events, that led to what has now happened. We can consider these decisions of the session on unilateral secession from the Soviet Union, on the abolition of the Constitution of the Lithuanian SSR, and on the abolition of the validity of the USSR Constitution on the territory of the republic, as a coup, a coup d'etat." To continued applause, he goes on: "I think that we have to say resolutely that we won't accept these decisions, we reject them, and if they are implemented, we call on you to take up civil disobedience, we call on those who work in state bodies not to implement them." And further: "We have to demand a referendum on the question of what the future of Lithuania is to be. Deputies who have been elected by little more than 30 percent of the votes cannot dictate their will to the whole of the people living in Lithuania without the consent of the people."

The next speaker, Vysotskiy, second secretary of the Salcininkai Rayon Party Committee, takes the rostrum. He says to applause: "Power is being sought by many of the ideological successors of those who carried out the coup in 1926, those who shot the retreating soldiers in the back in 1941, those who left mass graves near every small town during the German occupation, those who by deceipt drove young people after the war into the forests and turned them into bandits. Why have we forgotten so quickly that 138,000 soldiers of the Red Army died on the home front, saving Soviet Lithuania from the fascist aggressors?"

The next speaker, a secretary of the party committee of the Vilnius higher party school, says: "I can assert that we have been brought to this situation by those who today make up a majority in the republic's Supreme Soviet. I don't trust these people, I won't carry out—I don't trust these people, and I won't carry out their decisions." He goes on: "And if the rights of small peoples are flouted, the rights of every person are flouted, then this is not the right of a nation to self-determination, it is tyranny."

The rostrum is then taken by Colonel (Golodov), described as a serviceman. He says: "Dear fellow thinkers, friends: The adoption of legislative acts against the Armed Forces and the abolition of the activity of the military commissariats was no surprise for us. The former parliament deprived us of our right to vote. The present one has gone further, recognizing us as illegal.

The military have become a thorn in the flesh for the legislators. The desire to be rid of us is understandable." He goes on: "The deputies of parliament should know that military matters have been and still are the province of the USSR Defense Ministry. The 130 deputies will have to answer sooner or later for the laws adopted against the will of the people, for the mass unemployment they are promising, and responsibility will be sought for the social ills of tomorrow by the 40,000 servicemen whom they are trying to return from the Army ahead of their time."

The next speaker, who claims that there are more than 100,000 people present at the rally, reiterates that the USSR Constitution remains in force on the territory of Lithuania. He says: "Why have we come here today? I think, primarily, because we are not sure of our future. Is that so or not? [loud response] We are not sure because we are being offered unemployment, that's for some of us, and the rest are being offered private property. Tell me, what can there be in common between those who are going to be unemployed, and those who are going to own private property? That's where the essence of the issue lies today. Capitalist ways are being restored in Lithuania today."

An engineer takes the microphone and reads out a proposed appeal to the peoples of the Soviet Union on behalf of the participants in the meeting warning of the dangers of the processes currently under way in Lithuania and giving an assurance that the participants in the meeting will do everything to remain part of the Soviet Union. Another speaker notes that the applause can be considered approval of the appeal. The rostrum is taken by a Heroine of Socialist Labor, who warns of the dangers of indifference and her determination to remain within the Soviet Union. It is then announced, to loud applause, that there are about 200,000 people present at the meeting. Further speakers are shown addressing the crowd, expressing their opposition to the decisions of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. A speaker named as Valeriy Ivanov conveys greetings from the intermovements of Moldavia, Latvia, and Estonia, and asserts that the issue in Lithuania is not an ethnic one, but a class-based one.

Mykolas Burokevicius, first secretary of the Communist Party of Lithuania Central Committee linked to the CPSU, takes the rostrum: "I think that Soviet Lithuania has existed and will continue to exist as a union soviet socialist republic within the Soviet Union. I ask all of you to be confident that Lithuania will not secede from the Soviet Union." He concludes: "I think that such a force as has gathered here today is the best guarantee of the existence of Soviet power in Lithuania."

The documents of the meeting are then adopted. An appeal to the president of the USSR is read out: "Esteemed comrade president. Esteemed comrade members of the USSR Supreme Soviet. We appeal to you at a time that is grave and bitter for us, for our families and friends, for all citizens of the Soviet Union. The leaders of Sajudis, who have established themselves in the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, in effect carried out on 10-12 March 1990 an anticonstitutional coup." The appeal goes on to state that illegal acts are being adopted, and that "the interests of many thousands of citizens who are categorically opposed to being torn away from the peoples of the USSR are being arrogantly and hypocritically ignored." It goes on: "We have set up a committee of citizens of the USSR in Lithuania, which we entrust with representing and protecting our interests. All matters relating to the future of Lithuania and affecting our interests are discussed and addressed with the obligatory and full participation of this committee. In order that our proposals be set out, we ask that representatives of this committee be received at the USSR Supreme Soviet, and that they be granted the possibility of addressing one of its sessions in the near future. Comrade president, comrade members of the USSR Supreme Soviet, we believe and hold firm hopes that you, relying on the will and support of the whole of the Soviet people, will be able to defend your fellow citizens from the encroachments of political adventurists. City of Vilnius, 18 March 1990." The decision is deemed adopted on the basis of the applause.

The resolution of the meeting is then read out. It consists of five points: To support the resolution of the Congress of People's Deputies on the decisions of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet; to be guided in future by the USSR Constitution and the Lithuanian SSR Constitution; to set up a committee of citizens of the USSR within Lithuania and to entrust it with representing and defending the citizens of the USSR at the USSR Supreme Soviet and in state and public organizations of the Lithuanian SSR, and to instruct the committee to ensure the protection of the property interests of citizens of the USSR, of enterprises and establishments of unions and union-republican subordination, and public organizations; categorically to rebuff attacks on the Soviet Army and to express solidarity with its members; and the organizers of the meeting are to publish the resolution and other documents adopted in the mass media. Again, the resolution is adopted on the basis of the applause.

Lithuanian Party Plenum Appeals to Workers

LD2103114990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0930 GMT 21 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] As we have already reported from Lithuania, the plenum of the Interim Central Commitee of the republic's Communist Party on the CPSU platform has fully approved the decision by the extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies. The plenum called on all workers in the republic who are not indifferent to Lithuania's destiny within the USSR to take active and energetic actions, and to express their stance through these actions.

At the same time, at the continuing session of the Lithuanian Sejm, the chairman of the republic's

Supreme Soviet assessed the USSR Governent statement as a kind of start to negotiations, in a report which he delivered yesterday.

Lithuanian KGB Chief Views Current Role

90UN1175D Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 28 Feb 90 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Edmundas Baltinas, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Committee for State Security, by Vilyus Kavalyauskas, 13 February 1990: "What Is State Security Safeguarding"]

[Text] We strode into the large building near Lenin Square like pioneers. A journalist could have also come here previously to get material for an article or to consult. But no more. And only one at a time. But now, walking in quite a large group, we felt that glasnost is also opening these heavy doors a bit.

We think that the women who were on duty here day and night near the Committee for State Security [KGB] also helped to open them. A picketer on Vasar e 16-oses Street helped us to organize a dialogue with the leaders of the Committee for State Security and a discussion regarding the KGB archives and about the need for these organs at all.

We came to this meeting prepared—"armed" with 94 of our readers' questions that they addressed to the leaders of the KGB through the editorial staff. It was physically impossible to accept more of them on the telephone because it was too hot to handle since it was constantly ringing. Therefore, we offer our apologies to those who could not reach us by telephone and we hope that we can also ask similar questions in the future.

Edmundas Baltinas, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Committee for State Security, also gave us this promise and he introduced the journalists from TIYESA to Tomas Lazarevichyus, head of the investigations department; Pyatras Vozbutas and Aleksandr Remishevskiy, heads of the Service for the Protection of Constitutional Law and Order; Anzelmas Armonas, head of the counterintelligence directorate; and Vilyus Kontrimas, secretary of the KGB Partkom.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] Just what is the goal of KGB activity these days? This is a question from E. Vasilyauskas of Birshtonas.

[Baltinas] The goal of the state security organs is to provide a stable political situation in Lithuania. This is also the task of the new subdivision—the Service for the Protection of Constitutional Law and Order. State security organs are required to observe the processes that are occurring. However, we think that under no circumstances should we interfere with them. At least until they do develop into violations of the Constitution and laws. We need to inform the republic government about everything in detail (not the Central Committee as it was until recently).

We are very alarmed by the information we have received that illegal politicized structures are being created that consider their goal to be destabilization of the situation in the republic. We believe that all of society is also interested in having these dangerous ideas neutralized in the very embryonic stage. I can answer the question, what is the KGB safeguarding and is the KGB necessary, with a question—do we need the subdivision of the Committee for Combating Aircraft Hijacking, etc.? Who can provide a guarantee that this service is not necessary?

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] Undoubtedly, many people have the Caucasus outlook in mind. Therefore, Vilnius resident V. Motskus asks: What is being done to combat the illegal arms sale in Lithuania?

[Baltinis] This is already becoming a serious problem: There is an unhealthy demand arising to have a weapon. We did not intend to frighten society, however, the curve is inexorably climbing. There are various causes—they are both organized crime, the desire of cooperatives to protect themselves, and the irresponsible aspirations of juveniles. Tips regarding individuals who under certain conditions may use weapons for political violence are causing a great deal of alarm. Of course, we must take this into account.

Secondly, we must not forget that representatives of the "hot" republics are also arriving here to search for weapons. Many colleagues from the Ministry of Internal Affairs are also working in this area. Quite a few weapons, rounds, and explosives are being confiscated through the common efforts of residents. Here is one case that is evidence of the nature of the arms: Students from Panevezhis and Kedaynyay had dozens of cannon balls and even a surface to air missile.

Incidentally, military people are largely to blame for this. They are secretly selling arms and therefore we were compelled to appeal to the commander of the Baltic Military District. Admittedly it is impossible to assert that the whole region is being armed with the military's help. We would like to ask local residents through your newspaper to directly inform state security organs or the militia about individuals who are illegally storing arms, also about military ammunition guarding violations, and about its sale for the purpose of making money.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] How many people work in the KGB? What assets support the state security organs? What is the ethnic composition of KGB agents? Vilnius residents A. Lekayaichyus, G. Ukyalis, and V. Averka and Birshtonas resident E. Vasilyauskas ask about this.

[Baltinis] If we adhere to the same principle that KGB Chairman V. Kryuchkov did during his speech at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet we would not need to answer such questions. We would have to present such information only to the Parliament Commission for Defense and Security Affairs.

But if I answer simply and politely, it is very simple to count up our staff even by how many delegates we elected at the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress. Thus, if we elected three delegates, about 600 communists work [in the KGB]. We also have a few Komsomol. They are not only operations agents—there are also quite a few civilians. The KGB is supported only through the Union Budget. Our pensions are also paid from it.

Fifty four percent of those working in Lithuanian SSR state security organs are Lithuanians. Members of all other republic nationalities also work [for the KGB]. This information is about the officer corps, that is, about the corps of operations agents.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] Are fears grounded that the Committee for State Security is dragging out the rehabilitation process for political prisoners? (Y. Blazhyavichyus, Vilnius).

[Baltinis] In recent weeks, there have been rebukes expressed toward us in RESPUBLIK, ATGIMIMAS, and other publications that we have procrastinated in sending files to the procurator's office. There is no basis at all for spreading such information. We are not violating decrees on regulation of rehabilitation.

When we asked the procurator's office to present specific cases of procrastination, we did not receive an answer. On the contrary, we learned that files we sent are not collected at the secretariat on time. That was what happened with the files addressed to department procurator V. Zhemyalis.

On 29 December, 1989, we informed society in the press that we, jointly with the procurator's office, had completed the business of rehabilitating individuals who had been illegally convicted and that we had issued these individuals appropriate rehabilitation certificates. This rehabilitation was conducted in execution of the 16 January 1989 Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet that was adopted at the suggestion of the USSR Committee for State Security.

A total of 31,400 files were reviewed (according to a KGB clarification—editor, SOVETSKAYA LITVA). In accordance with the decree, 3,425 individuals were rehabilitated. These were primarily files from 1940-1941. Various former government and political figures of the independent Lithuanian Republic, individuals who participated in the activities of political parties and organizations and, during the postwar years quite a few were repressed for Anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda based on them. This decree does not affect individuals convicted for treason against the Fatherland, participation in armed bands, or aid to them.

More individuals who are subject to rehabilitation are encompassed by the 28 July 1989 Decree of the Republic Supreme Soviet "On Rehabilitation of Individuals Convicted for Certain Deeds." Execution of this decree has been assigned to the Supreme Court and the Lithuanian SSR Procurator's Office. Therefore, of the 29,000 total files, approximately 24,000 still need to be reviewed.

We are assisting court and procurator office employees. In accordance with an assignment from the procurator's office, we are once again reviewing facts brought to light to very rapidly approve citizen's applications. With regard to rehabilitation, a group of agents that has experience with this type of work has additionally been formed in the committee.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] P. Bugvilenis from Panevezhskiy Rayon and T. Chyapukene from Vilnius ask if there is a list of deported [individuals] at the Committee for State Security?

[Baltinis] We do not have a list of exiles. The Ministry of Internal Affairs has all of their files and is conducting all correspondence on the issue of exiles. You need to address such questions to them.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] Well, just who is dragging out rehabilitation? (TIYESA)

[Baltinis] The rehabilitation process is not being purposely dragged out. We think that the groups created under the procurator's office and the Supreme Court are too small. When we were assigned rehabilitation work in accordance with the previously mentioned union decree, we assigned about 100 agents to do this and the work was completed. But at the present time, all agents of the investigations department and archives are accomplishing the procurator's office task on rehabilitation issues.

It is very important that people receive rehabilitation and compensation as soon as possible.

Much time is being lost while files are being sought in various archives of the USSR. Often, up to 15 inquiries must be sent to various authorities on account of one person.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] Has it occurred that persons repressed at that time have not been rehabilitated now? (TIYESA)

[Baltinis] Yes, if the crimes they committed do not permit the Law on Rehabilitation to be applied to them.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] Recently, several KGB leaders from Moscow spoke on Central Television. In answer to a question on persecution of the clergy, one of them stated that "the KGB has never been engaged in church matters." We know that in Lithuania this position does not correspond to reality. If you are talking about disassociating [the KGB] from the illegal activities of "those years," what years do you consider to be the watershed? (TIYESA)

[Baltinis] The new thinking arrived in the KGB considerably earlier than the beginning of perestroyka. Not one individual has been repressed for political crimes in Lithuania since 1984.

The clergy had not been treated as a separate category. Just like other people, representatives of the clergy were convicted in accordance with Article 68 (Anti-Soviet Agitation and Propaganda). This was a law of the era of stagnation. But we did not create it. This law protected the one party system, the leaders of that era, and their privileges. Now we can no longer even imagine this. But we reject the fact that cases were fabricated. They simply corresponded to the law of that era. There were comparatively few victims of it in Lithuania.

And if the court offers an apology "for violation of the law," this still does not mean that there were fabrications. With the elimination of Article 68, all individuals convicted in accordance with this article have been rehabilitated.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] Representatives of the clergy were also among the persecuted.

[Baltinis] Two, Svarinsksas and Tomkyavichyus, were convicted for Anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. Now they have also been rehabilitated.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] Several days ago, the secretariat of the Union of Journalists of Lithuania returned Gintautas Iyeshmantas into the ranks of the Union and, despite the fact that there is no one in the Union leadership who voted for his exclusion at that time, we expressed our regret regarding this case of injustice. Is the leadership of the Committee for State Security ready to openly express regret regarding recently committed injustices despite the fact that they did not contradict the laws of that era?

[Baltinis] We also feel dissatisfaction that a law existed and that we had to convict people based on it. At the same time, we are doing everything to correct the consequences of that injustice and the wrongs that were inflicted on people.

Incidentally, our neighbors—the Latvians and Estonians—are not rehabilitating those condemned under Article 68 en masse. They do not even have a decree. Here we are sort of pioneers.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] Very many readers—S. Pranyavichyus from Alitus, and Vilnius residents U. Starkene, N. Paulauskene, A. Trukanayte, S. Bagdzyavichyus, J. Petreykite-Rukene, and N. Arminene from Kaunas—would like to leaf through their personal files or the files of their relatives, to get photographs from them, and also to get items that were confiscated. Is this possible? At the same time, we beg for the assistance of our colleague, V. Yuodakis, an assistant professor at Vilnius University, who is writing the history of his innocent repressed family.

[Baltinis] If a person wants to complete an application regarding rehabilitation, he can send a lawyer who is familiar with the case. We still cannot show personal files to victims or to their relatives—otherwise, a search will begin for people who gave testimony on the matter and settling of scores will follow.

Let us listen to the question of I. Kazlauskene from Vilnius: "Do we really want all state security archives to be open—including complaints of recent years? Will this help the unity and consolidation of the nation?"

As for photographs in files—we have already long ago begun returning them to relatives of rehabilitated persons along with other personal documents in the files.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] Of course, State Security knows that the death of Poet Kazis Yakubenas is linked to the post war activities of its personnel. Can the KGB disprove this fact today? (V. Svyantitskas, Vilnius)

[Baltinis] The case of K. Yakubenas was described in two issues of YAUNIMO GRYATOS. In 1949, the procurator closed his case as a result of the fact that K. Yakubenas was unjustly charged with a crime. He died much later on the outskirts of Vilnius—he was beaten up and his clothes were removed. This could have been done at the hands of criminal elements. But there is nothing in the archives that is evidence of a political murder.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] A. Kazragite-Merzlyakova, who worked in KGB organs for many years, is enjoying the benefits of a war participant despite the fact that she was 15 years old when the war ended. Is this just? (V. Yankauskene, Vilnius)

[Baltinis] We need to carefully examine this question. Active partisan contacts who were juveniles at that time starting at 13 years of age, also obtained this status.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] Vilnius resident P. Yuodishyus and Kaunas resident J. Gerulaytis, who are interested in the files of their repressed relatives—Generals J. Yuodishyus and Z. Gerulaytis, appealed to the editors. They are nowhere to be found. Could the KGB take the initiative to find and return materials about well-known Lithuanian political and cultural figures to Lithuania?

[Baltinis] We will attempt to satisfy these specific requests. Very frequently we do not have enough information—names or dates of birth. That is the only way we can begin a search of files in someone else's archives. We will really render assistance. Thus, we are attempting to help the Union of Writers of Lithuania to discover the fates of repressed men of letters.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] And if a man is not so well-known? Thus, V. Paulauskas from Prenay asserts that several years ago he appealed to the procurator's office regarding the rehabilitation of his father, Albinas Paulauskas. The Supreme Court says that they cannot get the files from the KGB Archives. Is that true?

[Baltinis] Of course, having heard that, the son naturally may suspect that the archives are being destroyed. As soon as we received this question from your editorial office, we immediately checked into it. There actually is

a file on Paulauskas, Albinas, Yuozo, born in Shvenchënis, however, no one from either the Supreme Court or the procurator's office has requested it.

Or here J. Chapukaytis, a TIYESA reader from Vilnius, asserts that the Supreme Court for seven months now has not succeeded in obtaining a file for rehabilitation from the KGB. We were interested: On 1 December, it was sent to the Supreme Court.

At the request of B. Chesna from the village of Shyashtokay in Lazdiyskiy Rayon, we will take an interest in the file of his father-in-law, A. Kasperavichyus.

We could look into other matters that your readers are asking about but we need more information—thus we found seven complete files under one last name. Which one is needed and what person was our reader asking about?

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] Two professional archivists—Vilnius residents J. Grauzhinene and A. Grigaravichyus—ask if the people managing the KGB's archives have [undergone] special training and if they know all of the archive operating rules?

[Baltinis] We have non-professionals working in our [archives]. However, they take courses and their work and each step they take is governed by regulations. The regulations precisely indicate which materials may be destroyed, which must be kept permanently, which—temporarily, and which materials may be transferred to other institutions.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] B. Matyukene from Vilnius asks: Can state security agents "turn their skins inside out" and move together with the nation?

[Baltinis] We will not turn out our skin inside out. That is a cheap trick and it is true that many former [public] figures of the era of stagnation are resorting to it right now.

Let us take USSR People's Deputy G. Konoplev. Being an influential party worker in Alitus, he had an "evil-wisher"—Roman Catholic Priest Antanas Grazhulis. G. Konoplev wrote Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Second Secretary N. Dybenko: "Request your assistance in bringing a criminal case against Roman Catholic Priest-Extremist Grazhulis for gross Anti-Soviet propaganda."

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] How did this letter end up with you?

[Baltinis] We received it for execution from the Central Committee at that time. However, as we all know, we did not undertake any such activities. This is just the most flagrant example of how former leaders of party organs wanted to solve their own problems using state security's hands.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] A. Vaytkyavichyus from Vilnius asks, why are picket lines outside the KGB building being photographed? Vilnius resident S. Valyulis read in OGONYEK that KGB agents took pictures of events in Tbilisi and asks if state security organs are filming events in Lithuania.

[Baltinis] We are not only photographing but we are also filming picket lines. We want to have such film in the archives. Both Sajudis and amateur photographers are also taking photos. It is not only important to have the film. And what if a conflict occurs? These materials will never be used for evil purposes—especially if there are no evil schemes from the other party. Any such material can be used only in a trial. On the other hand, our agents are being photographed while entering the building. We also find this to be unpleasant.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] As Vilnius residents J. Rimkyavichyus and J. Kazlauskas told us when they called, a picketer was pelted with rocks near the KGB Building on January 24. They gave us the names and telephone numbers of witnesses. Can you comment on this?

[Baltinis] We called those who reported [this incident] to TIYESA. We got the impression that this event actually took place. The women very sincerely told us how the rock that was thrown hit someone in the leg. We apologized even though we had doubts. It could have happened, we are all people. If [picketers] call out obscene words to those entering the agents building, a negative load is built up. And we could not understand it since the windows were closed. In any case, we apologized to these women. We considered this to be a the act of a hoodlum and we will attempt to clarify it in more detail.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] It is no secret that the KGB had its informers in each collective. How will it be in the future? (R. Shetikas from Shyaulyay, P. Zalitis from Klaypeda, and J. Yankauskas from Vilnius.

[Baltinis] This is an important and I would say a delicate question that has been widely debated in society. There is no special service that does not use the services of informants. Furthermore, these individuals are not openly discussed anywhere.

Of course, we have such agents. Our agents—are honest people and our friends. Our common goal is—to protect against rash activities and crimes. They in turn are advising us how to restructure. Thus, they are sending us society's opinion on how the KGB should look. Therefore, it is no accident that we are talking out loud about the depolitization of our organs.

We are frequently seeing one and the same individuals among the organizers of social actions in recent months. Among them are people whose services we refused due to their low morals and inclination toward provocation. We would like to openly announce: If they do not change their provocative conduct, we will promulgate documents about their dishonorable conduct in the past. This is our official warning.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] Vilnius resident F. Kayris says that the KGB promised to find the authors of leaflets that are inciting [people] to inter-ethnic discord.

[Baltinis] We informed society about the work we did. Unfortunately, these leaflets are being distributed with increasing frequency. Cases of desecration of the state flag have also occurred more frequently. Many authors of leaflets have been ascertained. They are Yurbarkas resident S. Zhichkus, former Trakayskiy ROVD [Rayon Internal Affairs Department] Officer J. Gidryanis, Vilnius resident V. Stontsyalis, and Klaypeda residents V. Gneushev and D. Dvoyeglazov, authors of chauvinistic inscriptions.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] What is the KGB's position regarding the Yedinstvo Organization? (Vilnius residents J. Petravichyus and V. Zhyamgulis)

At the present time, this organization is operating legally and it is registered. It represents the interests of a definite group of people. We would like its leaders to be reasonable. They must adhere to laws, avoid confrontation, search for a constructive dialogue, and disassociate themselves from such utterly unacceptable and harmful forms of social activity such as strikes.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] Vilnius resident V. Motskus asks about the KGB's attitude toward the Lithuanian Republic's split and the formation of autonomies.

[Baltinis] The desire of each ethnic group in Lithuania to achieve cultural autonomy is understandable and natural. However, in our situation the creation of state autonomies—is an unacceptable path. We need to strive not toward autonomy of oblasts or rayons but toward mutual understanding, unity, and common efforts to solve problems.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] How many foreign intelligence agents have been arrested in recent years? (A. Shimonis, Vilnius)

[Baltinis] We have identified quite a few such people who arrive in our country to gather intelligence information. Our information has been used to declare such citizens "undesirable individuals" and to expel them from the country. But this could also occur in a year in an appropriate political situation. Counterintelligence work in many ways depends on the political situation.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] The numbers of trips abroad have increased recently. Representatives of cooperatives travel there very frequently even though they do not sell anything. Have the activities of foreign special services become more aggressive in connection with this? (S. Raykenas, Vilnius)

[Baltinis] I cannot say that foreign services have oriented themselves on cooperative employees—this level does not satisfy them. We have no illusions here. However, we all know that intelligence [services] track people of a much higher rank and contact them. We have information that the FBI and CIA have quite a few agents of Lithuanian origin and there are also many of them in the appropriate services of the countries of Western Europe. They frequently contact people who are leaving and also journalists. Unfortunately, we have never heard that journalists had shared information about this.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] Have we ourselves not made the intelligence [services] of Western countries a bugaboo? Closure of a large portion of the Republic's territory to tourists only prevents us from obtaining foreign hard currency. (TIYESA)

This will be resolved in the near future. Actually, foreigners now visit all areas and practically all industrial enterprises. We have already many times asked the Ministry of Defense to "open" the Republic. Closure is moral damage for entire areas and their residents. This is just a Ministry of Defense ban that thanks to our help is already in the process of softening.

What everyone would have to do immediately is to return the Lithuanian seashore to normal life. An enormous territory has been transformed into a border zone. We can agree with limitations on access to Neringa—a nature reserve. However, it is already absurd if man cannot approach the long strip of sea.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] Is it true that some of the narcotics that are being transported from the Southern Republics to Moscow, remain in Lithuania and that their route touches neighboring city of Grodno? (TIYESA)

[Baltinis] It turns out that narcotics that have been transported from the south have gotten stuck in Snechkus and in other locations where many southerners have congregated. Our narcotics are poor, they are half raw material, and they are practically not exported abroad. And our drug addicts mainly use local raw materials. For the time being narcotics are not being imported from abroad—maybe only because our drug addicts do not have enough money. But even in the underground world there are rich drug addicts and therefore a real danger of narcotics smuggling exists. Therefore, we are also coordinating our activities with customs.

We want to say that, based on our tips, customs agents detained money and gold objects alone worth 260,000 rubles just during the second half of last year. Edislav Piz, a citizen of Poland who was detained through our common efforts, became a sort of record holder when he carried 89,420 rubles and 300 dollars in currency, and gold objects worth 8,973 rubles.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] Can you gather evidence while monitoring telephone conversations during your struggle with the Mafia? (Vilnius residents V. Zaykauskas, J. Pyatrauskas, and V. Zhyamgulis)

[Baltinis] No, this is at variance with the Constitution.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] Even with the approval of the procurator?

[Baltinis] A draft of an appropriate law is still only being discussed right now. There are such acts in some states. It is true that in criminal cases when we have the procurator's approval we can withhold the printed material and mail. We know nothing about the case of the disappearance of the letter of dear Vilnius resident L. Saunorene. Ask the post office.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] And so we can reassure our reader Vilnius resident S. Plyapis who is collaborating with the BBC British Radio Station that he can continue to transmit his correspondence by telephone?

[Baltinis] You may.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] At the end of 1989 in a special broadcast, we quoted the words of V. Radzhvilas at the Sajudis Seim: "There is one more possibility besides a democratic method of destroying the occupation—to completely reject the legal path, to leave this road and to cold-bloodedly take up arms." I would like to ask the KGB to express its view on this possibility. (K. Vitkus, Vilnius)

[Baltinis] I do not want to believe that dear Mr. Radzhvilas said those words because he is a serious man, philosopher, and teacher. That sentence is, putting it mildly, overdoing it. Maybe it was taken out of context. If there was such an irresponsible statement, then it needs to be explained.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] G. Stankyavichyus from Vilnius asks you to clarify what the KGB's view is of the Sajudis guard detachments.

[Baltinis] We have attempted to find out if these young people can be used for some kind of action. There are no such detachments. They are training. They are called "boyeviks" in the central press despite the fact that this does not correspond to reality. They are young people who are helping to establish order at Sajudis gatherings. You meet various people among them. There are no tips that they are arming themselves and preparing for some kind of action.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] At one time, state security organs were tasked with combating illegal hard currency operations. Right now, hard currency sales are flourishing in Lithuania. Are you closing your eyes to this? (TIYESA)

[Baltinis] We are working however we have to correct the law itself and also the article of the Lithuanian SSR UK [Criminal Code] on smuggling.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] In RESPUBLIKA, they wrote about private car sales for convertible currency. Is this legal? (TIYESA)

[Baltinis] This is a violation of the law. However, they are selling [things] for hard currency even in stores. State security organs are waiting for a renewal of the laws. The same thing also took place with pornography: Previously, we zealously combated it, brought lawsuits, and now it is as if we are closing our eyes. The Committee decided to pay more attention to combating crime. Twenty more agents have been rushed in to combat organized crime.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] Incidentally, TIYESA readers and Vilnius residents V. Gruzdis and A. Yasene also suggest that to you. They think that the KGB has a lot of experience and technical capabilities in this regard.

[Baltinis] We have little experience and we need appropriate laws. For examples, laws like they have in the FRG, U.S., and Italy. They provide broad powers to state institutions who conduct the struggle with the Mafia. We have lagged behind quite a bit in a legal sense—the use of operational material and evidence is limited. Furthermore, it is very difficult to combat criminal groups due to poor technical supply.

Criminal groups are frequently wealthy. Recently, we drove out on one operation in three cars—in a state Volga and in two private automobiles, a Zhiguli and a Zaporozhets. By the way, both criminal groups arrived in ten modern automobiles.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] V. Pronskus, a reader from Vilnius, called us and said that many former prisoners of Lukishkskiy Jail assert that there is a tunnel connecting the jail with the KGB Building. Is this true?

[Baltinis] It is just as real as the tunnel leading from Gediminas Castle to Trakay. Our agents frequently joke about the tunnel to the beer bar that is located nearby.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] And do you use Lukishkskiy Jail as an isolation cell? (TIYESA)

[Baltinis] We have our own isolation cell. It is true that right now it is the other way around and, in accordance with a Ministry of Internal Affairs request, we are holding several criminals who are impossible to properly control under jail conditions for the purpose of strengthening isolation. You have probably read that men also have access to women there. Order is more strict in our isolation cells.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] In 1946, Bishop Borisyavkchyus was convicted and shot. The faithful of Telshyayskiy Diocese and all of Lithuania would like to know where he was shot. (A. Kudzhmayte, Vilnius)

[Baltinis] His Grace Bishop Vaychyus has already requested that we find the location where the Bishop is buried. However, we must say, that having reviewed many rehabilitation files, we have not found a single line about where they shot him, who shot him, and where he is buried. This certainly was a taboo in the instructions. And the people who carried out the sentence are silent. All the more so since their names are not officially mentioned anywhere. In the best case, maybe [we can only determine] the date that the sentence was carried out.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] Have the activities attributed to Raslanas been considered? He sadly glorified himself in the Raynyayskiy Forest for "services" for which he received the title of Honored Lawyer of the Lithuanian SSR? (G. Ukyalis, Vilnius)

[Baltinis] Raslanas left the state security organs in 1969 and received the honorary title while working in a different place. The KGB does not plan to reveal material either about Raynyay, about Klepochyay, or about any other person. All material found by us has been sent to the procurator's office.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] In 1982, a five story was annex erected in the KGB courtyard. Being a builder, I saw the plans for this structure. I was surprised that a special room for document destruction was provided for on each floor. Why are so many needed if massive numbers of documents are not being destroyed? (M. Budryunas, Vilnius)

[Baltinis] This structure is the center of government communications that also serves Kaliningrad Oblast. Its erection was not our initiative. Why was it built in our courtyard? Because we had to provide guards for government communications. We also asked the head of the communications center. He confirmed that their are small furnaces on the second, fourth, and fifth floors. They are designed for destruction of frequently changing encryption keys. However, the furnaces are so small that they do not even accommodate paper.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] Does the KGB really not have "shredders"—special devices that are used throughout the world to cut secret documents into narrow strips of paper? (TIYESA)

[Baltinis] Now we understand why the picketers are even looking for "paper macaroni" in garbage trucks.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] There is a first department, that is, a branch of the KGB, at the Vilnius Engineering Construction Institute. There are such departments at the majority of scientific and industrial facilities. What do they do and is their existence mandatory? (N. Zhukas, Vilnius) Vilnius resident P. Abukyavichyus asserts that personnel departments of institutions also cooperate with the KGB despite the fact that they receive their salary at their work place.

[Baltinis] The amount of secret documentation is decreasing and, with the expansion of glasnost, these first departments are already not needed everywhere. They are tasked to receive, register, and issue documents with limited access. These departments are entirely unnecessary in small institutions that do not maintain contacts with an overseas partnership. Of course, large enterprises must have commercial secrets.

What is our link to first departments? Sometimes we inspect how secret documents are protected. That is all. And if some pensioner of ours works there, that is his personal business.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] We began to talk about pensioners. Are your agents adequately socially protected since they are not members of a trade union?

[Baltinis] Our greatest problem is that we have a nonstandardized work day and here no one is actually protecting us. Even the regulations state that there cannot be any days off. The only privilege is a free trip to Klaypeda (or even to Sakhalin) once a year—just like all of the military gets. And we get irons, soap, and furniture just like everyone else—tears. Last year, the entire collective received four refrigerators and 10 Shilyalis black and white [television sets], and four cars of which two were allocated to pensioners.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] However, female reader N. Danilene from Shalchinikskiy Rayon asserts that A. Kunitsin, head of the KGB Rayon Department who has been working in the rayon for three years, obtained an apartment, a car, and three sets of furniture. V. Adamonis from that same rayon asserts that A. Kunitsin openly supports Yedinstvo.

[Baltinis] We confirmed the fact that A. Kunitsin obtained an apartment since he was transferred by higher headquarters to this rayon from another rayon. He has already been working in this system for ten years and, of course, could lay claim to an automobile. And, according to our information, he did not receive any furniture.

With regard to KGB agents' sympathies toward various groups: This issue will be resolved with the depolitization of the state security organs for which we are already actually preparing.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] How do leaders of the Committee for State Security imagine their activities in an independent Lithuania? (V. Syunas, Vilnius)

[Baltinis] The slogan advanced by the party "Lithuania without sovereignty is Lithuania without a future" also serves our purpose. However, we can only defend the law. At the present time, our position is ambiguous—we are subordinate to both the Union and to the Republic. Therefore, we must also protect both constitutions from violence but a collision of the constitutions is the concern of parliamentarians. It would also become easier for us if the Republic Supreme Soviet adopted a law on state security that specifically set forth what we can and should be engaged in. It hurts us when they talk about the KGB like a "nest of [proponents of] stagnation" where everyone is "dirty." We do not intend to go against our own people.

We agree on one thing: If perestroyka is occurring in our society, the Committee for State Security must undoubtedly be restructured. This process has already begun—an orientation to life under a constitutional order is occurring.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] What is being done to depoliticize the KGB? (R. Vilkas, Nauyeji Vilnya) Does the

KGB leadership agree that people from other parties should work in the organs? (J. Pransketis, Vilnius)

[Baltinis] According to modern requirements, we should not belong to any political group or defend its interests. When several political parties are operating in society, our task is just to carry out the requirements of the law.

People who have occupied some position or other with the appearance of two communist parties in Lithuania also work in KGB organs. Take, for example, the 38 authors of the letter published in TIYESA.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] Were they persecuted in any way? (TIYESA)

[Baltinis] In January, some of them were commended for specific work results. At the same time, we discussed the fact that their opinions were not expressed in the best manner. To correspond with your bosses through the newspaper is not the most successful way and the colleagues completely agreed with this.

And it was most advisable to adopt an appropriate law on depolitization of law enforcement agencies so that the KGB collective is capable of work and does not engage in "unscrupulous politics." Membership in the party for those working in them and also for those working in the KGB must be suspended. We have not yet elected delegates for either the city party conference or the Oktyabrskiy Rayon Party Conference. Of course, this is our initiative and de jure we will conduct ourselves in that manner when the law has been adopted.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] Vilnius resident M. Matilis asks, can a KGB of union and republic subordination be depoliticized?

[Baltinis] Apparently it can. An example is the Ministry of Internal Affairs. We ourselves are not passively waiting. Lithuania is one of the first to transition to a real multi-party system. We have already sent specific proposals to the USSR Committee for State Security.

Our dual subordination is very uncomfortable for us. We are often between the devil and the deep blue sea. This is also true even with regard to the archives: If this had been our affair alone, it would have been easier to find a solution. And A. Brazauskas called V. Kryuchkov regarding this matter, however the answer was negative.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] A. Martsishauskas from Shyaulyay asks about the fate of his brother Zigmas Martsishauskas who left for Bulgaria with Ona Chepulita in 1982 and after that to the U.S. and has not returned. Can his brother return home without fearing repression?

[Baltinis] Yes, no one will persecute him. Just like other people who have also found themselves abroad and who have not been deprived of USSR citizenship can return. Thus, we reviewed and terminated the case of Singer R. Daynoras, Professor K. Yeringis, and Teachers B. Klyuchinskas, A. Yurgutis, and others. All of them can return. They can obtain citizenship.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] How would the KGB view the return of Vitautas Skuodis?

[Baltinis] V. Skuodis left legally. There was no [criminal] case brought against him. There are no obstacles from our side. We would just like to remind [them] that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet has the deciding word in the event of a return.

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA] And we saved for last a very important question that bothers P. Petkyavichyus from Ionava, V. Zhyamgulis and V. Syunas from Vilnius, V. Adamonis from Shalchininkay, and finally us, TIYESA journalists: how does the KGB assess the renewal of Lithuania's statehood?

[Baltinis] There can be no other assessment—we will carry out whatever laws our highest organ—the Supreme Soviet—adopts. We will not be an obstacle on the path.

Lithuanian Delegation Visits Estonian Commission

90UN1175C Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 2 Mar 90 p 2

[ELTA Article: "Meeting of the Commission for Restoration of Independence"]

[Text] A meeting of a commission for preparation of a plan to restore Lithuania's independence took place on 1 March.

The group of commission members drove to Tallinn to acquaint themselves with the work of the Commission for Restoration of Estonia's Independence. Algis Mitskis, head of faculty at Kaunas Medical Academy; Bronislovas Zaykauskas, advisor to the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet; and Romualdas Ozolas, editor-in-chief of ATGIMIMAS Newspaper, informed those gathered at the meeting about this matter. Commission members were interested in the work conducted by the Estonians to prepare political, legal, and socio-economic bases for restoring independence. They decided to closely collaborate in this area in the future.

Information from individual commission working groups was discussed. Group leaders presented the information at the meeting: foreign relations—Algirdas Brazauskas, chairman of the Presidium of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet; and Economics—Algirdas Zhukauskas, vice president of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences.

At the meeting, the bases (the aspect of foreign relations) of the functioning of an independent Lithuania's economy were discussed. They will be published in the press.

The commission's future work was approved.

People's Front Leading in Estonian Election

LD2103221290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 21 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] The results of the elections to the Estonian Supreme Soviet is the theme of this next reportage:

[Correspondent V. Dvinin, identified by caption] Whereas during the elections to the local soviets at the end of last year the main question was still who exactly had been elected, now after the elections to the republic's Supreme Soviet, the question being more and more often asked is which party or movement won. Although there are as yet no final results, it may be said at the present time that the People's Front of Estonia is leading. Out of the 99 delegates already elected 39 are representatives of the People's Front. It will thus be this movement that will be determining policy in Estonia for the next few years, and the main political line of the People's Front is the restoration of an independent Estonian state. [video shows delegates in Supreme Soviet, then cuts to shots of a large rally where demonstrators are carrying the blue, black, and white Estonian national flags and banners, some of which say in English "Freedom for Estonia and "Stop Occupation"]

The other parties, including the Communist Party of Estonia, received far fewer of the electorate's votes. How to achieve popularity with the masses is now becoming one of the main problems for the communists of Estonia. The 20th Congress of the Estonian Communist Party, which opens at the end of this week, must find an answer to that question too. [video shows demonstrators at small open-air gathering carrying banners saying "Purge the Party of Nationalists" and "Our Party is the CPSU"]

Estonian Party Plenum Considers Elections

LD2103180990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Report by correspondent Heimar Lenk]

[Text] Today's plenum of the [Estonian Communist Party Central Committe held in Tallin today] was devoted to preparations for the 20th Congress of the Estonian Communist Party, which will open on Friday.

But in the plenum's work the preliminary results of the elections could not be passed over, inasmuch as in many respects they will determine the Estonian Communist Party's course henceforth. While during the elections to the local soviets at the end of last year the question of who precisely would find himself elected was still the principal question, now, after the elections to the republic's Supreme Soviet, the following question is being asked more and more frequently: which party or movement has won a victory?

Today, even though the final results aren't in yet, it can be said that the Estonian Popular Front is in the lead. Out of 88 delegates already elected, 39 are Popular Front representatives, so that it is this movement which will determine policies in the next few years in Estonia. And the Popular Front's principal line is the restoration of the Estonian independent state.

The other parties, including the Estonian Communist Party, received far less of the electorate's votes. How to obtain popularity among the masses is now becoming one of the main problems for Estonia's communists. The 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress, which opens at the end of this week, also has to supply an answer to this question.

Estonian Congress Issues Resolution

LD2103172490 Tallinn MAAHLET in Estonian 15 Mar 90 p 6

[Unattributed report entitled: "Resolution of the Estonian Congress on USSR occupation forces"]

[Text] As a result of the aggression which started on 17 June 1940, the USSR occupied and annexed the Republic of Estonia and eliminated the lawful government of the Republic of Estonia, thereby violating the agreements concluded between the USSR and the Republic of Estonia and the principles of international law. Military occupation of the Republic of Estonia continues until now.

Proceeding from the above and relying upon the 1949 Geneva Convention in respect of civilian populations in wartime and upon the addendum to the 1907 Fourth Hague convention "on laws and practices of the war on land", the Estonian Congress recognizes as criminal and terrorist the activity of the main aggression and occupation forces—the Soviet Army, the State Security Committee, and the internal forces—in Estonia. The Estonian Congress demands:

From the USSR Government:
1. For the citizens of the Republic of Estonia and other Estonian inhabitants who have been conscripted into the USSR forces under threat of criminal punishment to be freed. Any future forced conscription should be stopped immediately and any call-up into the Army should be annulled already this spring.

2. To stop the activity of the repressive USSR organs—the State Security Committee, internal forces, and others—and to remove them from the area of the Republic of Estonia.

3. To begin the immediate removal of USSR forces from Estonia, preferably under the control of international peace-keeping forces. To relinquish all the areas of the Republic of Estonia which are USSR military bases.

From local administration establishments:
1. To stop allocating land to the USSR occupation forces.

2. Not to cooperate with forced conscription into the USSR forces.

3. To protect citizens of the Republic of Estonia and other Estonian inhabitants who are in danger of forced conscription.

4. To free all persons who have been found guilty of refusing Army service or of curtailing their service, from serving any punishment.

The Estonian Congress considers it lawful for the citizens of the Republic of Estonia and other Estonian inhabitants to refuse serving in the forces of the occupying state.

The Estonian Congress considers it lawful and acceptable to serve only in Estonian formations outside USSR forces.

The Estonian Congress is ready to start talks with the USSR Government, and with the mediation of any third country or of international organizations.
Tallinn, 2 March 1990 [date as received]

Estonian Party Discusses Upcoming Congress

LD2103210190 Moscow TASS in English 2023 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] Tallinn March 21 TASS—A plenary meeting of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee was held here today. Its participants discussed matters relating to the holding of the 20th congress of the Estonian party scheduled for March 23.

The plenum discussed and approved theses for the Central Committee report and entrusted First Secretary of the Central Committee Vaino Vaelaes with presenting the report to the congress.

The plenum adopted a resolution on the procedure for electing delegates to the 28th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. It stipulates that the Estonian republican party organization should be represented at the congress in Moscow by 26 delegates, of whom nine will be determined through direct contested elections in party constituencies in some city and district party organisations. The plenum approved a commission for the organization and holding of the elections.

It was decided to hold direct elections before May 1. Other delegates will be named by the congress of Estonian communists.

The congress will also determine the place of the Estonian Communist Party in the emerging multi-party system.

Should the party become fully independent, adopt its own programme and rules and change its name, as some suggest, or should it be content with autonomy in deciding local issues but remaining part of the Soviet Communist Party and seeking renewal together with it? There are all indications that the debate will be heated. It is not ruled out that a third variant, acceptable to both sides, will be suggested at the congress. It would be welcome indeed, because meetings of communists—from primary organizations to the republican congress—are forums at which both language communities are represented and two languages are used.

Western Republics

Nationalist Party Official on Independence

AU2103122390 Paris AFP in English 1159 GMT 21 Mar 90

[By Sylvie Lanteaume]

[Text] Kiev, Soviet Union, March 21 (AFP)—The Ukrainian nationalist party Rukh, buoyed by fresh election victories after just six months in existence, has pledged to follow the example of the Baltic states and push for independence. Serguei Odarich, one of the party's leaders said: "The Ukraine is a test for the USSR: if we leave, it means the beginning of the end of the Union."

Larger than the Baltic states, where Lithuania has proclaimed independence, the Ukraine is the Soviet Union's second most populous republic behind Russia. It has a sound industry and agriculture that earned its reputation as the "Soviet bread basket."

Mr. Odarich led the recent election campaign for Rukh, the main party in a pro-reform democratic bloc that made a strong showing in elections for the republican parliament. Preliminary results this week showed the bloc will probably take 30 percent of the seats, with a majority in Kiev and Lvov.

Though initially dismissed by the local press as a band of "extremists," Rukh leaders say membership has soared from 200,000 to 4 million since it formed in September and it is now seen as a serious political opponent to the Communist Party. "The aim of Rukh is independence for the Ukraine," Mr. Odarich told AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE. "Our republic is rich, with lots of land and lots of people, but its development is slowed down by the Soviet system: We must leave the empire," he said.

Mr. Odarich said Rukh plans to use "the Baltic experience" to achieve independence. "We plan to procede by a legal and constitutional path, as Lithuania did," he said, referring to Lithuania's defiant proclamation of independence this month that Moscow wants repealed. He believes President Mikhail Gorbachev "would not intervene" in the Ukraine. "Against little Lithuania he could still find a pretext to send in troops. But against the Ukrainian people, this is impossible," he said.

Rukh's avowed goal of independence has gone much farther than its initial aim of obtaining democratic reforms "and greater autonomy for the Ukraine on the basis of a new treaty with the Union." Rukh leaders

quickly point out the republic's strengths. The 51.7 million population represent 18 percent of the country's total, but it "supplies 25 percent of the industrial production," they said. "We are self-sufficient in agriculture and energy: We have ample supplies of coal in the Donbass and nuclear power stations, notably Chernobyl," said Rukh's press agent Iaroslav Trofimov.

Rukh fought for official recognition in a republic where the party appartus has remained firmly conservative. They won this only one week before the first round of elections for the republican parliament and municipal and neighborhood councils—enough to stand candidates in only 45 percent of the voting districts. Its strongest showing was in Kiev, where it took 16 of the 22 deputy seats, and in Lvov, a strong nationalist center where the preliminary results show it probably took all 23 seats. It is also expected to win a majority in both city councils.

Rukh's ruling council has scheduled to meet this weekend in Khust, near the Hungarian border, according to Mr. Trofimov. Structural and leadership changes are expected, to consolidate the group's drive towards independence.

Rukh has also become more openly anti-communist. About 100 Rukh militants gathered for a hillside mass in Kiev Monday night to commemorate students killed in a 1920 revolt against the Soviets when the Ukraine entered the Union. Some of the group who brandished the blue and yellow Ukrainian nationalist flag were detained by local militia for several hours.

Strong religious sentiment has persisted among Ukrainians. Their traditional church, the Uniate Catholic rite, was forced to merge with the Russian Orthodox Church after its entry into the Soviet Union—a move that embittered many. Aided by Rome, negotiations to give the Uniates recognition started up with Moscow but now appear nearly dead.

Important support has come from members of the Ukrainian community abroad, who number some 3 million in the United States and Canada alone. So far, they have supplied some computers and radio equipment. Two members of the U.S. Congress were also on hand for the election in Kiev last weekend.

Ukrainian Oblast Leadership Changes Noted

90UN1132B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 11 Feb 90 p 3

[RATAU Report: "Plenums of Party Obkoms"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Communist Party Plenum of the Transcarpathian Obkom [oblast committee], held in Uzhgorod, considered an organizational issue. G.I. Bandrovskiy was relieved of his duties as first secretary of the obkom because he went on a pension.

By a secret vote they elected from several candidates for first secretary of the obkom, M.Yu. Voloshchuk, who worked as the prorector of Uzhgorod University and previously as chairman of the Transcarpathian Oblispolkom [oblast executive committee].

B.V. Kachura, a member of the Politburo and secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, spoke at the plenum.

There was a plenum of the Ivano-Frankov Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party which considered an organizational issue. The plenum relieved I.G. Postronko of his duties as first secretary of the party obkom because he went on a pension.

As a result of a secret vote, the plenum, out of several candidates, elected as first secretary of the obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Z.V. Kuravskiy, who had worked as the head of the obkom's ideological division.

L.M. Kravchuk, a candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, spoke at the plenum.

An organizational question was considered at the plenum of the Khmelnitsy Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Because he went on a pension, the plenum relieved V.G. Dikusarov of his duties as first secretary of the party obkom.

The plenum decided that until the report and election conference, the performance of the duties of first secretary would be the responsibility of the second secretary of the party obkom, V.I. Kupratiy.

The head of the department for organizational party and personnel work of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, N.F. Strela, participated in the work of the plenum.

In Donetsk there was a meeting of the plenum of the oblast committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party. There they considered the question of certain results of the February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the sociopolitical situation in the oblast.

The plenum relieved A.Ya. Vinnik of the duties of first secretary of the obkom at his request.

The duties of first secretary were temporarily assigned to the second secretary of the party obkom, Ye.V. Mironov. The plenum interrupted its work after deciding to continue on 14 February. During this time its participants are to discuss the results of the first meeting in the party organizations and labor collectives. It was also suggested that they consult with communists about the times for conducting the oblast report and election party conference.

Belorussian Front Does Well in Elections

LD2103131290 Moscow World Service in Russian 1044 GMT 21 Mar 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program; report attributed to INTERFAX]

[Text] Mikhail (Grachev), one of the leaders of the Belorussian People's Front, told an INTERFAX correspondent, that as a result of a repeat ballot, 18 of the 40 representatives of the People's Front standing in the Minsk City constituency election have been elected to the republic's Supreme Soviet. On most occasions representatives of the Belorussian People's Front were competing against candidates from the party apparatus and gained victory; for example, Major (Gribanov) defeated Misun, first secretary of the Minsk City Party Committee, in a repeat ballot. However, in certain constituencies, the elections again failed, as no candidate gained the required 50 percent of the vote.

Belorussian Front Plans Independence Celebrations

LD2103175490 Moscow World Service in Russian 1044 GMT 21 Mar 90

[From the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program; report attributed to INTERFAX]

[Text] On 25 March, the Belorussian People's Front plans to hold celebrations to mark the republic's independence day, proclaimed in 1918. In the view of one of the leaders of the People's Front, (Yuriy Vadyko), this day should be the triumph of democracy that was declared 70 years ago, when the independent Belorussian People's Republic, which existed for less than a year, was proclaimed. It is planned on this day to hold a meeting near the House of Political Education, and a demonstration. The INTERFAX correspondent also reports that the day before, on 24 March, a republican conference of the alternative association of communists, the Democratic Platform in the CPSU, will be held in Minsk. Representatives of the republic's People's Front plan to take an active part in this conference.

People's Front Disrupt Moldavian Rally

LD2103132690 Moscow World Service in Russian 1044 GMT 21 Mar 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" Program; report attributed to INTERFAX]

[Text] About 100 supporters of the Moldavian People's Front tried to wreck a sanctioned rally by the Interfront and Yedinstvo in Kishinev, which were organized to meet with people's deputies of the republic. What is more, according to claims by one of the leaders of Yedintsvo—Anatoliy Lichetskiy—the law and order bodies were virtually inactive and did not hinder the crowd, which was in an extremist mood, from insulting deputies and the Russian population. Only the intervention of special-purpose troops slightly cooled the mob, which then organized a demonstration along the main street in Kishinev. Representatives of the People's Front of Moldavia carried slogans such as: "Lithuania today: it will be us tomorrow!" and others of an anti-Russian and anti-Soviet nature. A similar procession was organized by members of the Libertate Nationalist Party, which is demanding the unification of Moldavia with Romania.

Caucasus

Georgia Drops Party Role, Elections Delayed

LD2103123190 Moscow TASS in English 1202 GMT 21 Mar 90

[Text] Tbilisi March 21 TASS—An extraordinary session of the Georgian Supreme Soviet made on Tuesday amendments to the Republican Constitution.

The Supreme Soviet amended Articles 6, 7 and 49 of the republican constitution. Article 6, which previously recorded the Communist Party's leading role in society, now ensures the right "to participate on equal terms in policy-making and the management of state and public affairs" to all political parties, trade unions, youth and other public organisations."

Articles 7 and 49 have been amended to say that all political parties, public organisations and movements should act within the framework of the Georgian Constitution and legislation. They prohibit the creation and activities of parties, organisations and movements that set themselves the task to change by force the constitutional system and the integrity of the republic, to undermine its security, to kindle inter-ethnic and religious strife. Guarantees are given to public organisations that they will be able to fulfil the tasks recorded in their rules.

Numerous letters coming to the Supreme Soviet suggested that it would be unreasonable to hold elections to the Republican Supreme Soviet and local Soviets on the previously set date because a multi- party system is being created. The session decided to postpone elections until October-November 1990. The mandates of deputies to the Georgian Supreme Soviet and to local Soviets were prolonged accordingly.

Air Defense Troops Appeal for Cooperation

PM1203171390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Mar 90 First Edition p 6

[Own correspondent Colonel A. Yurkin article under the rubric "Alarming Report": "Under Fire From Extremists"]

[Text] The Air Defense Forces Military Council has appealed to A.N. Mutalibov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, and E.M. Kafarova, chairman of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium, for the necessary cooperation in normalizing the situation around the Air Defense Forces units and subunits located on the republic's territory. The appeal notes that in the period 11 January through 5 March this year there were 18 attacks on combat positions and garrisons. There have been casualties.

Private V. Kizin was killed at 2340 on 4 March as a result of an armed attack. This crime was carefully prepared: The power supply was cut off at the moment of the attack, and the territory under guard came under automatic fire from four sides simultaneously. This and other planned acts of provocation are meant to exacerbate relations between the Army and the people, to provoke retaliation. Threats directed at servicemen's families, which led to the evacuation of 1,700 people, are also continuing. Many soldiers of Azerbaijani nationality are going AWOL from their units or refusing to serve and master combat skills. All this is ruining traditions of friendship, tending to whip up tension, and preventing the Air Defense Forces from fulfilling their combat tasks of protecting the Azerbaijan SSR from the air and protecting the USSR state borders.

I managed to make telephone contact with Lieutenant Colonel V. Zolotukhin, unit chief of staff, who told me how Private Kizin died.

"As part of a patrol detail," Vladimir Vitalyevich said, "Vladimir Kizin was guarding a radar company's living quarters. When the lights went out and the shooting started, he tried to take up a position as ordered in a trench, but two bullets hit him in the hip. An Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] forces platoon came to his aid, and the exchange of fire continued for 35 minutes. When the action ended, Kizin was taken to the local hospital, but the power had also been cut off in the city, and they could not save him. The soldier who had dreamt of becoming a warrant officer died. He left a family and a small child in Kishinev. The attack sustained by the company commanded by Lieutenant A. Pozdnyakov was not accidental: Extremists are demanding on behalf of the National Front that the radar operators leave their positions before 14 March. This means that renewed acts of provocation are not ruled out, as have occurred at other points in Azerbaijan. The military are evidently in their way....

Committee Urges Public Aid for Nagorno-Karabakh

PM2203105790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Asim Dzhalilov report: "Forget the Feuds"]

[Text] Baku—The Azerbaijan Committee for Public Assistance for Karabakh has called for 1990 to be proclaimed "Nagorno-Karabakh Year."

As a mass social organization which is financially based on voluntary donations from enterprises, academic institutions, cooperatives, and individual citizens, the committee has managed to win recognition in a short space of time by its herculean efforts to give moral and material support to those who found themselves in a woeful plight as a result of ethnically motivated persecution.

"Whole peoples cannot be enemies," says the adopted "Appeal to Compatriots and all People of Goodwill." "Those who sow the seeds of enmity among them, who are indifferent to their fate and future, care only about their own prestige. Appealing to Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Russians, and representatives of all nationalities living in the republic, we urge: Let every honest person, casting all resentment aside, make his personal contribution to resolving the conflict; let no one wait for someone else to make the first move."

What does the committee itself specifically propose? The document specifically proposes the mobilization of forces to restore and strengthen the economy, and the urgent involvement of ministries and departments in carrying out construction, agricultural, healthcare, and educational work.

The appeal also contains a call to all Azerbaijanis and Armenians living in various parts of the world to promote the normalization of interethnic relations by dint of their own humane deeds, and not to tolerate dissension and hatred.

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, economic, military, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available source; it should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed, with personal and place names rendered in accordance with FBIS transliteration style.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735,or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.